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DEROGATING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
A. W. HARRIs*
I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

Assessment and Attribution

In early 2001, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change' (IPCC) issued its Third Assessment Report 2 consisting of
* Professor of Political Science, Department of Government & Politics, Humboldt State University, Arcata, Cal. My sincere thanks to Eric Matheson, Alyson
Walker, Editors-in-Chief, Kevin Hubbard, Managing Editor of Outside Articles,
and the Associate Editors of the Villanova Environmental Law Journal, for their
helpful comments and their patience. This article could not have been completed
without their assistance. Any and all errors or omissions are solely my
responsibility.
1. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, INTRODUCTION, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), 1 (2004), available at http://
www.ipcc.ch/about/faq/IPCC%201ntroduction.pdf
(explaining formation of
IPCC). The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) jointly established the IPCC in 1988 in response
to growing concerns within the atmospheric sciences community regarding the
observation of increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere. See id. GHGs are "those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both
natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation." United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. I, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
849 (UNFCCC).
2. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL

PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,

CLIMATE

CHANGE

2001: SYNTHESIS REPORT (Robert Watson et al. eds., Cambridge University Press
2001) (discussing recent revelations in climate change); see also WORKING GROUP I
TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE

CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS (J.T. Houghton et al. eds.,
Cambridge University Press 2001) (WORKING GROUP I), available at http://

www.grida.no/climate/ipcc-tar/wgl/index.htm (analyzing scientific data on climate); IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY
(JamesJ. McCarthy et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2001), available at http:/
/www.grida.no/climate/ipcc-tar/wg2/index.htm
(containing IPCC's Formal
Statement concerning impact of climate change); see also IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE
2001: MITIGATION (Tariq Banuri et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2001),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/wg3spm.pdf (discussing climate change
mitigation).
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three separate parts authored by separate working groups. 3 In the
volume of the subsection titled "The Identification of a Human Influence on Climate Change," Working Group I stated the following:
Detection is the process of demonstrating that an observed
change is significantly different (in a statistical sense) than
can be explained by natural variability. Attribution is the
process of establishing cause and effect with some defined
level of confidence, including the assessment of competing hypotheses. 4 The IPCC's mandate, or its "terms of reference []" includes the responsibility "to assess available
scientific and socio-economic information on climate
change and its impact and on the options for mitigating
climate change and adapting to it and ... to provide, on

request, scientific/technical/socio-economic advice to the
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations
'5
Framework Convention on Climate Change.
The IPCC's mission includes the need to gauge the anthropogenic
or human-induced contribution to climate change and its impact,
and making a determination whether "a human influence on climate change to date can be identified. '6 To make this determination, the IPCC stresses the importance of being able to eliminate,
3. See Robert Watson et al., CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: SYNTHESIS REPORT (2001)
(summarizing IPCC's Third Assessment Report). The Third Assessment Report
was produced in three volumes, with each Working Group authoring one of those.
See id. Working Group I was responsible for evaluating the scientific research on
climate change; Working Group I authored the first volume, THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS.
See id. Working Group II was responsible for evaluating the vulnerability of natural
and human systems to climate change and produced the second volume, IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY. See id. Working Group III was responsible for
evaluating the ability of human society to mitigate the consequences of climate

change, and produced the third volume, MITIGATION. See id.
4. See D. L. Albritton et al., Technical Summary, in CLIMATE

CHANGE

2001: THE

SCIENTIFIC BASIS: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE

at 55 (emphasis in

original) (defining detection and attribution).
5. See Working Group I, supra note 2, at vii (defining terms for discussion).
The IPCC interprets "climate change" as referring to "any change in climate over
time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity." See id.
The UNFCCC, on the other hand, prefers to view climate change as referring to a
change of climate that is "attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that
alters the composition of the global atmosphere and that is in addition to natural
climate variability observed over comparable time periods." See UNFCCC, supra
note 1, art. 1(2), 31 I.L.M. at 851. This article will utilize the IPCC interpretation
of the term "climate change" unless specifically noted otherwise in the text or in a
footnote.
6. See Albritton et al., supra note 4, at 55 (discussing IPCC goal of identifying
human effects on climate).
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with a reasonable degree of confidence, many of the possible alternative (non-anthropogenic) influences on climate change. 7 Specifically, the IPCC states:
The attributionof climate change to anthropogenic causes
involves statistical analysis and the careful assessment of
multiple lines of evidence to demonstrate, within a prespecified margin of error, that the observed changes are:
unlikely to be due entirely to internal variability; consistent with the estimated responses to the given combination of anthropogenic and natural forcing;8 and not

consistent with alternative, physically plausible explanation of recent climate change that exclude important elements of the given combination of forcings. 9
The IPCC contends it has made substantial headway in attributing recent observable changes in the global mean surface temperature, at least in part, to anthropogenic activity.' 0 Despite
uncertainties in estimating the extent of the signals from natural
climate variation and sulphate aerosols,1 1 "almost all studies are
nevertheless able to detect the presence of the anthropogenic
greenhouse signal 12 in the recent climate record." 13 The IPCC also
asserts climate change has negatively impacted many of this planet's
14
environmental systems.
7. See id. at 55-56 (providing IPCC policy for analyzing climate change).
8. See WORKING GROUP I, supra note 2, at 5, n.8 (defining radiative forcing).
The IPCC defines a "forcing," or more formally, a "radiative forcing," as "a measure of the influence a factor has in altering the balance of incoming and outgoing
energy in the Earth-atmosphere system, and is an index of the importance of the
factor as a potential climate change mechanism." Id.
9. See Albritton et al., supra note 4, at 56 (describing reasoning for statistical
inferences).
10. SeeJames E. Hansen, Head, NASA Goddard Inst. For Space Studies, Address before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation (May 1,
2001), available at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/legaff/hansen5-1.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (discussing aerosol). "Aerosols tend to increase the number of
cloud droplets, thus making the clouds brighter and longer-lived. All of the aerosol
effects have large uncertainty bars, because our measurements are inadequateand our understanding of aerosolprocesses is limited." Id. (emphasis added).

11. For a discussion of airborne particles, see infra note 53 and accompanying
text.
12. For a discussion of the term "signal", see infra notes 42-64 and accompanying text.
13. See Albritton et al., supra note 4, at 59 (analyzing impact of signals provided by recent studies).
14. See Stephen Schneider et al., Overview of Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerabil-

ity to Climate Change, in McCarthy et al., supra note 2, at 83 (stating IPCC belief in
negative impact of climate change). "[Allthough some regions may experience
beneficial effects of climate change (e.g., increasing agricultural productivity at
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The IPCC began work in earnest in 1988 by establishing the
World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) and publishing reports in
1990.15 The IPCC's mission is to "assess available information on

the science of climate change, in particular that arising from
human activities, assess the environmental and socioeconomic im16
pacts of climate change, and formulate response strategies." The
IPCC's early work helped lead to the ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and
the addition of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol1 7 to the UNFCCC, both of
which demonstrated the global community's commitment to reducing anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. 18 Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol encapsulates these commitments.' 9
high latitudes), previous IPCC assessments have concluded that net negative climate impacts are more likely in most parts of the world .

. .

. " Id.

15. See WORKING GROUP 1, supra note 2, at vii (listing categories of work products issued by IPCC beginning in 1990).
16. SeeJose D. G. Miguez, Equity, Responsibility and Climate Change, ETHICS, EQ
UITY AND INT'L NEGOTIATIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE 9 (Luis Pinguelli-Rosa & Mohan
Munasinghe, eds., 2002) (noting IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report is scheduled
for publication in 2007). A draft of the Fourth Assessment Report, divided into
the three main components of Working Groups I, II, and III, is currently being
circulated among national governments. General practice is to gather comments
from experts in the climate field. The United States Climate Science Program
made the draft available for comment, during a limited time frame, in the United
States in the Fall 2005 and Spring and Summer of 2006. A "first-order" draft was
opened for comment in Fall 2005, and a "second-order" draft was opened for comment in Spring and Summer of 2006. For further information on the draft Fourth
Assessment, see United States Climate Change Science Program, available at http://
www.climatescience.gov/Library/ipcc/wgl4ar-review.htm (last visited Oct. 24,
2007) (posting requests to United States Climate Change Technology Program
(CCTP) for expert review of different components of draft Fourth Assessment in
Federal Register as those components become available for review); see Department of State, United States Climate Change Technology Program, Public Notice,
71 Fed Reg. 41, 857 (July 24, 2006) (detailing United States Department of State's
receipt of first notification of availability of draft assessment components from
IPCC Secretariat); see a/soJim Giles, U.S. Posts Sensitive Climate Report for Public Comment, 441 NATURE 7089, 6 (2006) (expressing early comments on overall thrust of
draft Fourth Assessment).
17. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1970, 37 I.L.M. 22 (providing text of Kyoto Protocol). At
the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COPI) in Berlin in 1995, the
parties agreed that the original UNFCCC goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions at the 1990 levels would not produce a concentration "that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system." See UNFCCC, 31
I.L.M. 849, 854 (1992) (providing text of Article 4(2)(b)).
18. See David HunterJames Salzman & Durwood Zaelke, INTEUNATIONAL LAw
AND POLICY, 590 (2d ed. 2002) (commenting on need for international commitment to establish clear targets and timetables).
19. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1970, 37 I.L.M. 22 (providing text of Kyoto Protocol). The
Kyoto Protocol states the following:
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In later COP meetings, it was prevalently believed that the target reduction level for 1990 was unlikely to be achieved because of
the effort required by certain countries. As a result, an agreement
was reached allowing deficient countries to offset their greenhouse
gas (GHG) emission targets by increasing their biological carbon
sequestration through afforestation, reforestation, altering the
20
management of agricultural lands and trading carbon credits.
This agreement translated into the biological sequestration reaching an offset of up to eighty percent of the target GHG emission
2
reductions set out in the Kyoto Protocol itself. '
Participants in subsequent COPs attempted to ease the requirements for actual GHG reductions in order to induce additional
states to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Despite these easements, the
United States continued to object to the protocol. 22 In June 2001,

President Bush stated the Kyoto Protocol was "fatally flawed." 23 The
United States was (and remains) a signatory to the UNFCCC. Article 3 of the UNFCCC states, "[t]he Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of
24
climate change and mitigate its adverse effects."
[t]he Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that
their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of
the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned
amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and
reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the
provisions of this Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions
of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment

period 2008 to 2012.
Id.
20. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Confer-

ence of the Parties, July 16-27, 2001, SECOND PART OF ITS SIXTH SESSION HELD AT
BONN, 36, FCCC/CP/2001/5 (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop6secpart/05.pdf (adopting formally agreement during seventh
session of COP at Marrakesh in Nov. 2001, after formulating framework of agreement at two-part sixth session of Conference of Parties in Bonn).
21. See E. D. Schulze, et al., The Long Way From Kyoto to Marrakesh: Implications
of the Kyoto Protocol Negotiationsfor Global Ecology, 8 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 505,
513-16 (2002) (interpreting agreements from seventh session of COP).
22. See Alexander Gillespie, Sinks and the Climate Change Regime: The State of
Play, 13 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'v F. 279, 288 (explaining United States dissent).

The United States left the Sixth Conference of the Parties (COP6) climate change
negotiations at the Hague in October 2006 over the issue of the proper carbon
accounting methods to be adopted by Kyoto signatories. See id.
23. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush, President
Bush Discusses Global Climate Change (June 11, 2001), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html (discussing Kyoto
Protocol).
24. See UNFCCC, supra note 1 at 853 (requiring parties to take precautionary
measures).
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Article 3 demonstrates the United States has indeed intended
to institute "precautionary measures" in anticipation of climate
change. 25 Unfortunately, these measures have been ineffective.
This appraisal of the United States precautionary posture derives
from the degree of scientific certainty the United States insists upon
before accepting the emission reduction obligations established by
the Kyoto Protocol.
Based on Article 3 of the UNFCCC, it appears the United
States current precautionary stance is only utilitarian, rather than
robust. Current United States policy largely emphasizes cost considerations when weighing different policy responses to possible climate change projections. Article 3 also supports the current
position that there is diminished sense of urgency towards climate
change. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
announced that mounting scientific evidence suggests anthropogenic activity is making a significant contribution to climate
change. 26 The United States responds to this evidence with a
strong reliance on adaptation to the effects of climate change, with
a lesser reliance on mitigation of the problems (e.g. emission reduction). Through the application of adaptive measures, the current United States administration takes the position that the
negative consequences credited to climate change can be held to a
27
manageable level.
The current United States administration concedes climate
change is occurring; 28 yet they have adopted a precautionary policy
that is ineffective. This Article contends that the United States and
the larger global community would be better served if the United
25. See Paula Dobriansky, Head, United States Delegation to COP 1I (Dec. 7,
2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/rls/rm/2005/57867.htm (last visited
Oct. 24, 2007) (enumerating several measures to address climate change question,
including Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles, and Partnership for Clean Indoor Air).
26. See Press Release, Department of Commerce Press Release, Report Reconciles Atmospheric Temperature Trends (May 2, 2006), available at http://
(last
www.climatescience.gov/Library/pressreleases/pressrelease2may2006.htm
visited Oct. 24, 2007) (introducing new evidence that continues to support a substantial human impact on global temperature increases).
27. See UNITED STATES CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, STRATEGIC PLAN
FOR THE U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, 121 (2003), available at http://
www.climatescience.gov/Library/stratplan2003/final/ccspstratplan2003-all.pdf
(posing research questions that can lead to management strategies for
ecosystems).
28. See Press Release, Department of Commerce Press Release, Report Reconciles Atmospheric Temperature Trends (May 2, 2006), available at http://
(last
www.climatescience.gov/Library/pressreleases/pressrelease2may2006.htm
visited Oct. 24, 2007) (finding no discrepancy between global surface temperature
increase compared with higher atmospheric temperature levels).
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States adopted a precautionary stance that was no longer weak, utilitarian, and pedestrian, but was instead strong, robust, and expeditious. The current United States precautionary policy is utilitarian
and pedestrian because of the administration's perception that the
potential consequences of climate change are not imminent. The
administration takes the position that the progression toward those
consequences will take place in a linear or near-linear fashion. If
these projections do hold true over time, the present precautionary
posture might be justified. In that case, a precautionary posture
emphasizing adaptation rather than mitigation should negate severe consequences from climate change. If those projections do
not hold, mitigation would have likely been preferable because predominately negative consequences would occur, and regrets and recriminations would then be in order.
This Article argues for a different outlook toward climate
change than that currently embraced by the administration. A precautionary posture that is strong, robust, and expeditious would
prevent future regrets and recriminations. In adopting such a posture, the United States must abandon the view that substantial reliance on adaptation is a sufficient response to climate change. This
type of policy shift would first require an alteration in the current
view regarding the pace or velocity of temperature change and the
acknowledgment of imminent consequences of climate change. A
policy shift of this extent would also require an alteration of the
view that non-imminent consequences will be mild for those global
regions or individual states able to forge effective adaptive
measures.
Part I of this Article outlines the IPCC's argument favoring mitigation as the preferred response to climate change, with adaptive
measures to be applied in a complementary fashion. Part I also
includes the reasons for the United States rejection of the Kyoto
Protocol, as well as arguments from a segment of the scientific and
policy communities which counters the IPCC thesis. Part II of this
Article argues there is movement away from the current administration's declarations that uncertainty still resides in the science surrounding climate change, and, thus, reason for the United States to
agree to the Kyoto Protocol. Part II also shows that despite increasing recognition within the United States government of human activity contributing to climate change, the current administration
continues to maintain an inadequate and unjustifiable precautionary posture.
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Part III of this Article focuses on different articulations of the
precautionary principle and how the principle has been applied in
specific international instruments. Part III also characterizes the
current United States policy toward climate change as an inadequate application of the precautionary principle. Part IV presents a
representative sample of paleoclimatology concerned with abrupt
climate change. Part IV additionally argues the evidence in the climatological historical record clearly confirms the occurrence of abrupt climate change. Part IV asserts the occurrence of abrupt
climate change historically warrants modifying a central premise of
the United States policy on climate change.
B.

Forcings

The IPCC's task largely consists of validly attributing climate
change to a particular variable. 29 Specifically, this task is to "rule
out, with a reasonable degree of confidence,"3 0 the notion that the
recently observed variation in the climate system is "due entirely to
internal variability." 31 Internal variability refers to changes occur32
ring from factors generated within the climate system itself.
These changes are to be distinguished from external factors which
may also generate climate change. 33 The term climate change merits further elaboration.
Note that a change in climate is a change in the climate system.
Also note that " [t]he ultimate source energy that drives the climate
system is radiation from the sun."3 4 About half of the radiation is
visible light, and the other half is infrared.3 5 More than a third of
the solar radiation reaches the earth's surface, which returns heat
3 6
to the atmosphere, a good portion of which is infrared radiation.
29. See IPCC, 2001:

CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THIR

ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE

50 (Robert T.
Watson, ed., Cambridge University Press 2001) (comparing graphically anthropogenic forcing with natural forcing).
30. For a discussion of what constitutes a reasonable degree of confidence, see
supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
31. For a discussion of "internal variability," see supranotes 9-10 and accompanying text.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SYNTHESIS REPORT

32. For an overview of the current climate system, see WORKING GROUP I, supra
note 2, at 78 and accompanying text.
33. See WORKING GROUP I, supra note 2, at 5 and accompanying text (discussing external factors). Summary notes that changes in climate occur when there is
internal and external variability of the climate system, where external factors include both natural and anthropogenic. Id.
34. See id. at 89 (describing radiation from sun and effect on earth).
35. See id. (examining electromagnetic spectrum).
36. See id. (stating thirty-one percent of solar radiation is immediately reflected by clouds, atmosphere, and earth's surface).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol19/iss1/1

8

Harris: Derogating the Precautionary Principle

2008]

DEROGATING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

9

"For a stable climate, a balance is required between incoming solar
radiation and the outgoing radiation emitted by the climate system.137 Greenhouse gases have an important role in maintaining
38

this balance.
An increase in the atmosphere is an important atmospheric
3 9 Greenphenomenon that produces positive radiative forcings.
house gases (GHGs), however, are always present in the atmosphere at some level. 40 The presence of GHGs at relatively stable
concentrations in the atmosphere over time helps to produce a relatively stable climate that incorporates a natural greenhouse
4
effect. '

C.

Signals

The scientific community, environmental non-governmental
organizations (ENGOs), and many national governments are concerned with a relatively recent addition to the natural greenhouse
effect.4 2 The IPCC said this "addition" is contributed by human ac43
These sources brought about an
tivity, or anthropogenic sources.
37. See id. (explaining impact of solar radiation and its movement on climate
change group).
38. See Houghton et al., The Climate System: An Overview, in WORKING GROUP I,

supra note 2, at 89 (describing natural greenhouse effect as part of energy balance
of earth).
39. See Kyoto Protocol, supranote 19 at 41; see also Houghton et al., The Climate
System: An Overview, in WORMNG GROUP I, supra note 2, at 95 (labeling stabilization
of GHG concentrations as ultimate goal of UNFCCC). The major greenhouse
gases are listed in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol. They are carbon dioxide (C0 2),
methane (CH 4 ), nitrous oxide (N 20), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perflurocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluroide (SF6. Id.
40. See WOMuNG GROUP I, supranote 2, at 39 (describing presence of GHGs in
atmosphere for hundreds of thousands of years, and for carbon dioxide, tens of
millions of years).
41. See Houghton et al., supra note 2, at 90 (defining and discussing greenhouse effect). Specifically, the review explains:
The atmosphere contains several trace gases which absorb and emit infrared radiation. These so-called greenhouse gases absorb infrared radiation, emitted by the Earth's surface, the atmosphere and clouds, except
in a transparent part of the spectrum called the 'atmospheric window'...
they emit in turn infrared radiation in all directions including downward
to the Earth's surface. Thus greenhouse gases trap heat within the atmosphere. This mechanism is called the natural greenhouse effect.
Id.

42. See id. at 87 (citing IPCC as presenting evidence of human influence on
environment).
43. See id. (reasoning additional natural greenhouse effect contributed by
human activity).
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enhanced greenhouse effect by generating an increased level of GHGs
44
in the atmosphere.
In its 1995 Second Assessment Report, the IPCC issued the
"now famous words" 45 that "[t]he balance of evidence suggests
a
discernible human influence on global climate." 46 In its Third Assessment Report, the IPCC added that in the period between the
two assessments (1995-2001), progress had been made in the following ways:
[R] educing uncertainty, particularly with respect to distinguishing and quantifying the magnitude of [climate] responses to different external influences .

. .

. There are

new estimates of the climate response to natural forcing
and anthropogenic forcing, and new detection techniques
have been applied. Detection and attribution studies consistently find evidence for an anthropogenic signal in the
47
climate record of the last 35 to 50 years.

The anthropogenic signal, or forcing, must be differentiated from a
natural forcing, and the IPCC recognizes that considerable uncer44. See id. at 93 (explaining and discussing greenhouse effect). The IPCC
provided the following information regarding the concentration of particular
GHGs, carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide, causing major concern.
The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) has increased
by 31% since 1750. The present CO 2 concentration has not been exceeded during the past 420,000 years and likely not during the past 20
million years. The current rate of increase is unprecedented during at
least the past 20,000 years. About three-quarters of the anthropogenic
emissions of CO2 to the atmosphere during the past 20 years is due to
fossil fuel burning . . . . The atmospheric concentration of methane
(CH 4 ) has increased by 1060 [parts per billion] (151%) since 1750 and
continues to increase. The present CH 4 concentration has not been exceeded during the past 420,000 years ... Slightly more than half of current CH 4 emissions are anthropogenic (e.g., use of fossil fuels, cattle, rice
agriculture and landfills). The atmospheric concentration of nitrous oxide (N 2 0) has increased by 46 [parts per billion] (17%) since 1750 and
continues to increase. The present level of N 2 0 concentration has not
been exceeded during at least the past thousand years. About a third of
current N 20 missions are anthropogenic (e.g., agricultural soils, cattle
feed lots and chemical industry).
Id. at 7.
45. See Prue Taylor, Heads in the Sand as the Tide Rises: EnvironmentalEthics and
the Law on Climate Change, 19 UCLAJ. EVr'L. L. & POL'x 247, 253 (2000/2001)
(quoting IPCC regarding human effect).
46. See IPCC, Summary for Policymakers. THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE, J.T.
Houghton et ai., CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 5 (1996)
(reporting discernable
human effects in climate change).
47. See Houghton et al., supra note 2, at 10 (emphasis added) (asserting anthropogenic signal provides indication that human activity has detectable impact
on climate change, apart from natural external forcings).
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48
Detainty remains in any estimate of natural climate variability.
IPCC
the
Report,
Assessment
Third
its
in
uncertainty,
this
spite
produced results supporting the conclusion reached in the Second
Assessment: "[T] he observed change in global mean, annually averaged temperature over the last century is unlikely to be due entirely
' 49
The issue is identito natural fluctuations of the climate system.
fying the cause of the detected change in climate, which the IPCC
terms the "attribution problem."st ° The question of interest is
whether the detected change is confidently attributable to human
5
activities. The IPCC believes the answer is yes. ' Continuing uncertainties exist in how an observed change in climate is statistically
significant when compared with a change explained by natural variability (the detection problem).52 The IPCC notes:

Uncertainties in other forcings that have been included
do not prevent identification of the effect of anthropogenic greenhouse gases over the last 50 years ....Studies
that distinguish the separate responses to greenhouse gas,
sulphate aerosol and natural forcing produce uncertain
estimates of the amplitude of the sulphate aerosol and natural signals, but almost all studies are nevertheless able to
detect the presence of the anthropogenic greenhouse sig53
nal in the recent climate record.
A signal is some variation in certain indicators, like ocean or
atmospheric temperature, from the background stability of the sys48. See Houghton et al., supra note 2, at 91 (indicating climate system is nonlinear and that unpredictable behavior of non-linear systems can never be ruled
out).
49. See id. at 97 (discussing likelihood that obscured climate changes are
caused solely by material changes).
50. See id. (stating after detecting climate change, problem of determining
cause of change remains).
51. See Houghton et al., Detection of Climate Change and Attribution of Causes, in
I, supra note 2, at 699 (discussing human activities' impact on

WORKING GROUP

climate change).
52. See Albritton et al., supra note 4, at 55 (defining attribution).
53. See id. at 59 (emphasis added) (discussing ability to identify anthropogenic greenhouse signal regardless of other emissions). Sulphate aerosols are airborne microscopic particles which produce a negative cooling forcing. See id.
Black carbon aerosols are produced through the incomplete burning of fossil fuels
and "biomass" burning (generally of forests and grasslands) which tend to warm
the climate system. See id. A source of natural sulphate aerosols is volcanic activity.
See id. Anthropogenic sulphate aerosols include organic carbon from fossil fuel
burning. See id. "The anthropogenic sulphate aerosol forcing, while uncertain, is
negative over [the last fifty years] and therefore cannot explain the [observed atmospheric] warming." But see Summary for Policy Makers, supra note 2, at 9-10 (dis-

crediting argument).
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tem. 54 The following factors can cause variations from systemic
stability:
Any human-induced changes in climate will be embedded
in a background of natural climatic variation that occur
on a whole range of time- and space-scales. Climate variability can occur as a result of natural changes in the forcing of the climate system, for example variations in the
strength of the incoming solar radiation and changes in
the concentration of aerosols arising from volcanic eruptions .... To distinguish anthropogenic climate changes
from natural variations, it is necessary to identify the anthropogenic "signal" against the background noise of nat55
ural climate variability.
The "signal to noise" problem is the label for distinguishing
natural climate variability from variations generated through
human activity.5 6 This problem centers the debate between different factions within the scientific community and between national
governments. Climate variation may be due to external forcings,
e.g. solar radiation, or anthropogenic activity, the latter of which
can bring about increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases.
Thus, the detection and attribution of anthropogenic forcings on
climate change presents a statistical "signal to noise" problem. 57
Although uncertainties remain, the IPCC contends that the
"signal to noise" problem has been overcome to some extent. 58 Remaining uncertainties include: (1) the estimates of internal climate
variability drawn from models and observations; (2) reconstructions
of solar and volcanic forcing which, for the period prior to the last
two decades, must rely on limited observational data; and (3) large
differences between different models' responses to the same anthropogenic forcing. 59 Finally, the IPCC understood its task "[t]o
attribute all or part of recent climate change to human activity,"
further acknowledging that it "need[s] to demonstrate that alternative explanations, such as pure internal variability or purely natu54. See Houghton et al., supra note 2, at 89 (noting without this stability "system" would not be apparent).
55. See Albritton et al., supra note 4, at 25 (illustrating factors that may cause
variation).
56. See Houghton et al., supra note 2, at 700 (describing processes of detection and of attribution).
57. See id. (offering reasons for variation).
58. See id. at 730 (noting uncertainties surrounding problem).
59. See id. (listing uncertainties).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol19/iss1/1

12

Harris: Derogating the Precautionary Principle

20081

DEROGATING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

rally forced climate change, are unlikely to account for a set of
60
observed changes that can be accounted for by human influence.
The IPCC authors fully understood that unequivocal attribution of
climate change to anthropogenic causes was impossible because
conducting controlled experiments with independent variables
("agents of change"), to determine cause and effect, was impossible. 6 ' The IPCC instead relied on an estimation approach, allowing
that:
[T]o quantify, with associated estimates of uncertainty,
how much different factors have contributed to recent observed climate changes.

.

.

[t]he possibility of a con-

founding explanation can never be ruled out completely,
but as successive alternatives are tested and found to be
inadequate, it can be seen to become progressively more
unlikely. "62
After several years of concentrated work, the IPCC concluded
human activity is the most likely explanation for observed recent
climate change. 63 The IPCC notes:

The observed warming is inconsistent with model estimates of natural climate variability; [t] he observed warming in the latter half of the [Twentieth] century appears to
be inconsistent with natural external (solar and volcanic)
forcing of the climate system; [a]nthropogenic factors do
provide an explanation of [Twentieth] century temperamistaken a
ture; [i] t is unlikely that detection studies have
64
signal.
anthropogenic
an
for
natural signal
Not everyone in the scientific and policy spheres is persuaded by
the IPCC's assertions regarding likely anthropogenic causes of climate change. Part II discusses the bases for this skepticism.

60. See id. at 700 (stating what is necessary to attribute change to human
conduct).
61. See Houghton et al., supra note 2, at 700 (describing why attribution is
unequivocal).
62. See id. at 700-01 (summarizing ICC approach).
63. See Albritton et al., supra note 4, at 56 (noting that observed changes in
climate are consistent with estimated response to combination of anthropogenic
and natural forcing).
64. See Houghton et al., supra note 2, at 730 (noting IPCC's conclusions).
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AN ABSENCE OF SCIENTIFIC UNANIMITY

Dour Skepticism

In June 2001, in response to the IPCC's Third Assessment Report, the current United States administration commissioned the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to review the Assessment Report and develop a research agenda for the United States scientific
community to "reduce uncertainties in climate science. '65 In its report to the administration, the National Research Council (NRC)
stated: "[T]he IPCC's conclusion that most of the warming of the
last 50 years is likely to have been due to the increase in greenhouse
gas concentrations accurately reflects the current thinking of the
scientific community on this issue." 66 The NRC took note of the
same remaining uncertainties the IPCC highlighted in its Third Assessment Report. The NRC said that uncertainty remained
regarding:
[T] he level of natural variability inherent in the climate
system on time scales of decades to centuries; the questionable ability of models to accurately simulate variability
on those long time scales; and the degree of confidence
that can be placed on reconstructions of global mean temperature over the past millennium based on proxy
evidence.67
There may be no better example of the uncertainties "confounding" climate change science than the problem of "feedbacks. '68 The United States Department of State Climate Action
Report to the UNFCCC in 2002 portrays this phenomenon well. 6 9
Noted in the Report, for example, is how the response of the cli65. See UNITED STATES CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, Part I, Overview of
the Climate Change Research Initiative, in DRAFT STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE CLIMATE
CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, 14 (2002), available at http://www.climatescience.gov/
Library/stratplan2003/draft/ccspstratplan2003-1Inov2002.pdf (last visited Oct.
24, 2007) (DRAFT STRATEGIC PLAN) (directing NAS's actions for scientific
community).
66. See

RALPH J. CICERONE ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF

SOME KEY QUESTIONS at 3 (2001). This report is Appendix D of the UNITED STATES
DEPT. OF STATE, UNITED STATES CLIMATE ACTION REPORT; THE USA's 3RD NATIONAL
COMMUNICATION UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLI-

CHANGE (2002) (stating similarity in IPCC's and Scientific Community's
thinking), available at www.gcrio.org/OnLnDoc/pdf/ClimateChangeScience.pdf.
67. See id. at 3 (discussing sources of uncertainty).
68. See id. at 6 (noting how climate sensitivity to forcing is significantly imMATE

pacted by feedbacks such as melting sea ice).

69. See CICERONE ET AL., supra note 66, at 6 (discussing major factors contributing to climate change).
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mate system to atmospheric water vapor amount and clouds is likely
responsible for the most significant climate feedbacks.11

Despite the identified uncertainties, the NAS agreed "that the
observed warming is real and particularly strong within the last

twenty years."' 7 1 NAS scientists generally agreed with the assessment
from the IPCC's Working Group I that human activity was a contributing cause of climate change, in that an anthropogenic "signal"
was detectable among the background "noise" of climate variability. 7 2

NAS sought to "articulate more clearly the level of confidence

that can be ascribed to those assessments and the caveats that need
to be attached to them."7 3 In 2003, NAS was asked to review the

Draft Strategic Plan of the United States Climate Change Science
Program, 7 4 which was issued in November 2002. Though the NAS
commended the Plan's call for increased observational capabilities
and accelerated research on the carbon cycle, the general evaluation was at best mixed. When asked to determine if the Strategic
Plan's goals were clear and appropriate, NAS replied "the document is not a coherent strategic plan, because it lacks most elements of a strategic plan .... -75
For the purposes of this Article, the most important criticism of
the Draft Strategic Plan called for an improved grasp on uncertainties attached to the science of climate change. One NAS criticism of
70. See id. at 7 (quoting effects of feedbacks).
71. See id. at 3 (noting status of certainty).
72. See Houghton et al., supranote 2, at 730 (asserting it is unlikely that natu-

ral forcing can completely account for observed warming in recent decades).
73. See CICERONE ET AL., supra note 66, at 1 (explaining NAS goal).
74. See UNITED STATES CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, supra note 65, 14
(discussing history of climate research). The United States Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) was formed in 2002 to coordinate and direct United States
efforts in climate change and global change research. See id. The CCSP builds
upon the decade-old United States Global Change Research 1 Program (GCRP).
See id.The CCSP incorporates the GCRP and adds a new component-the Climate
Change Research Initiative (CCRI) whose primary goal is to "measurably improve
the integration of scientific knowledge, including measures of uncertainty, into effective decision support systems and resources." Id. at 5 (emphasis added). The
GCRP was created by the United States Global Change Research Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-606, 104 Stat. 3096-3104 (1990). The CCRI was created inJune 2001 to
study areas of uncertainty and "to enhance the ongoing research activities of the

United States Global Change Research Program (USGCRP)."
MATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, supra note 65, at 15.

UNITED STATES CLI-

75. See Committee to Review the United States Climate Change Program Stra-

tegic Plan, National Research Council, PLANNING CLIMATE AND GLOBAL CHANGE
RESEARCH: A REVIEW OF THE DRAFr UNITED STATES CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAM STRATEGIC PLAN 54 (National Academy of the Sciences 2003) (NRC, REVIEW OF DRAFT
STRATEGIC PLAN). The missing elements included unambiguous goals and a clear
timetable for accomplishing those goals, as well as a management plan ensuring
the goals are met. See id.
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the Draft Strategic Plan was that it needed to better inform decision-makers about uncertainty yet it failed to determine which un76
certainties were most important to decision-makers.
The establishment of the Climate Change Research Initiative
(CCRI), inJune 2001, appeared to be the beginning of an effort to
identify and reduce uncertainties in climate science. 77 The CCRI
program had a stated goal of identifying research initiatives which
would help reduce "the present uncertainties in climate science
and develop the enabling modeling capabilities, and . . .develop
research and data products that will facilitate the use of scientific
'78
knowledge to support policy and management decisions.
It is generally agreed that uncertainty in the validity and reliability of climate modeling remains, and improving those models remains necessary and desirable. 79 The level of uncertainty in the
climate models must be reduced before national policy should be
formulated (or re-formulated in the United States' case) based in
part on model predictions. The exact level of uncertainty, however,
remains an issue. One noted critic disagrees with the IPCC's findings regarding the ability of current climate models to replicate observations of atmospheric conditions, notably cloud cover and water
vapor.8 0 Other climate and atmospheric observers reported a similar discrepancy between general circulation models (GCMs) and
observed atmospheric temperature trend lines. 8 1 They have found
"that while the models generally agree with each other, they disa76. See id. at 6 (noting importance of CCSP having clear process for setting
priorities).
77. See United States Global Climate Change Research Program, THE UNITED
STATES CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH INITIATIVE (CCRI): SURVEY OF RESEARCH STRATEGIES TO REDUCE SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTIES 4 (Aug. 2001), http://www.usgcrp.gov/

usgcrp/Library/CCRlreport-aug200l/CCRlreport-aug200l.pdf

(last visited Oct.

24, 2007) (discussing development and goals of CCRI).
78. See id. (stating CCRI's proposed research initiatives).
79. See CICERONE ET AL., supra note 66, at 15 (discussing necessity of updating
current climate models).

80. See Daniel Grossman, Dissent in the Maelstrom, Sci. AM. (Nov. 2001) at 37,
available at http://www.wbur.org/special/antartica/images/RichardLizden/pdf
(last visited Feb. 27, 2007) (noting failure of models to predict outcome). Professor Richard S. Lindzen contends that in certain configurations, water vapor and
cloud cover may produce "negative feedback," that is, may bring about a cooling
or at least a stabilization in the planet's surface temperature. See id. This hypothesis is in contrast to IPCC conclusions asserting clouds and water vapor will likely
bring about "positive feedback;" that is, an increase in global surface temperature.
See id.
81. See generally David Douglass et al., Altitude Dependence of Atmospheric Temperature Trends: Climate Models Versus Observations, GEOPHYS. RES. LETr., Vol. 31, L13208
(2004) (presenting study performed by Douglass).
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gree with the observations."' 2 The observations conflicting with the
models are atmospheric (above surface) as "the three state-of-the
art greenhouse models... show positive temperatures that increase
[H]owever, the existing observational data sets
with altitude ....
83
show decreasing as well as mostly dtcreasing trends since 1979."

In attempting to explain this discrepancy, Professors David
Douglass, Benjamin Pearson and Dr. S. Fred Singer8 4 pose two possibilities. The first possibility is that "the models are correct and
account for all relevant forcings. If so, then we must conclude that
the observational data sets... are all incorrect. '85 The other possibility is that "[t]he models do not fully capture the multitudinous
climate effects (including various feedbacks) of an increase in
greenhouse gases. Since the observed surface temperature trends
'86
.. . agree with the models, then they too must be questioned.
Douglass and his researchers, believing it unlikely that the unnecessary observational data sets would all be inaccurate, concluded that
"it seems more likely that both the models and observed surface
trends are problematic.

'87

The central point of Douglass's argument was that the GCM
temperature predictions disagreed with the observational data sets
relative to atmospheric measurements of temperatures, but the GCM
temperature predictions agreed with observational surface temperature measurements.8 8 Since the observational data sets all agree
with each other, Douglass stated the GCMs must be questioned,
particularly their predictions regarding atmospheric temperatures. 89 If the models' validity regarding atmospheric temperatures
are questionable, then the accuracy of the model predictions pertaining to surface temperatures are also questionable. 90

82. See id. at 5 (discussing disagreement between modes and observation).
83. See id. (discussing temperature difference between models and
observations).
84. See id. (stating authors). Profs. Douglass and Pearson are on the faculty at
the University of Virginia, Department of Physics and Astronomy. Dr. Singer is
with the Science & Environmental Policy Project, Arlington, VA. See id.
85. See id. at 6 (describing first possibility).
86. See Douglass et al., supra note 81, at 6 (describing second possibility).
87. See id. (emphasis added) (concluding probability of problematic
observations).
88. See id. (finding that models all disagree with near surface data in Global,
tropics and SH averages).
89. See id. (stating that models show positive temperature trends increasing
with altitude, while observational data sets show decreasing trends since 1979).
90. See id. (questioning accuracy of surface temperature based on other
inaccuracies).
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Researchers followed with a critical inference: If the validity of
the GCMs is questionable, and the observed surface temperature
trend lines agree with GCMs, then the surface temperature trend
lines themselves are questionable. 9' This inference allowed the investigators to conclude both the GCMs and the observed surface
temperature trends are problematic and their agreement was irrelevant. 92 In the end, this group of investigators posited this "apparent agreement may be a coincidence. ' 93 But the more somber
suggestion, that the latter agreement may have been a result of "a
'tuning' of the models to the surface temperature trends,"94 was
95
also proposed and is addressed below.
The Douglass research counters the mainstream position of climate scientists. 9 6 Douglass's work is an example of a distinct minority position in the scientific community regarding anthropogenic
causes of climate change. It is presented here to note the existence
of a minority position, not to imply that it is a compelling one.
Douglass's work is not compelling for two reasons. First, the
inference that surface temperature trends are suspect because they
must agree with questionable models is dependent on both the
confidence one has in a particular observational data set and the
model designed to replicate the observed trend. The United States
Climate Change Science Program (USCCSP) generated new findings, published in April 2006, which appear to support the ability of
GCMs to make valid predictions of temperature trends (tropospheric and lower stratospheric) by more correctly simulating
97
observations.
In one section of the USCCSP Report, a team of scientists used
nineteen different models and observational data from the two de91. See Douglass et al., supra note 81, at 6 (positing that since observed surface
temperature trends agree with models, surface temperature trends must also be
questioned).
92. See id. (stating that it is likely that both models and observed surface
trends are problematic).
93. See id. (discussing second of two conclusions).
94. See id. (discussing second of two conclusions).

95. For a discussion of incentives for research scientists, see infra notes 113-17
and accompanying text.

96. SeeJerry D. Mahlman, Global Warming: Misuse of Data and Ignorance of
Science, Union of Concerned Scientists (2001), available at http://www.ucsusa.

org/assets/documents/globalwarming/ACFCGy9yc.pdf (asserting much of minority position contrarian science is methodologically weak).
97. See Temperature Trends in the Lower Atmosphere: Steps for Understanding and
Reconciling Differences (2005), http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sapl-1/
finalreport/sapl-1-final-al1.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (Temperature Trends) (examining differences in atmospheric temperature at varying levels of atmosphere
and causes of such differences).
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cades between 1979 and 1999 to examine global mean tropospheric
temperature trends. 9s This team found "[a]ll of the satellite- and
radiosonde-based [balloon and aircraft temperature sensors]
trends.

. .

are contained within the spread of model results. This

illustrates that there is no fundamental discrepancy between
modeled and observed trends in global-mean tropospheric temperature." 99 The finding that there is no discrepancy between the
modeled trends and observable trends directly contradicts the inferences the Douglass team made.
Additionally, a research effort lead by Thomas Karl, Director of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National
Climatic Data Center, offered a plausible explanation for the lack
of consonance between atmospheric observational temperature
trends and GCM atmospheric temperature predictions, noted both
by Richard Lindzen' 0 0 and David Douglass.' 0 ' The Karl team said,
"In reality, all data sets are not equally plausible realizations of the
true climate system evolution. The climate system has evolved in a
single way, and some data sets will be closer to this truth than
others."10 2 This statement suggests atmospheric observational data
sets need to become more accurate and more complete. The
USCCSP tried to produce this result in the April 2006 publication.103 In doing so, it has diminished the importance of the
Lindzen and Douglass critiques.
The second reason Douglass's work is not compelling is it suggests other climate scientists have not accurately utilized the data
the models generated. This would likely prompt a strong rebuttal
from the targets of such an assertion. The group of climate scientists and policy advocates who put forth this assertion and question
the motives of some researchers working in the climate change

98. See id. at 89-90 (explaining data compiled by using fingerprint studies,
which utilize meticulous statistical methods to compare spatial and temporal patterns of climate change by using both computer models and observation).

99. See id. at 110 (explaining in detail results from observations of tropospheric temperature trends).
100. For a discussion of Linzden's argument regarding the inaccuracy of
GCM's in depicting climate sensitivity, see infra notes 105-08 and accompanying
text.
101. See Douglass et al., supra note 81, at 6 (describing inconsistency between
GCMs and observed climate trends).
102. See Temperature Trends, supra note 97, at 87 (arguing tools must be devel-

oped to objectively differentiate data sets).
103. See id.at 117 (stressing importance of complementary data sets in better
understanding differential warming).
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mainstream is a very small one (relative to the mainstream). This
04
Article will return to this discussion below.
Professor Richard Linzen10 5 , a prominent climatologist at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has also expressed strong
distrust of the ability of GCMs to correctly depict climate sensitivity
to increasing volumes of GHGs. He expressed his doubts by saying:
[O]ur own research suggests the presence of a major negative feedback involving clouds and water vapor, where
models have completely failed to simulate observations
....
If we are right, then models are greatly exaggerating
sensitivity to increasing CO 2. Even if we are not right...
the failure of models to simulate observations makes it
even less likely that models are a reliable tool for predict06
ing climate.'
It must be stressed that Professor Lindzen and his colleagues are
part of a small, but vocal, minority within the climate scientist community. They published a paper which appears to offer support for
the preceding expressed doubts. 10 7 The Lindzen team notes:
"[T] he model feedbacks are, at present, simply artifacts of the models. Our work strongly suggests that the relevant feedbacks are negative rather than positive, and very large in magnitude. If this is
indeed correct, then concerns for global warming are greatly
exaggerated."1' 08
In a vein similar to Douglass, Professor Lindzen asserts that
current GCMs remain unconvincing in predicting climate sensitiv104. For a discussion of the skepticism toward many mainstream scientists, see
infra note 134 and accompanying text.
105. See Lindzen, Richard S., http://www-eaps.mit.edu/faculty/lindzen.htm
(listing accomplishments). Lindzen is the Alfred P. Sloan Professor of Atmospheric Science in the Department of Earth, Atmospheric, and Planetary Sciences
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. See id. Professor Lindzen was a major contributor to a portion of the 2001 IPCC Third Assessment Report concerned
with physical processes (Chap. 7). See id.
106. See Testimony of Richard S. Lindzen before the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee on 2 May 2001, 107th Cong. (2001), available at http://www(last visited Oct. 24,
eaps.mit.edu/faculty/lindzen/Testimony/Senate2001.pdf
2007) (Lindzen Testimony) (expressing doubts about reliability of models system).
107. See Richard S. Lindzen et al., Does the Earth Have an Adaptive Infared Iris?,
82 BuLL. AMER. METEOR. Soc. 417 (2001) (articulating hypothesis of cloud modulated "iris" effect, which operates to minimize global warning).
108. See Richard S. Lindzen, Richard S. Lindzen Answers a Few Questions About
this Month's Fast Breaking Paperin Field of Geosciences, ESI Special Topics, Feb. 2003
(Lindzen Answers), available at http://www.esi-topics.com/fbp/2003/february03RichardLindzen.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (addressing questions about his
article on iris effect). This article is entitled Does the Earth Have an Adaptive Infrared
Iris?. See Lindzen Testimony, supra note 106 (stating effect of hypothesis).
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ity to increasing concentrations of GHGs. In a separate paper, however, a team of atmospheric scientists mounted a direct challenge
to Lindzen's theories. This paper, authored by a team led by Dr.
Bing Lin of the NASA Langley Research Center, relies on direct
observations of broadband radiation fields to examine the impact
of water vapor and clouds on climate sensitivity. 10 9 Lindzen's "iris
hypothesis" states that the "cloudy-moist [tropical upper tropospheric] regions contract when the surface warms and expands
when the surface cools. In each case the change in the troposphere
acts to oppose the surface change, and thus presents a strong negative feedback to climate change."' 10 Lin's paper notes "[t]he observations show that the clouds have much higher albedos and
moderately larger longwave fluxes than those assumed by Lindzen.
As a result, decreases in these clouds would cause a significant but
weak positive feedback to the climate system, instead of providing a
strong negative feedback."11 The Lin paper counters the Lindzen
and Douglass teams' earlier work.

Strong skepticism from a small minority, based on arguments
about data and methods, exists within the scientific community;
these arguments are recognized and are within the bounds of acceptable scientific debate. 112 But, in public testimony, Lindzen
raised the issue, similar to the Douglass paper, about the motives of
many of those doing "mainstream" science. 1 3 The Douglass paper
suggested some of the GCMs had been "tuned" to fit the data, while
Lindzen asserted the scientific endeavor in the United States has
developed, in his view, an unfortunate "incentive structure." 1 4 He
contends that, "[s] cientists associate public recognition of the relevance of their subject with financial support, and relevance has
come to be identified with alarming the public. It is only human for
109. See Bing Lin et al., The Iris Hypothesis: A Negative or Positive Cloud Feedback?,
15 J. CLIMATE 3 (2001) (using Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission satellite measurements over tropical oceans in order to evaluate iris hypothesis proposed by
Lindzen group and subsequently demonstrate its contrasting results).
110. See Lindzen testimony, supra note 106 for a summary of the significance
of Lindzen's research.
111. See id. at 3 (quoting abstract and noting several limitations of iris study as
possible reasons for their conflicting conclusions).
112. See Bjorn Lomborg, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE
REAL STATE OF THE WORLD (Hugh Matthews trans., Cambridge University Press
2001) (1998) (discussing doubt as to validity of models).
113. See Douglass et al., supra note 81, at L13208 (suggesting that agreement
between models and observed surface trends reflects tuning of models to fit surface trends).
114. See Lindzen Testimony, supra note 106 (asserting scientists respond to incentives like all humans).
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Lindzen, in response to the question of what he would do if he
controlled federal funds for climate change research, said he would
reduce the level of such funding, because by doing so, the collection of "vested interests" involved researching the problem would
1 16
dwindle.
Those doubting the validity of the models predicting climate
sensitivity' 17 have cited Lindzen's belief that climate sensitivity to
increasing levels of GHGs in the atmosphere is significantly lower
than the estimates provided by the IPCC.118 In several GCMs, Professor Bjorn Lomborg supported Lindzen's beliefs by noting that
none of the selected models seemed able to incorporate the negative cloud and water vapor feedback Lindzen pointed to, "indicating that present models seriously overestimate C0 2-induced
warming.""1 9 Lomberg actually relied considerably on Lindzen's
work in criticizing the IPCC and the "mainstream of environmental
science." 120 Lomberg stated, "[t]he cloud simulations are fraught
with uncertainty and new research seems to indicate a strong, negative cloud feedback which would lower the climate sensitivity

dramatically." 121
A second paper by Dennis L. Harmann and Marc L. Michelson
was recently published and offered evidence to contest Lindzen's
"iris effect."' 122 Lindzen and his team attempted "to use both obser115. See id. (adding that broad consensus among scientists that climate
change is significant must be viewed in context of human inclination).
116. See Grossman, supra note 80, at 36 (highlighting Lindzen's belief that
science is in premature stage, creating much reason for skepticism and virtually no
foundation for consensus). For further discussion of Lindzen's thesis on "financial

incentives embedded in current science," see supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
117. See Lomborg, supra note 112, at 271 (discussing those who express
doubts about validity of models). Bjorn Lomborg is a political scientist based at
the University of Aarhus, Denmark. See id.
118. See id. (explaining Lindzen's view that there is little reason to be concerned for our future). Lindzen estimates climate sensitivity to be roughly 0.4°C,
while the IPCC estimate is in the range of 1.5' - 4.5°C). Id.
119. See id. at 271 (asserting lack of replication of negative feedback indicates
CO-induced warming overestimations).
120. SeeJohn Rennie, A Response to Lomborg's Rebuttal, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN,
Apr. 15, 2001, available at http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articlelD=00040A72A95C-1CDA-B4A880 9E C5 88 EE DF & page Number= I& cat ID=9 (describing
term mainstream used by Lomborg critic).
121. See Lomborg, supra note 111, at 273 (stating new research shows negative
cloud feedback may lower climate sensitivity).
122. See Dennis L. Hartmann & Marc L. Michelsen, No Evidence for Iris, 82
BULL. AMER. METEOROLOGICAL Soc. 249 (2002) [Hartman & Michelson] (concluding observational analysis presented by Lindzen group provides no support for
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vations and theory to determine the climate feedbacks from clouds
and water vapor that [can] determine the sensitivity of climate to

such factors as increasing greenhouse gases."' 123 The Hartmann
and Michelsen paper does not support the conclusions of Lindzen's
paper. 124
The Lindzen paper concluded that increased sea surface temperatures (SST) lead to a reduced area of anvil clouds, which are
those cumulonimbus clouds whose higher elevations have reached
the upper troposphere and have spread out horizontally, potentially trapping significant amounts of heat. 12 5 The anvil clouds are
tied with lower level deep convective cloud systems, which transport
solar heating of the ocean into the troposphere.1 26 "[P] recipitation
forms more efficiently in warmer cumulus towers, and hence leaves
less unprecipitated moisture and ice to form clouds outside the towers." 12 7 The consequent reduction in anvil clouds likely will produce a negative feedback to climate change because of lower levels
of moisture (water vapor) in the troposphere. 12 8 Smaller quantities

of clouds and water vapor in the troposphere will allow heat to escape, lessening the greenhouse effect. The Hartmann and Michelson team found:
The deep convection cores are separated by more than
1000 km from the clouds that are associated with most of
the variation in cloud-weighted SST. The explanation for
the correspondence

between cloud-weighted SST and

cloud area is thus a shift in the latitude or longitude of the
cloudiness and not a change in the relation between deep
1 29
convective and associated tropical anvil cloud amounts.
Hartmann and Michelson's work weakens Lindzen and Lomborg's
conclusions regarding climate sensitivity mechanisms.
hypothesis that increased sea surface temperature reduces area covered by tropical
anvil cloud).
123. See Lindzen Answers, supra note 108 (providing reasoning used by Lindzen

of observation and theory examining greenhouse effect).
124. See Hartmann & Michelsen, supra note 122, at 254 (stating lack of evidence of change in ratio of anvil area to convective area).
125. See Lindzen et al., supra note 107, at 419 (finding very strong inverse
relationship between mean sea surface temperature and cloud area).
126. See Hartman & Michaelsen, supra note 122, at 251 (noting that higher
colder clouds and warmer convective clouds in tropics are part of same cloud
system).
127. See id. (discussing effects of precipitation and temperature).
128. See Lindzen et al., supra note 107, at 427-32 (listing computations).
129. See Hartmann and Michelsen, supra note 122, at 249 (explaining relationship between cloud weight and cloud area).
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An atmospheric scientist based at the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Colorado, Jerry Mahlman, also expressed
1 30
doubts about Lomborg's arguments regarding climate change.
Mahlman remarked that Lomborg appropriately noticed "the measured tropospheric temperatures are not warming as much as the
measured surface temperatures."1 3 1 He remarked that Lomborg affirms the Lindzen team's conclusion that if sustained, this difference "could reduce the magnitude of the positive water vapor
13 2
feedback and thus reduce the magnitude of climate warming."'
Mahlman is wary of such a conclusion. He points out others have
analyzed these conclusions, and these analyses should give us pause
before drawing conclusions based on this data. "Clearly... sweeping conclusions from these data sets concerning the magnitude of
33
expected climate warming are not warranted."'
This Article now turns to a very different critique from the critique based on the uncertainty of science. While the focal point of
this Article is scientific uncertainty, the question of what might motivate certain scientists to engage in the study of climate change
(aside from the "pure science" and "policy science" stimuli just
mentioned) is serious and merits at least a brief reference.
Professor Lindzen noted that scientists are human beings who
respond to particular incentives. 3 4 During an interview, Lindzen
stated that current government policy regarding the funding of science creates incentives to publicize a subject in a manner that will
keep the subject or issue relevant.1 3 5 On certain issues, Professor
Lindzen noted science funding depends on "alarming" the policy136
making community.
Others have taken up this criticism of the mainstream scientific
community, particularly the IPCC. Two university-based social
scientists, Boehmer-Christiansen and Kellow, devote a good deal of
130. See generally, Mahlman, supra note 96 (reviewing BJORN LOMBORG, THE
2001) (asserting doubts about Lomborg's arguments
regarding climate change).
131. See id. at 4 (explaining reasoning behind doubts concerning Lomborg's
SKEPrICAL ENVIRONMENTALST

arguments).
132. See id. (discussing potential effects of Lomborg and Lindzen team's
conclusions).
133. See id. (reasoning sweeping statements made unwarranted).
134. See Paul Georgia, IPCCReport Criticized by One of Its Lead Authors, ENVIRONMENT & CLIMATE NEWS, June 1, 2001, available at http://www.cei.org/gencon/
019,02098.cfm (referring to Lindzen's comments at briefing sponsored by Cooler
Heads Coalition in U.S. Senate Environment Committee Room).
135. See id. (noting incentives leads to questionable behavior by scientists).
136. See id. (stating financial support for science depends on alarming
public).
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attention to the composition of the Working Groups of the IPCC,
particularly Working Groups I and II.137 They describe Working
Group I as composed "largely of energy policy and technology advocates who are generally supportive of policies for energy conservation and renewable energy technologies that they think
governments will be 'forced' to adopt as responses to the prospect
of dangerous anthropogenic climate change." 138 In BoehmerChristiansen and Kellow's view, the investigators who wrote the
chapters on impacts in the IPCC's three general assessment reports
were predisposed toward recommending a turn toward conservation and renewable energy before evidence on climate change had
been assembled and analyzed.
Working Group I predominately consisted of atmospheric
physicists, meteorologists and computer programmers specializing
in climate modeling. 3 9 Boehmer-Christiansen and Kellow point to
what they perceived became:
[A] n institutionalization within the IPCC process of scientists, who were either government employees or working
in government funded, often rather financially insecure,
centres frequently associated with meteorological offices
and institutes that had an interest in there being a climate
problem which would justify further research. Few university scientists contributed to the IPCC process because
they lacked the travel funds, access to the largest computers and the ability to attend meetings regularly, since
they had to teach. The IPCC process has therefore been
dominated by scientists whose livelihoods depend upon direct government allocations for climate research, and thus on
a belief now deeply entrenched even at the official level
that dangerous climate change was both likely and subject
140
to mitigation by policy.

137. See generally, SONJA BOEHMER-CHRISTIANSEN & AYNSLEY KELLOW, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: INTERESTS AND THE FAILURE OF THE KYOTO PROCESS
(Edward Elgar 2003) (noting two scientists reviewed purposes of Working
Groups). The missions of the IPCC's Working Group I, Working Group II and
Working Group III were "assessment," "impacts" and "response strategies," respectively. See id.
138. See id. at 139 (describing composition of Working Group I).
139. See Appendix IV, Reviewers, in THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS at 845 (listing reviewers and their academic departments).
140. See Boehmer-Christiansen & Kellow, supra note 137, at 140 (emphasis
added) (explaining composition of membership of Working Group I).
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This order of criticism fails for at least two reasons. First, it
asserts that many university scientists were not able to participate in
the IPCC process due to other time commitments elsewhere. This
assertion, however, does not necessarily show that if more university-based scientists had been able to participate, IPCC recommendations would have been significantly different than they in fact
were. 4 1 Secondly, that atmospheric physicists and climatologists
receive government funding for their work does not show that
scientists submitted proposals because of a need to maintain their
salaries or their laboratories.
Upon observing the flow of government funds to scientists with
properly structured evidentiary-based proposals, one could just as
easily conclude that those scientists applying for funds recognized
an interesting question which they placed in a selective funding
process. If a funding panel found the question interesting and the
investigative process sufficiently rigorous, then the funding panel
would have had reason to support the proposed research. An inference that funding is being allocated to scientists with sincere intentions is at least as plausible as that proposed by Boehmer42
Christiansen and Kellow, and Lindzen.1
B.

Prominent Questions

Early in 2001, the administration asked the NRC to assist the
administration in its review of United States climate change policy.
The NRC responded by analyzing a set of "key questions. 1 4 3 One
question asked if there is a safe concentration of greenhouse gases.
In response, the NAS analysis carefully stated:
The question of whether there exists a "safe" level of concentration of greenhouse gases cannot be answered directly because it would require a value judgment of what
constitutes an acceptable risk to human welfare and ecosystems in various parts of the world, as well as a more
quantitative assessment of the risks and costs associated
141. See Naomi Oreskes, The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change 306 Sci.
1686 (2004) (explaining peer-review process, not scientist's base, determines quality of research).
142. See Georgia, supra note 134 and accompanying text (comparing inference from mainstream climate science to inference put forth by Lindzen). See also
BOEHMER-CHRISTIANSEN & KELLOW, supra note 137, at 135 (comparing inference
from mainstream science to inference put forth by Boehmer-Christiansen and
Kellow).
143. See Cicerone et al., supra note 66, at I (stating how NRC assisted in review
of United States climate change policy).
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with the various impacts of global warming. In general,
however, risk increases with increases in both the rate and
144
the magnitude of climate change.

Early in 2001, the President organized a Cabinet-level review of
United States policy and programs on climate change. 145 The Cabinet group asked NAS to analyze a set of prominent climate change
questions, including the question stated above about safe GHG
levels. The questions the current administration posed to NAS indicated that the administration has doubts regarding the wisdom of
the approach to climate change taken by the Kyoto Protocol.
In a letter responding to a March 6, 2001 inquiry from Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig and Roberts, President Bush discussed the
administration's views on global climate change. 1 46 The current administration voiced its strong opposition to the Protocol because "it
exempts 80 percent of the world, including major population centers such as China and India, from compliance, and would cause
serious harm to the U.S. economy."' 147 Most observers cite this letter as evidence of the United States rejection of the Kyoto
Protocol.

148

In practical terms, rejecting the Protocol merely meant the Executive Branch decided not to submit the Protocol to the Senate for
ratification and publicly disavowed any support for the international instrument. The Clinton Administration first submitted this
protocol to the senate in 1997, after the passage of the Byrd-Hagel
resolution. 149 "The [Bird-Hagel] resolution was to provide gui144. See id. at 4 (stating response to whether science has determined if safe

level of concentration of greenhouse gases exists).
145. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush, President
Bush Discusses Global Climate Change (June 11, 2001), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html (citing report on
climate change policy). See also CICERONE ET AL., supra note 66, at 51. (referencing
this report).
146. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Text of Letter from the
President to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig and Roberts (March 13, 2001), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html
(on file
with author) (discussing current administration's stance on global climate change
issues).

147. See id. (explaining current administration's opposition to Kyoto
Protocol).
148. See Press Release, President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change, supra
note 145 (explaining current administration's opposition to Kyoto Protocol). In

his remarks, the president noted, "we do not know how much effect natural fluctuations in climate may have had on warming." See id.
149. See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (stating how Kyoto Protocol was first
addressed). "In July, 1997, the Senate adopted by a vote of 95-0, Senate Resolution
98, commonly known as the 'Byrd-Hagel' Resolution." See Frank H. Murkowski,
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dance to the Administration and its global climate negotiating team
' 150
as they entered negotiations in Kyoto.
Before the United States could become a signatory to an international agreement on climate change, the following conditions
had to be met: (1) emission limitation commitments from developing countries 15 1 and (2) an absence of harm to the United States
economy. 15 2 These two conditions continue to be major issues today. The economic argument is powerful and not easily refuted. It
serves as the basis for what the current administration labeled in
February 2002 as "a reasonable, gradual" approach to the problem
of climate change.

153

A reasonable, gradual goal ...

offers advantages over the

reductions set out in the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol focused on rather dramatic short-term reductions with
unclear consequences and, in turn,jeopardized the ability
to invest in long-run scientific and technological solutions.
A reasonable goal offers insurance consistent with existing
154
climate science without putting the economy at risk.
A healthy economy should be safeguarded and should not be
subjected to undue risk. But a measure of risk to the economy may
need be tolerated in order to protect the value of a stable "anthropogenic friendly" climate.
The United States objection, stemming from the Kyoto Protocol and the international community's perception of unprecedented warming of the global climate, appears to be threefold: (1)
economic cost and issues of fairness in bearing these costs; (2) scientific uncertainty regarding whether the observed climate change
is something other than an iteration of a natural variation which
The Kyoto Protocol is Not the Answer to Climate Change, 37 HARV. J.

ON

LEGIS. 345, 353-

54 (2000).
150. See Frank H. Murkowski, The Kyoto Protocol is Not the Answer to Climate
Change, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 345, 353-54 (2000) (explaining that Senate recognized developed nations must participate).
151. See HEIKE SCHROEDER, NEGOTIATING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: AN ANALYSIS
ON NEGOTIATION DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS 37 (Lit Verlag 2001)
(discussing further United States position toward developing country emission limitation commitments).
152. See Murkowski, supra note 150, at 353-54 (explaining conditions for signing climate change agreement).
153. See Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President,
H.R. Doc. No. 107-788, at 247 (2002), available at http://origin.www.gpoaccess.
gov/usbudget/fy03/browse.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (stressing need to policy flexibility in order to keep economic growth at high level).
154. See id. (quoting current administration's statement comparing Kyoto
Protocol with reasonable, gradual approach).
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has occurred in the past; and (3) uncertainty pertaining to whether
human activity has made a significant contribution to the observed
change in climate. In response to a request for analysis from the
administration, the NRC reported "a causal linkage between the
buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the observed
climate changes during the 20th century cannot be unequivocally
established."1

55

Although it appears to be true that a causal link cannot be established, it may be imprudent for the administration to avoid taking action. To some extent it is a statistical matter. There are early
statistical indications that anthropogenic activity is contributing to
climate change.1 5 6 Despite these studies, the United States has not
become a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol because it would risk
harm to the United States economy and allow developing countries
to avoid emission limitations.
The administration argues it would be unjust to impose the
cost of GHG emission reductions on the United States economy if
developing countries were providing an exemption from GHG
emission reductions, thus shielding their economies from the costs
associated with emission reductions. The administration has clearly
articulated its stance regarding the fairness issue, stating, " [t] he Kyoto Protocol is unfair to the United States and to other industrialized nations because it exempts eighty percent of the world from
compliance." 1 57 Members of Congress also expressed this concern,

as evidenced by the 95-0 vote in favor of the Byrd-Hagel amendment in the Senate. In the House of Representatives, there is a
similar concern "that implementing the Kyoto Protocol would create incentives for moving jobs offshore to developing countries that
have no emission reductions.

' 158

To further strengthen its enmity

155. See CICERONE ET AL., supra note 66, at 17 (explaining effects of human
activities on climate change).
156. See Andrew C. Revkin, Can Global Warming Be Studied Too Much?, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2002, at F1 (stating casual link exists between anthropogenic activity
and climate change).
157. See Christie Todd Whitman, Statement by EPA Administrator Christie
Whitman on Meeting with Members of the European Community (April 3, 2001),
7
available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/blab9f485b0989 2852562
(explaining
e7004dc686/acf69d4a9b345ffe85256a23006aa7fc?OpenDocument
why Kyoto Protocol is unfair to United States and other nations).
158. See Zoya E. Bailey, The Sink that Sank the Hague: A Comment on the Kyoto
Protocol, 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 103, 115 (2002) (discussing concern of potential job loss from Kyoto Protocol). For a full presentation of the 'Job loss" argument, applied particularly to the United States steel industry, see Heather A.
Steinmiller, Comment, Steel Industy Watch Out! The Kyoto Protocol is Lurking, 11
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 161, 191-94 (2000).
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for the Protocol, in 1998, Congress began the now regular practice
of circumscribing Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) appropriations so that no funds could be expended for "the purpose of
implementation or in preparation for implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol."

159

If the United States signed the Kyoto Protocol, many industries
would potentially be vulnerable to increased costs of production.
The formation of umbrella lobbying is a mechanism through which
industries can attempt to prevent mandated emission limits. These
lobbying organizations are delegated to voice objections of the
member industries before Congress and executive branch agencies.
The Climate Control Coalition (CCC) is an example of such an organization. It presented the criticism that the Kyoto Protocol's specific emission reductions timetable injected into the Protocol a
basic defect. The CCC believed timetables would impose undue
costs on industries producing a significant GHG volume.1 60 The
Cooler Heads Coalition, another United States industry umbrella
lobbying organization, voiced a particular concern with the debate
over carbon sinks. 16 1 In general, the administration prefers defining sinks less stringently. In contrast, the European Union (EU)
would prefer a climate change regime with greater focus on actual
16 2
emission reductions and less emphasis on carbon sequestration.
159. See Veterans Affairs and HUD Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-276,
112 Stat. 2461, 2496 (1998) (proscribing EPA from making any effort to "proscribe
or issue rules, regulations, decrees or order" designed to implement the Protocol);
see also H. R. REP. No. 105-769, at 37 (1998) (preventing funds from being used to
implement Kyoto Protocol).
160. See Bailey, supra note 158, at 113 (citing Eric J. Lyman, Climate Change:
Industry Says Failureof Hague Talks Proves Kyoto Protocol Cannot Work, INT'L. Er'v'T.

Nov. 29, 2000, at D2) (explaining Global Climate Coalition's criticism of
Kyoto Protocol).
161. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 19, at art. 3.1, 37 I.L.M. 33. (carbon sink
can be understood as any land form (forest, agricultural land or rangeland) able
to store, or sequestrate, carbon dioxide). The Protocol, however, only allows carbon stored by forests to count toward reduction obligations. See id. The United
States delegation at the Conference of the Parties 6 (COP-6) to the UNFCC at the
Hague in Fall 2000, which initially took the position that farm land should also be
counted toward emission reductions, modified that position during the course of
the negotiations, and agreed (for the purposes of the COP-6 negotiations) not to
insist on the inclusion of farmland as a category of carbon sink. See Bailey, supra
DAILY,

note 158, at 109-10 (citing EricJ. Lyman, Climate Change: US Compromises on Kyoto
ProtocolFails to Gain Support of EU/Insustiy Groups, INT'L ENV'T. DAILY, Nov. 22, 2000,

at D4) (describing position of UNFCC at Hague). In the end, the EU countries in
particular, and the United States, could not reach an agreement on several aspects
of the carbon sinks issue. See id.
162. See Bailey, supra note 158, at 110 (characterizing inability to reach agreement as a failure when compared with purpose of COP-6). The Protocol has been
adopted, but only in February, 2005, not in the two year time frame originally
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Uncertainty

Far and away the greater proportion of the scientific community finds the anthropogenic signal unmistakable, and that its "effects can reasonably be predicted and that prudence calls for more
action now."' 1 3 It is prudent to take steps to minimize risk of harm
even in the face of uncertainty.1 6 4 The United States takes the position that uncertainties surrounding the risk to global climate are
such that the Kyoto Protocol's restrictions, like the emission reduction timetables, are unwarranted. The issue might be cast as an
argument about risk: (1) how much risk is tolerable; (2) what steps
can and should be taken to achieve a "tolerable" risk; and (3) what
principles, or rules of thumb, should be adopted to answer what is
65
effectively a public policy question.1
Disagreement exists within the scientific community as to the
risk created by the government's refusal to strictly adhere to the
Kyoto Protocol's climate change regime. 166 This disagreement over
climate change has been acknowledged publicly by the United
States government. The President noted this small measure of scientific disagreement prior to a June 11, 2001 statement, in which
envisioned. Id. But the issue of carbon sequestration's ability to "offset" GHG
emissions is a cost issue for the United States; that is, not being able to offset emissions in this way, and thus in order to meet Kyoto emission limitations within the
2008-2012 time frame, having to reduce GHG emissions to meet those limits has
been viewed as untenable by two United States administrations. Id. A statement by
Roger Ballentine, a member of the United States COP-6 delegation during the
Clinton administration, is instructive. He stated," [a]t the end of the day, we will
sign a treaty that will be right for the environment, but one that accomplishes that
without hurting the economy." Quoted in Bailey, supranote 158, at 110 (citing Eric
J. Lyman, Climate Change: U.S. Compromises on Kyoto Protocol Fails to Gain Support of
EU/Industry Groups, INT'L ENv'T. DAILY, Nov. 22, 2000, at D4).

163. See Revkin, supra note 156, at F4 (explaining that effects can be reasonably predicted), available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?sec
=health&res=9AO3E7DDI F38F930A35751 C1A9649C8B63&n=Top%2FNews%2F
One participant in the climate
Science%2FIropics%2FGlobal%20Warming.
change debate has commented that certain parties "do not want to take action
based on early indications, and with climate, early indications is what we have." Id.
164. See Heidi Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, Negligence: Virtue, Ethics and Tort
Law 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431, 1443 (2000) (citing PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND
VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 3 (1978)) (noting how ideas of

prudence are incorporated into American principles of negligence law).
165. See CICERONE ET AL., supra note 66, at 20 (discussing risk in relation to
safe levels of greenhouse gases).
166. See Grossman, supra note 80, at http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articlelD=00095BOD-C331-1C6E-84A9809EC588EF21 (arguing that humans have little
discernible effect on climate change). An interested layperson studying public
statements of reputable scientists may become perplexed by this less than unanimous scientific opinion regarding the risks that climate change presents to society.
Disagreement in scientific opinion regarding the major issues of the day is not
uncommon.
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he referenced a National Academy of the Sciences report discussing
"uncertainty" in regards to the "effect natural fluctuations in climate may have had on warming." 16 7 In testimony before Congress,
Senator Hagel asserted that "most of this century's global warming
occurred in the first half of the century before there was a significant concentration of anthropogenic GHG emissions."' 68 Senator
Hagel made a second statement in the Senate, included in the Congressional Record, advancing the belief that "research has failed to
establish that global warming is a significant problem." 169 These
statements illustrate the strong skepticism regarding human contribution to climate change and whether the observed change in climate is more than that which is expected to occur through natural
variation.
While there is a measure of dissent, the dissent is quite modest
compared to the mainstream belief regarding the significance of
climate change and the magnitude of the human contribution to
the change. This dissent is at least partly attributable to uncertainty
in the results of extremely complex computer models developed to
study climate changes. The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) alluded to this uncertainty. "[V] irtually all published estimates of how climate could change in the United States are the
These complicated models... are
result of computer models ....
still not accurate enough to provide reliable forecasts on how cli70
mate may change."
167. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush, President
Bush Discusses Global Climate Change (June 11, 2001), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html (noting President
Bush's acknowledgment of scientific disagreement on climate change). See also
THE DYNAMICS OF EVOLUTION: THE PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM DEBATE IN THE NATURAL SCIENCES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson, Eds.,
1992) (providing an example of scientific debate regarding an aspect of evolution).
For an example, see Chapter Five, authored by Antoni Hoffman. The volume illustrates how the theory of evolution, although widely accepted in biology and paleontology, still generates vigorous argument as to its particulars. See id.
168. See Denee A. Diluigi, Kyoto's FatalFlaws: A Springboardfor Domestic Greenhouse Gas Regulation, 32 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 693, 703 (2002) (citing 143 CONG.
REC. S10308-01 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1997)) (quoting Sen. Chuck Hagel of Nebraska).
The quoted sentence is from Dr. Patrick Michaels, a University of Virginia Professor of Environmental Science. Senator Hagel has modified his position on climate
change in recent years. See Next Steps on Climate Change, available at http://
www.swnebr.net/newspaper/cgi-bin/articles/printversion.pl? 157008 (last visited
Oct. 24, 2007) (setting forth Senate floor speech introducing three proposed
pieces of legislation).
169. See Diluigi, supra note 168 at 703 (citing 143 CONG. REC. S10308-01)
(daily ed. Oct. 3, 1997)) (referring to statement by Professor Lizden at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and stating political support of current policy).
170. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: Office of the Administrator,
U.S. Climate, http://www.yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/cli-
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But at the same time, most of the persons executing the mathematical computer modeling of climate change recognize the shortcomings in their own models. Several scientists, in a recent paper
reviewing the extent of scientific understanding of climate change,
first point to a certain degree of confidence in the models' predictive capabilities. Despite their simplified form and consequent limi-

tations, the models reproduce seasonal distributions of pressure
and temperature well. 7 'I The authors are, however, forthright in
pointing to the imperfections of present climate change modeling
by noting that despite progress, imperfections in the models
remain:
Despite these gains there are a number of features of the
climate system that are still rather crudely represented in
climate models. The coarse [spatial] resolution of these
models (typically 30 or roughly 300 km) restricts their ability to accurately represent terrain effects and to simulate
processes that occur on smaller scales. Other shortcomings occur in the representation of aerosols, precipitation,
and clouds and changes in solar irradiance. For these and
other reasons there remain substantialscientific uncertainties

in model predictions, including uncertainties in the predictions of local effects of climate change, occurrence of extreme weather events, effects of aerosols, changes in
of precipitaclouds, shifts in the intensity and distribution
172
tion, and changes in oceanic circulation.
In the evaluative lexicon the scientific community utilizes, it
seems safe to say the role of greenhouse gases in climate change,
including anthropogenic GHG emissions, particularly carbon dioxide, is not well understood. If predictive abilities of the models
simulating a phenomenon are not fully developed, then we cannot
say we adequately understand the phenomenon under investigation. Once our predictive abilities pertaining to the phenomenon
at hand are adequate, the extant uncertainties will diminish. The
current administration, taking special note of the uncertainties,
stated that the science remained too uncertain to pursue "a premamatefutureclimateusclimate.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2004) (on file with author)
(discussing accuracy of computer models).
171. See Tamara S. Ledley et al., Climate Change and Greenhouse Gases, 80 EOS,
Transactions, American Geophysical Union 39, Sept. 28, 1999, at 463 (discussing
accuracy of climate models).
172. See id. at 463 (citing Hansen et al., 1998; Houghton et al., 1996; Nohlman,
1997) (emphasis added) (explaining shortcomings of model predictions).
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lure Kyoto-style agreement."' 73 Renowned science writer Andrew
C. Revkin states that because of the uncertainties, the current administration has:
[C]alled for a decade of research before anything beyond
voluntary measures is used to stem tailpipe and smokestack emissions of heat-trapping gases that scientists say
are contributing to global warming .

. .

. Administration

officials say further research is still necessary because
scientists cannot say exactly what effects human activity will
have on global climate and how dangerous they will be. It
is worth taking the time to conduct more analysis at least
to clarify the balance of environmental and economic
174
risks, they say.
Most of the scientific community would not disagree with the
call for further research to reduce the uncertainty still contained in
the climate models. Disagreement does arise, however, with regard
to the decision to delay adoption of Kyoto Protocol. The debate
surrounded how much further to clarify the uncertainty before further action is taken. It appears that the current administration prefers to have further research establish, with certainty, that global
warming is a genuine threat to the health of the global community.
The administration stated that "[n] o one can say with any certainty
what constitutes a dangerous level of warming, and therefore what
level must be avoided. '' 175 The current administration also appears

to be seeking a causal link between anthropogenic activity and a
consequent increase in climate change before making a commitment
to proceed with the steps for GHG emission reduction called for by
the Protocol. "The current uncertainty surrounding climate
change implies that a realistic policy should be a gradual, measured
response, not a risky precipitous one."'17 6 If a causal linkage could
173. See Andrew C. Revkin, U.S. Planning Gradual Curb on Emissions, Taking
Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2002, at A5 (quoting R. Glenn Hubbard, Chairman of the
President's Council of Economic Advisors) (discussing current administration's
view of uncertain science).
174. See Revkin, note 156, at F1 (emphasis added) (discussing current administration's interest in further research).
175. See Press Release, Office of the White House, Remarks by the President
on Global Climate Change (June 11, 2001) (stating that exact levels of danger are
unknown).
176. See White House Council of Economic Advisors, 2002 Economic Report
of the President, available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy03/pdf/
2002_erp.pdf (explaining policy should be gradual due to current uncertainty); see
also Revkin, supra note 156, at F5 (discussing policy response to climate change).
Interestingly, in May 2002, the Department of State authored the Third National
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be established, the uncertainty surrounding climate change could
be reduced dramatically.
D.

Prudence

A prudent national policy would be one that did not delay taking action to prevent or lessen the likelihood of potential environmental harm, even if a causal link is not established yet. A prudent
or precautionary policy would perhaps advise against adopting the
administration's posture. Such a prudent approach would advise
that steps be undertaken to lessen the activity believed to have some
likelihood of actually causing the environmental harm. In the instance of climate change, the activity most associated with the harmful emission of greenhouse gases and enhanced greenhouse effects
is the burning of fossil fuels.

Further, analysts have commented that "research on the impacts of different atmospheric GHG concentrations is important,
but should not become an excuse to defer short-term action to reduce emissions."' 177 This statement does not deny the importance
of refining climate models in order to reduce uncertainty in climate
science. It suggests that to delay taking steps to reduce emissions,
even in the face of the present uncertainty, would risk substantial
harm to the global climate system. The UNFCCC explicitly counsels against citing scientific uncertainty as reason to deny or delay
178
an implementation of precautionary or mitigating measures.
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol embody the global community's response to this recognized, but imprecisely gauged, peril.
The three basic objectives of an emission limiting treaty in the short
to medium term are to, "(i) create strong incentives to start to reduce GHG emissions, (ii) provide a cost-effective framework for international cooperation, and (iii) maintain options and flexibility
Communication describing steps taken by the United States to meet the goals outlined in the treaty. The report states that "[g] reenhouse gases are accumulating in
Earth's atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing surface air temperatures and sub-surface ocean temperatures to rise .... Human-induced warming

and associated sea level rises are expected to continue through the Twenty-first
century." CICERONE ET AL., supra note 66, at 1. There are indications that the current administration was not entirely satisfied with all of the Report's content. This
dissatisfaction produces some irony in that the Report appears to provide the kind
of statement the administration has been seeking, yet part of the science which the
Report relies upon is disputed by the administration. See Andrew C. Revkin, U.S.
Sees Problems in Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2002, at A1.
177. See David B. Sandalow & Ian A. Bowles, Fundamentals of Treaty-Making on

Climate Change, 292 Sci. 1839 (2001) (discussing GHG concentrations).
178. See UNFCCC, supra note 1, art. 111(3), at 854 (1992) (noting desire for
precautionary/mitigating measures).
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as an international regime is built over the coming years and
decades.

1 79

A "gradual, measured response"' 8 0 and a "short-term action to
reduce emissions" 18' represent opposing viewpoints on the role of
human activity in climate change. These varying perspectives produce different levels of certainty sufficient to provoke a commitment by the United States to accept the Kyoto Protocol
prescription. The Kyoto Protocol calls for reduced GHG levels
seven percent below that of 1990 levels, achieved within the 20082012 time frame.'8 2 Broad-based scientific organizations have
made efforts to provide the background against which the divergent views within the scientific community may be viewed. The issue of feedbacks described above18 3 concerns climate system
sensitivity to a particular forcing, i.e., "global mean temperature
change that would be expected after a time sufficiently long for
both the atmosphere and ocean to come to equilibrium with the
change in climate forcing."1 8 4 The Committee on the Science of
Climate Change of the United States NRC believed the feedback
issue should be given a high priority for future research because the
feedback mechanism contains such a large measure of uncertainty. 1 85 The American Geophysical Union (AGU) has described
the problem in the following manner:
[u] nderstanding climate response to a specified forcing is
one of the major challenges facing the climate research
community. The equilibrium response of the nonlinear
climate system depends in complex ways on various feedbacks, such as changes in water vapor concentrations and
cloudiness that can augment or diminish climate response
from that which would occur in the absence of such feedbacks. In principle, empirical inferences of climate sensitivity would be of great value, but development of such
inferences is confounded by the natural variability of the
179. See Sandalow & Bowles, supra note 177, at 1839 (stating treaty response

objectives).
180. See id. (noting challenges to treaty-making on climate change).
181. See id. (noting United States government's reaction to climate change).
182. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 19, Annex B, 37 I.L.M. 22 (discussing
some goals of Kyoto Protocol).
183. See Houghton et al., The Climate Stystem: An Overview, in WORKING GROUP
I, supra note 2, at 93 (noting impact of climate feedbacks).

184. See CICERONE ET AL., supra note 66, at 1 n.2 (explaining global temperature change would be long enough for atmosphere and ocean to come to
equilibrium).

185. See id. at 31 (stating research priority).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol19/iss1/1

36

Harris: Derogating the Precautionary Principle

20081

DEROGATING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

climate system, by local or regional effects that can be different from the global effects, and by the simultaneous
workings of multiple transient forcings and responses. For
these reasons a principal means for understanding climate
system response to forcing is by use of computer models of
186
the Earth's climate system.

But what the AGU sees as a valid method of reducing climate
change uncertainty, the administration views as a weakness in the
science of climate change. In the administration's view, the computer models developed thus far "are still not accurate enough to
18 7
The
provide reliable forecasts on how climate may change."'
United States administration's critique of current climate change
science is exacting indeed. Not only are there vexing uncertainties
attached to climate change science, but the principal mechanism
which climate scientists developed to reduce these uncertainties
with computer modeling is severely inadequate.
The AGU's position statement on climate change acknowledged the present uncertainties in climate change science but suggested the global community will likely have to learn to live with
these uncertainties. Specifically, the AGU states:
In view of the complexity of the earth climate system, uncertainty in its description and in the prediction of
changes will never be completely eliminated . .

.

. It is

important that public debate take into account the extent
of scientific knowledge and the uncertainties. Science cannot be the sole source of guidance on how society should
respond to climate issues. Nonetheless, scientific understanding based on peer-reviewed research must be central
to informed decision-making. 188
In a summary to the article forming the background from which
the AGU position statement was drawn, the authors presented their
understanding of the climate change question from a geologic viewpoint.1 8 9 An excerpt from that summary states:
186. See Ledley et al., supra note 171, at 4 (stating AGU's description of
problem).
187. See EPA, supra note 170 (explaining government's view on computer
models).
188. See Ledley et al., supra note 171, at 453 (stating AGU's position on climate change).
189. See id. at 12 (presenting information on response of climate system, over
extended period, to increases in greenhouse gases).
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Global mean temperatures have increased between 0.3'
and 0.6' during the last 150 years. This change has not
been monotonic, but it is unusual in the context of the last
few centuries. On the timescale of the last few thousand
years there [has] been larger climatic variation during
times when variations in CO 2 have been relatively low. It is
clear that atmospheric CO 2 is not the only influence on
global climate. However, there have been large natural
variations of CO

2

in the geologic past, and these changes

are correlated with general features of climate change.
There is no known geologic precedentfor large increases of atmospheric C0 2 without simultaneous changes in other components of
the carbon cycle and climate system. 190
This is not scientific hyperbole or alarmist reaction to inconclusive data. It is, instead, a notice to members of the policy-mak-

ing community alerting them to potential changes in climate
brought about by increasing concentrations of GHGs. The AGU
notes " [t] hese changes are predicted to include increases in global
mean surface temperatures, increases in global mean rates of precipitation and evaporation, rising sea levels, and changes in the biosphere."''
GHG concentrations will increase in this century
because of a presumption that without policy prescriptions at the
national and global levels, "the rapidity and uneven geographic distribution of these changes could be very disruptive." 19 2 The AGU
"believes that the present level of scientific uncertainty does not justify inaction in the mitigation of human induced climate change
and/or the adaptation to it.'

19

3

E. Key Findings
Recently uncovered evidence from the Arctic region seems to
support AGU's predictions that increases in the global mean surface temperatures, increases in precipitation, and rising sea levels
may result as a consequence of increasing concentrations of
190. See id. (emphasis added) (summarizing background of AGU position).
191. See FYI, Text of AGU Position Statement on Climate Change, American
Institute of Physics, (Jan. 29, 1999) http://www.aip.org/fyi/1999/fyi99.012.htm
(explaining specific inclusions of predicted changes).
192. See id. (discussing problems associated with GHG concentration
increases).
193. See id. (discussing AGU's recommendations). The term "mitigation" may
imply the restraint on the imposition of limits and the reduction of GHG emissions. There may be differing interpretations.
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GHGs.19 4 The Arctic Council'

95

and the International Arctic Sci-

96

conducted a study evaluating the impact of clience Committee'
mate change on the Arctic region over a four-year period, releasing
the results in Fall 2004.197 The Overview Report portion of the assessment integrated the results of the Scientific Report into a set of
ten "Key Findings."' 9 8 The heading introducing the key findings
offers what is, as Dr. Corell comments, 199 in effect a succinct summary of the ACIA findings:
194. See Ledley, supra note 171, at 463 (discussing climate changes from increased greenhouse gases).
195. See ACIA, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment - Scientific Report, iii (2005),
http://www.acia.uaf.edu/PDFs/ACIA.ScienceChapters-Final/ACIAPrefaceFinal.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (discussing effects in increase of GHGs). The
Arctic Council is an intergovernmental organization "that provides a mechanism
to address the common concerns and challenges faced by arctic people and governments." See id. The Council "is comprised of the eight Arctic nations (Canada,
Denmark/Greenland/Faroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden
and the United States of America), six Indigenous Peoples organizations (Permanent Participants: Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council,
Gwich'in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and Saami Council) .... See id.
196. See id. at iii. (describing commissioning of ACIA). The International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) is an NGO (composed of the national science organization of eighteen countries, including the United States) which works toward
gaining cooperation between scientific organizations conducting Arctic research.
The IASC works closely with the Arctic Council. See id. (describing International
Arctic Science Committee).
197. See Dr. Robert W. Corell, Statement before the U.S. Senate, Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation (Nov. 16, 2004), http://
www.acia.uaf.edu/PDFs/Testimony.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (stating purpose of study). Dr. Corell is Chair of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
(ACIA). The assessment is divided into two parts: one part is a Scientific Report of
more than 1,200 pages that is "fully referenced, and is composed of detailed scientific and technical information describing current understanding of climate
change, climate variability, and increased UV radiation and their consequences
over the entire Arctic region." Id. The second part of the study is an Overview
Report written in plain language summarizing the science underpinning the assessment, and it attempts to "synthesize the key findings of the assessment and
place those insights in a policy-makers framework. It states our collective consensus of understanding and knowledge concerning the consequences of climate
change over the entire Arctic region." Id.
198. See id. at 4 (describing key findings). These ten key findings are: (1)
Arctic climate is now warming rapidly and much larger changes are projected; (2)
Arctic warming and its consequences have worldwide implications; (3) Arctic vegetation zones are very likely to shift, causing wide-ranging impacts; (4) animal species' diversity, ranges, and distribution will change; (5) many coastal communities
and facilities face increasing exposure to storms; (6) reduced sea ice is very likely
to increase marine transport and access to resources; (7) thawing ground will disrupt transportation, buildings, and other infrastructure; (8) indigenous communities are facing major economic and cultural impacts; (9) elevated ultraviolet
radiation levels will affect people, plants and animals; and (10) multiple influences
interact to cause impacts to people and ecosystems. See id.
199. See id. (stating purpose of key findings).
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The Arctic is now experiencing some of the most rapid
and severe climate change on Earth. Over the next 100
years, climate change is expected to accelerate, contributing to major physical, ecological, social, and economic
changes, many of which have already begun. Changes in
[A]rctic climate will also affect the rest of the world
200
through increased warming and rising sea levels.
The following discussion will only draw from the ACIA's findings pertaining to this question, found in the discussion of the first
key finding. One relationship in the discussion is a similarity between observation and prediction in the temperature trend lines
for the Arctic region. This similarity may not exhibit a one-to-one
correlation, but it is discernible. The ACIA "drew upon results of
five climate models from leading climate research centers and one
moderate emissions scenario... to be the primary basis for its as20 1
sessment of the impacts of future climate conditions."
The ACIA projected five GCMs opposing what they contended
were moderate emissions scenarios in terms of the level of future
GHG emissions. The different GCMs make different assumptions
regarding the range of possible responses to increasing GHG concentrations (e.g., the loss rate of polar ice sheets, which can change
ocean salinity and surface density, and can consequently change
ocean depth or direction by particular ocean currents).202 The results were described in the following manner:
Regardless of the emissions scenario or computer model
selected, every model simulation projects significant
200. See id. at 3 (quoting report introduction).
201. See id. (describing basis for future conditions). An emissions scenario
includes an estimate of how societies are likely to evolve, including factors such as
population growth, technological change and economic growth. Integrating these
and other factors into the calculation, an estimate is made of the level of emissions
global society will likely emit. The ACIA notes that climate models represent "aspects of the climate system (such as how clouds and ice cover might be expected to
change, and ultimately how climate and sea level might be influenced) somewhat
differently [different assumptions], resulting in differences in the degree of warming projected." Id. The models (GCMs) attempt to show how the climate system
will likely respond to the increasing emission of GHGs predicted by the emission
scenarios, i.e., what will be the "climate sensitivity" to those emissions. See id.
202. See WORKING GRouP I, supra note 2, at 50 (noting range of possibilities).
Reduction of sea ice gives a positive feedback on climate warming at high
latitudes. Furthermore, because sea ice contains less salt than seawater,
when sea ice is formed the salt content (salinity) and density of the surface layer of the ocean is increased. This promotes an exchange of water
with deeper layers of the ocean, affecting ocean circulation.
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global warming over the next 100 years. Even using the
lowest emissions scenario, and the model that generates
the least warming in response to changes in atmospheric
composition, leads to a projection that the earth will warm
more than twice as much in this century as it warmed over
the past century. Model simulations further indicate that
the warming in the Arctic will be substantially greater than
the global average (in some regions, more than
double) .203

The five GCMs utilized by the ACIA under a middle range
emissions scenario project temperature change over roughly the
next century. After averaging the change calculated by the five
models, the ACIA reported that:
By the latter part of this century, annual average temperatures are projected to rise across the entire Arctic, with
increases of roughly 3-5 degrees Centigrade over the land
areas and up to 7 degrees Centigrade over the oceans.
Winter temperatures are projected to rise significantly
more, with increases of 4-7 degrees Centigrade over the
oceans.204

These projections are commensurate with recently gathered observational data from the Arctic region. This data observes the
following:
Records of increasing temperatures, melting glaciers, reductions in extent and thickness of sea ice, thawing
permafrost, and rising sea level all provide strong evidence
of recent warming in the Arctic. There are regional variations due to atmospheric winds and ocean currents, with
some areas showing [more] warming than others and a
few areas even showing a slight cooling; but for the Arctic
as a whole, there is a clear warming trend. There are also
patterns within this overall trend; for example, in most
places, temperatures in winter are rising more rapidly
20 5
than in summer.
203. See ACIA, supra note 195, at 27 (describing results).
204. See id. at 28 (quoting ACIA report).
205. See id. at 22 (describing patterns and trends). Recent work on the Arctic,
particularly on what is known as the "ice-albedo feedback" effect, seems to support
the notion that a discernible receding of the Arctic ice cap is occurring due to
climate change (it seems unlikely that the rate of loss in sea ice in the Arctic is due
to natural variation), at least a portion of which may be due to anthropogenic
activity. See Gabrielle Walker, Climate Change: The Tipping Point of the IceBerg, 441
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The findings by the ACIA for the Arctic region provide support
for some of the IPCC's results at the global level in 2001:
There is a wide range of evidence of qualitative consistencies between observed climate changes and model responses to anthropogenic forcing. Models and observations show increasing
global temperatures, increasing land-ocean contrast, diminishing sea-ice extent, glacial retreat, and increases in
precipitation at high latitudes in the Northern Hemisphere. Some qualitative inconsistencies remain, including the fact that models predict a faster rate of warming in
the mid-to upper troposphere than is observed in either
20 6
satellite or radiosonde tropospheric records.
The ACIA's reported work and, at least partial substantiation of
findings by the IPCC's Third Assessment prompted Dr. Robert
Corell, the ACIA's Chair, to remark:
The major message is that climate change is here and now
in the Arctic. The scientific evidence of the last 25 to 30
years is very dramatic and substantial. The projections of
future change indicate that this trend will continue and be
substantially greater than the trends we're seeing on a
20 7
global scale.
Thus, there are rapidly approaching consequences of Arctic region
climate change.
NATURE

802 (2006) (discussing effect of melting of Arctic sea ice). Apparently the

annual reduction in Arctic sea ice caused by solar radiation in the summer has
been excessive in recent decades. This change from past patterns results in more
open water in the Arctic region.
Open water reflects much less sunlight than ice - in what it is known as
lower albedo - so the greater the area of dark open water, the more summer warmth the ocean stores. More stored heat means thinner light ice
in the next winter, which is more vulnerable to melting the next summer
- meaning yet more warmth being stored in the open water in the following year ....
Id. at 802. There could be multiple impacts due to a substantial loss of sea ice,
including a change in high-altitude wind patterns (including jet streams), deterioration of the Greenland ice sheet and most importantly, a shift in the
thermohaline circulation. Thermohaline circulation is an ocean current which
transports heat between different regions of the oceans, due to a "freshening" (diluted salinity) of the circulation. See id. For a discussion of thermohaline circulation, see infra notes 374-75 and accompanying text.
206. See WORKING GROUP I, supra note 2, at 57 (emphasis added) (quoting
IPCC report supporting findings of ACIA report).
207. See Andrew C. Revkin, Study Finds Warming Trend in Arctic Linked to Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004, at A3 (quoting ACIA chair).
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Mitigation

The AGU contends a cautionary posture by the global community toward future possible climate change is advisable. 2 08 The
UNFCCC appears to have incorporated a precautionary
9
"approach": 201
The parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent, or minimize the causes of climate change
and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of

serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such
measures, taking into account that policies and measures
to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as
210
to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.

In this quote from the UNFCCC, the term "mitigation" refers not to
the causes of climate change, in the sense the AGU appears to utilize the term, but to the consequences of climate change. Although
it is conceded that scientific uncertainty is not an appropriate reason for postponing steps to prevent or minimize the causes of climate change, this directive is qualified by the statement that such
steps should be "cost-effective." 21 1 The present administration included, as a major component of its climate change strategy, a plan
for the adaptation to and mitigation of the potential adverse effects
of a change in the global climate, with greater emphasis on
2 12
adaptation.
This administration is fully justified in seizing upon the language in Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol when shaping a national
response to climate change. Article 3 calls for signatories to "prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its ad208. See AGU, HUMAN IMPACTS ON CLIMATE (2003), http://www.agu.org/
sci-soc/policy/climate-change-position.html (outlining extent of changes which
climate change may cause and recommending adoption of strategies including
emissions reduction).
209. See id. (calling for mitigation of adverse effects of climate change).
210. See UNFCCC, supra note 1, art. 111(3) (emphasis added) (incorporating
precautionary approach).
211. See id. (emphasizing that measures responding to climate should have
lowest possible cost).
212. SeeJanet Gamble & Caitlin Simpson, Chapter 9: Human Contributions and
Response to Environmental Change, Climate Change Science Program, in CH. 9 STRATEGIC
PLAN FOR THE U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM AT 94-100 (2003), http://
www.climatescience.gov/Library/stratplan2003/final/ccspstratplan2003-chap9.pdf
(last visited Oct. 1, 2007) [FINAL STRATEGIC PLAN] (noting disposition of present
administration towards adaptation over mitigation).
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verse affects." 213 Additional language in the UNFCCC, specifically
Article 4 language, calls for developed countries and all Annex 1
countries generally to "adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting
its anthropogenicemissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs." 214 In its exploitation of the UNFCCC's Article 3 language, the administration
mistakenly emphasized mitigation. The administration emphasized
minimizing adverse consequences, but it should have emphasized
emission reduction or limitation.
Both the AGU and the IPCC would support an effort to adapt
to the effects of climate change, but only as part of an overall strategy placing the highest priority on prescribed emission limits and
reduction. Many of those who have deliberated on the climate
change issue understand the term mitigation to mean something
other than just limiting impact. Because it will take many years to
alter the warming process, any action to reduce emissions will:
[R] equire two sets of actions: one, called mitigation, to slow
the speed and amount offuture climate change by reducinggreenhouse gas emissions; and the other, called adaptation, to attempt to limit adverse impacts by becoming more resilient
to the climate changes that will occur while society pur2 15
sues the first set of actions.
The AGU and ACIA contend that to arrange policy priorities otherwise would place the global environment at risk.2 16 To some observers, this is precisely what the current administration did by
opting out of the Kyoto Protocol's prescribed emission limits and
placing a high priority on societies' adaptation and the mitigation
of climate change effects.
The current administration argues that the hierarchy it has
structured, with varied emphasis placed on different aspects of the
climate change question, is the best policy for the United States. It
is important to consider how national governments can come to
grips with public policy decisions as difficult as climate change.
213. See UNFCCC, supra note 1, art. 111(3) at 854 (emphasis added) (advocating precautionary measures).
214. See id. art. IV(2) (a) (emphasis added) (stating Article 4 restrictions).
215. See Susan Joy Hassol, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment in IMPACTS OF A
WARMING ARcric 8-9 (Cambridge University Press 2004) (emphasis added) (discussing global climate changes).
216. See AGU,HUMAN IMPACTS

ON CLIMATE, supra note 208 (emphasizing importance of adaptation); ACIA, supra note 195 (stressing need to reduce
emissions).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol19/iss1/1

44

Harris: Derogating the Precautionary Principle

2008]

DEROGATING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

These decisions are particularly difficult because they are immersed
in uncertainty. The policy choices of the current administration
seem to be rooted in the language of the UNFCCC that calls for
mitigation of the adverse effects of climate change. The United
States Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) identified the mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change as a critical research
need: "[The] assessment of the full costs and benefits (including
productivity impacts) of environmental policy and technology
choices (mitigation and adaptation)... effect human well-being at
2 17
different scales, including the individual or household level."

The current administration's policy statements indicate that the administration intends the "environmental policy and technology
choices" to apply to the adverse effects of climate change.
On a global scale, considerable gaps exist in understanding,
modeling and quantifying the sensitivity and vulnerability of human
systems to global change and measuring the capacity of human systems to adapt. For instance, little is known about the effectiveness
of applying adaptation experience with past and current climate variability and extreme events to the realm of climate change adaptation; nor is much known about how this information could be used
to improve estimates of the feasibility, effectiveness, costs, and benefits of adaptation to long term change. 2 18 Most climate scientists
believe work on adaptation to climate change is necessary, but they
also believe it should not be performed at the expense of work on
reducing projected future emissions. Because GHGs have long residence times in the atmosphere, there will be varying, but significant, impacts on different societies in future decades affecting the
well-being of future generations. Thus, gaining an understanding
of climate fluctuations is an important milestone along the path
2 19
towards sustainability.
G.

Negotiations

It is difficult to fault the current administration for heavily emphasizing adaptation, and for what the administration terms a "mitigation of impacts" strategy. But commentators note how critical it
217. See UNITED STATES CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, supra note 65, at
95 (stating importance CCSP places on climate change as critical research need).
218. See id. at 90 (discussing some problems regarding current climate
variability).
219. See Shardul Agrawala & Mark A. Cane, Sustainability: Lessons from Climate
Variability and Climate Change, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 309, 310 (2002) (discussing
impacts of climate fluctuations on people's sustainability).
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is for the administration to make use of an entire range of options
in responding to climate change:
[A]ttention needs to be paid to the associated costs and
benefits of adaptation strategies, strategies for mitigating
the impacts of global change on different economic sectors and people in different locations and economic
brackets, market and non-market valuations of positive
and negative impacts, the possibility of new economic instruments for responding to global change, and the role
of public and private institutions and public policies in in220
fluencing adaptive capacity.
The current administration's climate change research agenda includes the intent to study the effects of mitigation steps regarding
emissions limitations or reductions in the more common usage of
the term. The administration's preferred term, instead, appears to
be "emission targets." In its CCSP 221 the administration recently
identified a key research need to pursue the:
Development of the capability to study the economic and
trade effects of various mitigation options that differ in
complex ways, both within and among countries, including broad policy approaches (e.g., emission targets, technology subsidies, voluntary national goals) and means of
implementation (e.g., voluntary programs, incentives,
taxes, cap and trade systems and quantity constraints). 2 22
A clear research objective of CCSP is to study the economic
impacts of efforts to reach certain emission targets. The efforts
would be voluntary, with added reliance on incentives. Depending
on the size of incentives and how vigorously the voluntary efforts
are promoted, positive results could be realized. The research leading to the implementation of such a mitigation program, however,
is not necessarily focused on reduction or limitation. The chapter
220. See Gamble & Simpson, supra note 212, at 96 (discussing costs and benefits of adaptation strategies). Interestingly, in this passage the authors cite to the
IPCC, perhaps in an effort to show there is a measure of compatibility between the
IPCC's recommendations for responses to climate change, and the future policy
choices of the United States administration. See id.
221. For a discussion of the history of the CCSP, see supra note 65 and accompanying text; see also NRC, REVIEW OF DAFr STRATEGIC PLAN 1, supra note 75 and
accompanying text (describing research goals).
222. See Gamble & Simpson, supra note 212, at 95 (emphasis added) (discussing key research plans).
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covering "human contributions and responses to environmental
change" poses two key questions:
What can be projected about the effectiveness, cost, and
environmental and health effects of alternative energy and
mitigation technologies, including sequestration options?
How can this research contribute to efforts to develop mitigation technology options by, for example, placing values
on such items as temporary carbon storage and the availa223
bility of limited resources such as land and water?
Carbon sequestration occurs when oceans or various activistore, remove, or absorb carbon dioxide existing in reserties
voirs2 25 or sinks. 226 The UNFCCC integrates sequestration in its
precautionary measures. When forming national policies, precautionary measures "should take into account different socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks
and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise
all economic sectors." 22 7 The Kyoto Protocol attempts to strike a
balance between technically achievable and economically manageable ways to reduce anthropogenic emissions on one hand and possible increases in CO 2 absorption by terrestrial systems on the other.
Regarding the increases in CO 2 absorption, the objective is to re22
duce GHG concentrations in the atmosphere.
In attempting to achieve this aim, at COPI in Berlin in 1995,
the parties stipulated a policy that formed part of the Berlin Mandate. 2 29 The policy stated that the soon to be negotiated Protocol
22 4

223. See id. at 94 (stating questions for technological change).
224. See ROBERT T. WATSON ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON LAND USE, LAND USE CHANGE AND FORESTRY 6
(2000), http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/srlulucf-e.pdf (last visited Oct 1, 2007) [Watson
et al., LAND USE] (describing land use, land use change, and forestry).
225. See UNFCCC, supra note 1, at art. 1(7) (defining term reservoir). A reservoir is a "component or components of the climate system where a greenhouse
gas or a precursor of a greenhouse gas is stored." Id.
226. See id. (defining term sink). A sink is "any process, activity or mechanism
which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas
from the atmosphere." Id.
227. See id. at art. III (stating principles for Article III).
228. See Schulze et al., supra note 21, at 506 (discussing specific and broad
goals of Kyoto Protocol to UNFCCC).
229. See Paul G. Harris, Common But Differentiated Responsibility: The Kyoto Protocol and United States Policy, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 27, 32-33 (1999) [KYoTO AND U.S.
POLICY] (citing Report of Conference of Parties on its First Session [Conference of
the Parties I]). The main thrust of the Berlin Mandate was concerned with the
"common but differentiated responsibilities" principle (CBDR). Id. "The CBDR
principle was reaffirmed in 1995 at the first conference of the FCCC parties in
Berlin. Countries agreed to the 'Berlin Mandate,' whereby developed countries
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to the UNFCCC would cover "anthropogenic emissions by sources
and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the
Montreal Protocol." 23 0 The Kyoto Protocol mandated that:
The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources
and removals from sinks resulting from direct human-induced land use change and forestry activities, limited to
afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation since 1990,
measured as verifiable changes in stocks in each commitment period shall be used to meet the commitments in
this Article of each Party included in Annex I. The greenpledged to act first to reduce their GHG emissions before requiring developing
countries to do so." Id. at 32-33 (citing Conference of the Parties I), see U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties, 1st Sess., at
1, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (1995), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop/07a01.pdf. "The Berlin Mandate declares that the process of
implementing the Climate Convention shall be guided, inter alia, by the CDBR
principle." See Harris, KYOTO AND U.S. POLICY at 33 (citing Conference of the Parties I, art. 1(1)(a), at 4).
It reminds parties that they are required to consider the special needs of
the developing countries and that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases had originated in developed
countries, that the per capita emissions in developing countries are still
relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs.
Id. (quoting Conference of the Parties I, art. I(1) (d), at 5) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). "It goes on to state: 'The global nature of climate change calls
for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an
effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social
and economic conditions.'" Id. (quoting Conference of the Parties I, art. I(1) (e),
at 5).
230. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties, MARCH 28 - APRIL 7, 1995, FIRST SESSION HELD AT BERLIN, 5,
FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (June 6, 1995), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/copl/07a01.pdf. See also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change Ad Hoc Group On the Berlin Mandate, OCTOBER 30 - NOVEMBER 3, 1995,
SECOND SESSION HELD AT GENEVA,
17-46, at 7-11, FCCC/AGBM/1995/7 (Nov. 21,
1995), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/1995/agbm/O7.pdf (noting
discussions held at meeting on possible policies which could be implemented to
advance goals of Berlin Mandate); see also Alexander Gillespie, Sinks and the Climate
Change Regime: The State of Play, 13 DuKE ENVrL. L. & POL'Y F. 279 (2003) (discussing objectives set by Berlin Mandate); Jennifer L. Morgan, Global Climate, 6 Y.B.
INT'L. ENVrL. L. 223, 229 (1995) (explaining Berlin Mandate). Afforestation can
be defined as the laying down of tree plantations that occurs on land that has not
been forested for at least 50 years. See also Watson, et al., supranote 224, at 6 (defining afforestation and deforestation). Reforestation is a conversion of non-forested
land into forested land through human activity, but the land in question has not
been through a 50-year span in which it was not forested. See id. But in practical
terms reforestation means the planting of new tress immediately after a disturbance or harvesting, and where no land use change has occurred. See id. In general terms, deforestation is the clearance of forests from land with no intention of
reforestation, i.e., to put the land in question to different use. See id.
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house gas emissions from sources and removals by sinks
associated with those activities shall be reported in a trans-

parent and verifiable manner and reviewed in accordance
with Articles 7 and 8.231

The Protocol's language, however, was sufficiently ambiguous to
produce major disputes over its interpretation and application, par-

ticularly in the COP negotiations. Although the basic idea behind
the Kyoto Protocol was to promote greater natural carbon sequeswording cretration then pre-1990 levels, the Protocol's ambiguous
232
ated major discrepancies in interpretation.
Divergent views on the appropriate method of carbon accounting began with the negotiation of the Protocol itself. The United
States urged the inclusion of GHG reduction through the use of
sinks and "actual emission limitations in measuring attainment of

2 33 Most other countries in the negotiaits overall commitment."'
tions opposed using sinks and reservoirs and prevailed on this posi-

tion. 234 Although the power to use sinks is limited to "afforestation,

235 due to the lack of research in
reforestation, and deforestation,"
that area, the Protocol allows a degree of creativity in defining sinks
and their use. Countries may use carbon sinks to offset emissions
by "planting new forests (afforestation and reforestation) instead of

practicing deforestation ....

or by applying new management ap-

proaches ....,,236 The IPCC notes that modifications in management are included in the Protocol. It states, "[f or those activities
where only narrowly defined management changes under Art. 3.4
are involved (e.g., conservation tillage) and the land use remains

231. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 17, art. 111(3) (discussing monitoring of
net changes in GHG emissions caused by certain sources and removal).
232. See Schulze et al., supra note 21, at 509 (stating basic idea of Kyoto Protocol and discrepancies caused by wording of Protocol).
233. See Perry E. Wallace, Global Climate Change and the Challenge to Modern
American Corporate Governance, 55 SMU L. Rv. 493, 506 (2002) (describing United
States commitment to reduction of GHGs through sinks and actual emission
limitations).
234. See Schroder, supra note 151, at 82 (noting how most developing countries were opposed to unearned credits for naturally occurring absorption).
235. See id. (quoting Kyoto Protocol art. 111(3)); see Kyoto Protocol, supra note
17, art. 111(3) (discussing limits of sink use).
236. See Schulze et al., supra note 21, at 507 (discussing alternatives of using
carbon sinks to offset emissions). See also Kyoto Protocol, supra note 17, art. 3(4), at
3 (encouraging establishment of rules and guidelines to outline role of sinks in
Protocol).
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the same, it may be feasible to partially factor out natural variability
237
and indirect effects."
After the Protocol was finalized in 1997 at COP3, debate over
sinks continued among different groups of countries. By the time
of COP6 in 2000, which was held in two parts, there were at least six
identifiable discrete groups of states engaged in the debate. 23 8 The
two most important groups were the Umbrella group and the European Union (EU) group. Both groups were important because
their members were all Annex I states that held the largest responsibility under the Protocol to reduce GHG emissions in the first commitment period (2008-2012).239 These two groups had opposing
views on the appropriate method of carbon accounting. The Umbrella group's position was:

[B] iological sinks should be credited to balance fossil fuel
emissions ....

[L]and management is an important tool

to produce or enhance sinks. [Also,] a national full carbon balance (full carbon accounting) should be used as
[a] basis for negotiations, because virtually all land in industrialized nations is in fact being managed; even national parks [which] are [being] set aside by human
actions. The [United States] delegation made clear in the
general assembly that they would use statistical sampling
and models in order to integrate the biological sinks of
North America and determine from this the C storage of
240
the nation.
237. See Watson et al., supra note 224, at 11 (discussing possibility of factoring
out natural variability and indirect effects).
238. See Schulze et al., supra note 21, at 509 (stating existence of six identifiable groups of states).
In negotiating a complicated issue among more than 100 nations it is
inevitable that the partners will form groups to more effectively articulate
their demands and requests. The main groups in the Kyoto negotiations
were: (1) the Umbrella group consisting of the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, Norway, New Zealand, and the Russian Federation; (2) the EU
group, comprising its 15 member states; (3) the G77 with China, which
contains the developing countries, including Saudi Arabia; (4) AOSIS,
the Association of Small Island States, which run the risk of being
drowned by sea level rise; (5) GlI, i.e., the European countries with transition economies, and (6) the Environmental Integrity Group, led by
Switzerland.
Id.
239. See id. at 506 (explaining industrial prominence and higher emission
standards for Annex I states under protocol).
240. See id. at 509 (describing position of Umbrella Group on bio-sinks and
United States delegation's insistence on using statistical sampling models with biosinks).
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The position of the EU group differed greatly from that of the Umbrella group: "The EU [group] wished to restrict the accountability
of sinks, and to encourage technological changes that reduce fossil
fuel emission (increased efficiency of energy use, and of alternative
energies sources) [and] [t] he only area proposed to allow accounting of biological sinks was afforestation and reforestation . . 241
The carbon accounting issue serves as a useful illustration of the
admistration's decision to rely on policy when responding to climate change. The United States defines mitigation as an action
taken to reduce adverse effects of GHG emissions instead of as a
measure taken to reduce fossil fuel emissions.
At the COP6 2000 Hague meeting, the United States declared
its strong support for full carbon accounting and its opposition to
any restrictions on that method.
However, due to scientific uncertainty in calculation
of carbon sequestration by sinks, the EU rejected the
United States position and demanded limits on how much
forest sequestration could be claimed toward meeting Kyoto obligations. Although the two factions neared agreement in this area (with the United States offering to
an acreduce its sink claim from 312 to 20 million tons),
24 2
collapsed.
talks
the
and
cord proved too elusive
The talks were unsuccessful because of technical concerns.
One concern surrounded the debate of the term forest management.
"Normal forest management is excluded from the Kyoto Protocol,
although [normal forest management] is by no means always carbon-neutral [and] can result in additional sinks or sources for
CO 2.' ' 2 4 3 Although the Protocol itself, in Article 3(3), speaks only to
"human-induced land use change and forestry" as eligible for inclusion as sinks, the relevant terms became "land use, land use change,
and forestry" (LULUCF) 244 This change occurred partly because
of the recognition that forest management need not include a
change in the purpose for which the forest is used. Simple land
use, therefore, should be explicitly incorporated in deliberations
241. See id. (contrasting view of EU group with Umbrella Group).
242. See Gillespie, supra note 22, at 289 (citing Sarah Simpson, Debit or Credit?,
Sci. AM., Feb. 2001, at 25; Hotting Up in the Hague, ECONOMIST, Nov. 18, 2000, at 97)
(describing factors contributing to failure of talks at 2000 Hague meeting).
243. See Schulze et al., supra note 21, at 509 (discussing possibility of additional sinks and CO 2 sources due to forest management).
244. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, LAND USE, LAND
USE CHANGE, AND FORESTRY at 61 (Robert Watson eds. 2000) (explaining current
terminology stemming from Article 3(3) of the Kyoto Protocol).
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leading to a decision on the proposed acreage's eligibility as a sink.
Land use is the "total of arrangements, activities, and inputs that
people undertake in a certain land cover type," with land cover being the "observed physical and biological cover of the earth's land,
as vegetation or man-made features.

'245

The issue, at least in part, centered on whether certain types of
land use could be legitimately placed in the category of forest management. A forest is typically defined as "[a] n area managed for the
production of timber and other forest products or maintained as
woody vegetation for such indirect benefits as protection of catchment areas or recreation."' 24 6 During the COP6 Hague Meeting,

the EU's initial position was that the inclusion of sinks in a carbon
accounting system should be limited to forests because the aim was
to "restrict the accountability of sinks, and to encourage technological changes that reduce fossil fuel emission (increased efficiency of
energy use, and of alternative energies sources)."247 The EU proposed to allow accounting of biological sinks only for "afforestation
and reforestation." 248 This position was consistent with the Protocol's language discussing net changes in GHG emissions by sources
and removals by sinks. The Protocol specified that commitments
must be met by "direct human-induced land use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation since 1990."249 The Protocol provides that in the future COPs

may consider "removals in the agricultural soils" and possible modification of LULUCF categories. 250
During the course of the two sessions of COP6, the Parties considered certain "additional activities" under the Protocol's Article
3(4).251 Activities in addition to afforestation, reforestation and de245. See id. at 61 (citing UNITED NATIONS FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION (FAO), STATE OF WoRLD's FORESTS (1997); FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION/UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM (FAO/UNEP); TERMINOLOGY
FOR INTEGRATED RESOURCES PLANNING AND

MANAGEMENT

(1999))

(defining land

use and land cover).

246. See id. (defining forest).
247. See Schulze et al., supra note 21, at 511 (presenting positions of Umbrella
group and EU).
248. See id. at 508 (stating net changes in GHGs must be directly human induced). See also Fred Pearce, Kyoto Lives, NEW Sci.,July 28, 2001, at 13 (discussing
net changes).
249. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 19, at art. 3(3) (stating goals of EU and
only proposed area for sink use).
250. See id. at art. 3(4) (stating possible consideration of sinks in future

COP's).

251. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 244, at
195-98 (describing additional activities as reforestation and deforestation or ARD,
in addition to afforestation).
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forestation (ARD) would be accountable in the first commitment
period. The Parties agreed at COP6 to include the emissions by
sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gasses created by revegetation, in addition to ARD. 25 2 The Bonn draft decision on land
use explained:
Based on the Agreement at COP6, caps and discounts
are to be applied to the national reports2 53 in order to
account for effects of elevated CO 2 and N-deposition as
well as to account for pre 1990 management activities. For
crop- and grazing-land management and re-vegetation
sinks will be accepted as full C-sinks on a so-called net-net
basis (i.e., the flux rate from 2008 until 2012 minus the
flux at 1990 times five.). In contrast, forest management
252. See United Nations Framework Convent-on on Climate Change Conference of the Parties, October 29 - November 10, 2001, SEVENTH SESSION HELD AT
MARAKESH, 58, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (Jan. 21, 2002), available at http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01.pdf (last visited Oct. 2 2007) [COP7] (discussing agreement at COP7 of what activities would be counted). Under "definitions, modalities, rules and guidelines relating to land use, land-use change, and
forestry activities under the Kyoto Protocol," the following definitions are given:
(e) '[r]evegetation' is a direct human-induced activity to increase carbon
stocks on sites through the establishment of vegetation that covers a minimum area of 0.05 hectares and does not meet the definitions of afforestation and reforestation contained here;
(f) '[f]orest management' is a system of practices for stewardship and use
of forest land aimed at fulfilling relevant ecological (including biological
diversity), economic and social functions of the forest in a sustainable
manner;
(g) '[c] ropland management' is the system of practices on land on which
agricultural crops are grown and on land that is set aside or temporarily
not being used for crop production;
(h) '[g]razing land management' is the system of practices on land used
for livestock production aimed at manipulating the amount and type of
vegetation and livestock produced.
Id.
253. See Schulze et al., supra note 21, at 513 (citing why discounts applied).
See also UNFCCC, supra note 1, at art. XII(1) (a), 31 I.L.M. 849, 865 (requiring
communication of information related to objectives of Convention). National Reports are national communications which each party to the UNFCCC is obligated
to make to the Conference of the Parties. See id. at 865. In part, a national report
is "[a] national inventory of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by
sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, to the extent its capacities permit, using comparable methodologies to be promoted and
National
agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties." See id. See also UNFCCC
4
Reports, available at http://unfccc.int/national_reports/items/1 08.php (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (listing types of required reports). There are three different
types of reports that are submitted: "periodic submissions by developed countries
covering all aspects of implementation," that is, Annex I countries; "annual submissions by developed countries on greenhouse gas emissions and removals," often
referred to as inventories; and "periodic submissions by Parties not included in
Annex 1,"covering all aspects of implementation. See id.
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sinks are defined based on the change in C-pools during
the commitment period (2008 to 2012), discounted by
85% in order to account for the effects of elevated CO 2, Ndeposition and forest age structure resulting from activi254
ties and practices before the reference year.

This was the essence of the Bonn Agreement (Bonn) as pertaining
to additional activities reached at COP6.
The United States rejected the agreement, and after the COP6
Hague meeting, the delegation did not participate in any Bonn sessions. COP6 PresidentJon Pronk summarized the additional activities and achievements of the Hague session. To a certain extent,
the following Pronk summary is a restatement of the preceding
255
quote:
First interval (full crediting up to level of 3.3 debit)
Parties recognize the unintended outcome of article 3.3,
namely that countries who have an overall increase in
their total forest carbon stock, may nevertheless have their
assigned amounts reduced because of accounting and definitional conventions under article 3.3. Therefore, Parties
decide that Parties may fully account for carbon stock
changes and net GHG emissions in areas under forest
management up to a level that is equal to the net debit
incurred under the provisions of article 3.3, under the
condition that the total forest carbon stock changes since
1990 in that country compensates the net debit incurred
under the provisions of article 3.3. This first interval shall
not be more than 30 Mt CO 2.

Second interval (discounted crediting in remaining interval to
factor out non-direct human induced effects and to address
uncertainty)
Parties decide that carbon stock changes accounted for in
accordance with the provisions of article 3.4 shall, for the
broadly defined management activities, exclude the effects
of indirect nitrogen deposition, elevated CO 2 concentrations, other indirect effects and, (for forest ecosystems)
the dynamic effects of age structure resulting from man254. See Schulze et al., supra note 21, at 513 (citing paragraph 1 (h) and n.5 of
Bonn draft decision on land-use FCCC/CP/2001/L.11/Rev.1/CMP.1), availableat
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/ 10. 1046/j.1 365-2486.2002.00523.x
(last visited Oct. 24, 2007).
255. For a discussion of climate change impact see infra, note 268 and accompanying text.
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agement activities before 1990. Therefore, Parties shall apply a reduction of [30 percent] of the net carbon stock
changes and net GHG emissions that result from additional cropland and grazing land management activities
and 85% to the net carbon-stock changes and net GHG
2 56
emissions that result from additionalforest management.

The conference thus recognized that countries where sinks had
come under direct human management activities should be allotted credit for those sinks.
In summary, those Annex 1 countries acting to fulfill their obligations under Article 3.3 of the Protocol (afforestation, reforestation and deforestation) which incur a net gain of GHGs (a debit)
may offset that debit with additional activity removals under Article
3.4 up to a certain limit. The parties decided that to fulfill their
obligations under Protocol Article 3.4, the parties "shall apply a reduction of thirty percent to the net carbon stock changes and net
GHG emissions that result from additional cropland and grazing
land management activities and of eighty-five percent to the net
carbon stock changes and net GHG emissions that result from addi257 The parties' agreement
tional forest management activities. .
on these proportions came at a cost; the United States stopped participating in the COP6 Hague negotiations. The main issue at debate was the appropriate discount rate to apply to additional
activities, particularly additional forest management. At one point
during the COP6 Hague negotiations, the United States proposed
that under Article 3.4, "all countries would be able to count fully
not more than [twenty] million tonnes of annual carbon uptake in
managed forests," and "[c] redits beyond this level would be limited
by two-thirds. '258 In this respect, some groups of countries stressed
the need to differentiate credits for additional human induced CO 2
uptake from natural, non-human induced C2 uptake. They as"...

256. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Confer-

ence of the Parties, November 13-25, 2000,

FIRST PART OF ITS SIXTH SESSION HELD

13, FCCC/CP/2000/5/Add.2 (Apr. 4, 2001) (emphasis added),
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop6/05aO2.pdf [COP 6] (applying
discount rate to net GHG emissions resulting from direct human activities on
cropland, land grazing, and forest management).
257. See Gillespie, supra note 22, at n.136 (discussing what parties agreed with
regard to.first commitment period).
258. See INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (IISD),
AT THE HAGUE,

SUMMARY OF THE SIXTH CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2000) VOL. 12 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., No. 163

Nov. 27, 2000, at 11 (summarizing outcome of COP6, and U.S. proposals for Art.
3.4), available at http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12163e.html.
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serted that countries should not be able to offset carbon emission
debits with non-human induced carbon removals. The problem
was basically one of scale. The EU and other groups in the Hague
negotiations responded to the United States proposal to allow
twenty million tons of annual carbon uptake from managed forests:
[T] he UK, on behalf of the EU, responded to the [United
States] proposal. [It] said the EU accepts the concept of
carbon sinks, especially forests, but, with the Central
Group Eleven.

.

. and Norway, stressed a number of

problems, especially of scale. The G-77/China change
stressed the need to exclude credits for natural uptake.
The [United States], with Japan, said natural effects cannot
be factored out in a satisfactory manner. 259
The majority of parties at the Hague believed a discounting
mechanism would make it difficult to satisfactorily factor out natural CO 2 uptake:
With regard to the second interval 260 a discounted crediting was to apply due to non-human induced effects and
remaining uncertainties in this area. In particular, in the
second period parties were to exclude the effects of indirect nitrogen deposition, elevated carbon dioxide concentrations, other indirect effects and, (for forest ecosystems)
the dynamic effects of age structure resulting from management activities before 1990.261

The United States delegation disagreed with the Hague majority on
two points for two reasons. First, the United States disagreed with
whether the amount of carbon uptake, human or non-human induced, should be held fully accountable. 262 Second, disagreement
arose over what discount rate should be applied for carbon uptake
263
above that level.

The EU group ultimately rejected the United States proposal,
which the United States considered more a concession than a pro259. See id. at 11 (emphasis added) (discussing EU and other country groups,
response to United States proposal of Article 3.4).
260. See Schulze et al., supra note 21, and accompanying text (discussing second interval).
261. See Gillespie, supra note 22, n.136 (discussing application of discounting
credit).
262. See Schulze et al., supra note 21, at 513 (stating EU belief that if Umbrella
position were accepted, no incentive for particular industrial states to reduce emissions would remain).
263. See id. (discussing discount rate concept).
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posal. Key EU environmental ministers (some of them leading
members of national Green parties) could not tolerate the concessions, offered by British deputy Prime Minister John Prescott to the
United States chief negotiator Frank Loy, regarding the counting of
forests as carbon sinks. 264 The dynamics of this exchange are described as follows:
On Wednesday, 22 November, [Mexican] Minister
Carabias Lillo reported on two sessions of informal consultations on LULUCF, which had explored different conditions for including Article 3.4 activities possibly even in the
first commitment period, under controlled conditions.
She noted that the issue had not been resolved ....

On

Thursday, 23 November, she reported that the informal
group on LULUCF had split into two subgroups the previous night, with one group focusing on the analysis of Article 3.4, and the other on the inclusion of LULUCF
activities on the CDM [Clean Development Mechanism].
On the work of the former, she said ideas had been discussed for discountingsome elements, such as pre-1990 uptake . .

.

. She then said the LULUCF group had now

reached a limit, and there was little prospect for
26 5
convergence.
The convergence mentioned by the Mexican delegate did not
occur during the COP6 Hague meeting. 266 The British and United
States delegations did not reach a last gasp deal. John Prescott's
"compromise package, which possibly sought to cater to Umbrella
Group demands on sinks, was not acceptable to others within the
EU. While Pronk's Note made a valiant attempt to find convergence on this issue, it seems the stakes were too high." 26 7 Convergence has still not occurred. At COP7 the Parties formally adopted
the original draft agreement from COP6 (Bonn). The agreement
states:
A Party included in Annex I may choose to account for
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions by sources and
removals by sinks resulting from any or all of the following
264. See Fred Pearce, A Broken Pact, 168 NEW SCIENTIST, 5, Dec. 2, 2000 (noting EU negotiators lack of counter proposals after rejecting U.S. proposal).
265. See IISD, supra note 258, at 11 (stating problems with talk as stressed by
media).
266. See id. (stating convergence did not transpire during COP6).
267. See id. at 18 (discussing certain delegations' disapproval of compromise

package).
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human-induced activities, other than afforestation, reforestation, or deforestation, under Article 3, paragraph 4
and in the first commitment period: revegetation, forest
management, cropland management, and grazing land
management ....
For the first commitment period, accountable anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions by
sources and removals by sinks resulting from cropland
management, grazing land management and revegetation
under Article 3, paragraph 4, shall be equal to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals
by sinks in the commitment period, less five times the anthropogenic gas emissions by sources and removals by
sinks resulting from these eligible activities in the base
year of that Party, while avoiding double accounting.
For the first commitment period, a Party included in Annex I that incurs a net source of emissions under the provisions of Article 3, paragraph 3, may account for'
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions by sources and
removals by sinks in areas under forest management
under Article 3, paragraph 4, up to a level that is equal to
the net source of emissions under the provisions of Article
3 paragraph 3, but not greater than 9.0 megatonnes of carbon times five, if the total anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the managed forest since 1990 is equal to, or larger than, the net
source of emissions incurred under Article 3, paragraph
3.268

At COP6, the EU position stressed the importance of "prevent[ing] the accounting of the large sinks attributed to forest management and agriculture, because if the numbers cited by the
Umbrella group were accepted, this would provide no incentive to
269
reduce fossil fuel emissions by some industrialized nations."
With respect to forest land, in COP6 the United States concluded
that virtually all forests in industrialized countries were "managed,"
e.g., national park forests, and as such, these lands ought to be in-

268. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Confer-

ence of the Parties, October 29 - November 10, 2001, SEVENTH SESSION HELD AT
MARAKESH, 59, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (Jan. 21, 2002), available at http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/1 3a01 .pdf (stating agreement adopted at COP7).
269. See Schulze et al., supra note 21, at *1 (discussing EU's position at
COP6).
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cluded in a full carbon accounting scheme. 27° The United States
suggested that a full accounting of sinks, particularly forests, could
meet as much as half of its emission reduction obligations for the
first commitment period. 27 1 Some quarters have strongly doubted
the accuracy of the United States estimates due to measurement
uncertainties.

272

The United States negotiations leading up to and during COP6
illustrate the formulation of its response to the climate change issue. Acting as a UNFCCC party and a Kyoto COP participant indicates recognition that a degree of precaution regarding climate
change is necessary. The United States, however, continues to pursue a pedestrian rather than an expeditious application of the precautionary principle. To evade significant GHG emission
restrictions, the United States prefers to offset a large proportion of
those emissions through absorption by sinks. The creation or management of sinks to absorb or store GHG emissions is not a reprehensible course of action, but for the country that leads the
emission of GHGs, it seems a less than laudable alternative.
The possibility that the current administration may be exploiting the UNFCCC is disconcerting to some observers. The
UNFCCC's mitigation terminology creates an opportunity to implement a climate change policy that is weaker than preferred, but still
complying with UNFCCC language. The current administration
adopted a form of the precautionary principle, or precautionary approach, in its policy toward climate change. This precautionary
principle is intended to prevent harm to the environment from
proposed or ongoing human activity. 273 The current administra-

tion, however, has adopted a weak and utilitarian form of the precautionary principle. Given the potential adverse consequences of
future climate change, a stronger and more robust principle is
needed.

270. See id. at 511 (stating United States position on carbon accounting
scheme in COP6).
271. See Gillespie, supra note 22, at 289 (discussing claim potential of COP6).
272. See id. at 293 (presenting wide-range of results from different studies).
273. See generally Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary

Principle, 33 ENVrL. 4, 5 (1991); see also James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker,
Refining the PrecautionaryPrinciple in InternationalEnvironmental Law, 14 VA. ENVrL.

L. J. 423, 432 (1995) (discussing vague and variable duties placed on states by
principle). The precautionary idea has been ascribed the status of a legal principle because of the conceptual impression surrounding the concept. See id. at 448.
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POLICY APPLICATIONS

Precautionary Forms

A substantial amount of debate has been generated over
whether precaution as a legal concept is a principle of international
law or remains only a policy guideline. A number of international
legal instruments have incorporated the precautionary concept.
These documents may impose binding legal obligations (i.e., assigning liability for violations of legal obligations) on signatories or
it may only suggest the proper ethical (and voluntary) policy path
signatories are urged to adopt. Where a legal instrument's language indicates binding obligations, a reference to the precautionary concept is a call for voluntary measures on the part of signatory
states. At a minimum, the concept of precaution is an emerging
274
international norm.

The precautionary concept as a principle does have its defenders. 275 One commentator correctly stated that where the precautionary idea might fully be placed in an international law hierarchy,
"[a] t a minimum . .. there is sufficient evidence of state practice to

justify the conclusion that the [precautionary] principle.., reflects
a broadly accepted basisfor internationalaction, even if the consequence
of its application in a given situation remains open to interpretation." 276 Because the term precautionaryprincipleis widely applied, it

will frequently be used along with selective use of the term "precautionary approach," a usage found in several international instruments to convey the nuanced adoption of the precautionary
concept by particular instruments. A good example of this usage
can be found in Agenda 21 from the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in June,

1992:
274. See ZygmuntJ. B. Plater, From the Beginning, A Fundamental Shift in Paradigms: A Theory and Short History of EnvironmentalLaw, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 981, 1000
n. 73 (1994) (discussing adoption of view that humans are part of environmental
whole). For further argument in support of this view, see Owen McIntyre &
Thomas Mosedale, The PrecautionaryPrinciple as a Norm of Customary International
Law, 9J. ENVr'L. L. 221 (1997).
275. See David Freestone & Ellen Hey, Originsand Development of the Precautionary Principle, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHAL-

3 (1996) (defending precautionary principle); James
Cameron & Julie Abouchar, The PrecautionaryPrinciple:A FundamentalPrinciple of
Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C. INT'L. & COMp. L.
REv. 1, 2 (1991) (stating benefits of precautionary principle).
LENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION

276. See Philippe Sands, The "Greening" of InternationalLaw: EmergingPrinciples
and Rules, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 293, 301 (1994) (emphasis added) (dis-

cussing status of precautionary principle as governing rule of international rule).
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In the face of threats of irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific understanding should not be an
excuse for postponing actions which are justified in their
right. The precautionary approach could provide a basis
for policies relating to complex systems that are not yet
fully understood and whose consequences of disturbance
277
cannot yet be predicted.
This statement suggests that an approach, rather than a principle,
might be better suited to address those phenomena that are not
well understood, but which appear to pose threats of some magnitude to the environment. An approach may imply a broader range
of actions in response to perceived threats. An approach should
not be construed to mean that measures in response to threats of
environmental harm should be less than resolute.
Language in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which parallels language in Agenda 21, suggests that states
intend to avoid taking resolute steps if such action exceeds or excessively taxes their capacities. This provides a justification for hesitation in responding to climate change. 278 The phrase cost-effective
measures, when linked to a precautionary approach, provides an economic conditionality not attached to many conceptions of the precautionary principle.
This kind of conditionality depicts a precautionary approach as
weaker in its response to threats than a precautionary principle. It
would seem to call for a policy cognizant of the need for precaution, rather than a policy advocating precautionary steps. "The precautionary approach is more of a conceptual framework than a
legal instrument. In contrast, the "principle" carries stronger legal
' 2 79

implications."

One might very well associate a "precautionary approach" with
the climate change policy framework put in place by the current
277. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
Agenda 21, U. N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/PC/100/Add. 1, Ch. 35, 3 (1992) (promot-

ing scientific knowledge in decision-making process regarding development).
278. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15,
June 13, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (applying precautionary approach discretionarily
on states). Specifically, it notes: "[i]n order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation." Id.
279. See Sonia Boutillon, The PrecautionaryPrinciple: Development of an International Standard, 23 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 429, 434 n.ll (2002) (discussing wide termi-

nology used to reference precautionary principle).
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administration. The UNFCCC employs the term "precautionary
measures" and declares that those measures should be employed
"at the lowest possible costs.

' 28 0

The UNFCCC incorporates the

idea of precaution with a degree of conditionality attached. The
Second North Sea Conference is generally recognized as the first
instance of state recognition of a precautionary approach, usually at
the ministerial or cabinet level. The Ministerial Declaration
(London Declaration) issued by the conference urged recognition
of the precautionary idea to protect the North Sea from potential
harm due to the release of toxic substances. 28 1 The London Declaration states, "a precautionary approach is necessary which may require action to control inputs of such substances even before a
causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific
28 2
evidence."
Use of the current administration's climate change policy as an
example of a precautionary approach appears justified. 28 3 The
question, however, is how a government might move from only an
approach, or general orientation, or perhaps even a weak version of
the principle itself, to a more rigorous policy which rests on a
stronger and reasonably well-defined principle. 2 4 A government
might be persuaded to do this upon a clear showing that accession
will bring greater benefits than reluctance, where the benefit is reduced risks of significant environmental harm. A number of
sources examining different components of the principle might
help determine if particular components would be valuable in the
construction of a policy framework toward an issue like climate
change.
Governments signatory to legal instruments have presumably
found the articulations therein politically acceptable; but the
United States rejection of the Kyoto Protocol illustrated how governments can lose their affection for international agreements over
time. The Kyoto Protocol considerably strengthened the articulation of the precautionary principle employed by the UNFCCC into
280. See UNFCCC, supra note 1, at art. 111(3) at 854 (giving list of principles in

art. 3).
281. See Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea:
Ministerial Declaration Calling for Reduction of Pollution: London, Nov. 25,
1987, 27 I.L.M. 835, (1988) (noting precautionary approach to protect North Sea).
282. See id. at 838. (justifying precautionary approach to protecting North

Sea).

283. See Boutillon, supra note 279, at 431 (noting benefits of precautionary
principle).
284. See Hickey & Walker, supra note 273, at 439 (explaining usefulness of
consensus on criteria of adequacy).
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an articulation which included "a specification of those human activities for which precautionary measures are required. '2 8 5 This
shift to a more robust agreement caused the United States to distance itself from the UNFCCC and to reject the Kyoto Protocol. It
is worth considering what aspects of the precautionary idea, if incorporated into a principle, would render that principle strong, as
opposed to weak.
B.

Standards

A strong precautionary principle might call for a "proof of
harmlessness" standard to determine whether a proposed activity
286
should go forward, be suspended, or be cancelled altogether.
This standard would correspond with the establishment of a standard at or approaching zero-risk. It may be that demanding a proof
of harmlessness or zero-risk standard is asking too much of environmental or natural resource scientific studies. Occasionally, though,
such a demand has been made. One instance where the zero-risk
standard has purportedly been applied is the whaling moratorium
debate within the International Whaling Commission (IWC).287
Such a standard may not be fully applicable, however, since the
IWC achieved a high degree of confidence through biological
surveys of different whale species regarding the "causal link" between intensive commercial exploitation of Baleen whales and the
288
decline in the Baleen whale species.
The imposition of the moratorium was more a protective measure than a precautionary determination because the LWC was con285. See id. at 426 (stating articulation of principle if proposed criteria is uniformly applied).
286. But see Vern R. Walker, The Siren Songs of Science: Toward a Taxonomy of
Scientific Uncertaintyfor Decisionmakers23 CONN. L. REV. 567, 572 (1991) (discussing
proof of harmlessness standard).
287. IWC, Chairman's Report of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting, 33 REP. INT'L
WHALING COMM'N 20-21 (1983) (discussing whaling moratorium). The International Whaling Commission established the whaling "moratorium" in 1982, and it
took effect in 1986 to allow countries with national whaling industries to prepare
for the economic consequences of the temporary ban on commercial whaling.
The key language establishing the ban reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the other provisions of paragraph 10 [of the ICRW
Schedule containing national catch limits], catch limits for the killing for
commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the 1986 coastal and
1985-86 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be zero. This provision will
be kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990
at the latest the commission will undertake a comprehensive assessment
of the effect of this decision on whale stocks and consider modification of
this provision and the establishment of other catch limits.
Id.

288. See id. (discussing details of how species surveys are conducted).
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fident of a close association between over-exploitation of Baleen
whales and the decline in those whale species. The IWC's confidence had risen virtually to the level of a causal relationship between the former and the latter. Thus, the risk to Baleen whale
abundance due to excessive hunting is almost certain. The IWC's
position was that a high degree of certainty of a causal link between
an identified human activity and a consequent harm existed, and
the organization was obligated to take measures to prohibit the activity. 28 9 There is a measure of ambivalence in the precautionary
principle pertaining to the role of a causal link between a proposed, or ongoing, activity and a consequent harm. A perceived
association between a proposed activity and a potential consequent
harm invokes the precautionary principle. It would be difficult to
justify taking precautionary measures absent this perception. Yet,
as the observed association becomes stronger and the probability
increases that a potential harm will occur due to a human activity,
the need for protective steps rather than precautionary ones becomes imperative.
The policy of the IWC to maintain the moratorium on biological grounds may be an application of the precautionary principle.
In its application, estimates of species abundance are a critical component of determining catch limits. Calculation of abundance estimates are nonetheless contentious within the IWC. Certain IWC
members continue to express doubts about the level of certainty attached to the species abundance estimates. 29 0 Observers of the
whaling debate within the IWC have expressed strong skepticism
regarding the estimates, and in some instances, they opined the
population estimates are overestimated. 29 1 At the same time, additional biological data has stimulated strong opinion that the IWC
has failed to sufficiently take into account the relative health of certain whale populations. 29 2 Certain populations may have recovered
to a point where limited commercial exploitation of those populations could be re-instituted without threatening their continued
health. 2 93 Despite such skepticism, the IWC acted cautiously and
289. See id. (outlining lWC's position).

290. See id. (illustrating debates within Commission concerning species abundance estimates).
291. See William C. Burns, The International Whaling Commission and the Future
of Cetaceans: Problems and Prospects, 8 CoLo. J. INT'L. ENVr'L. L. & POL'Y 31, 52
(1997) (discussing 1WC's role in whaling debate).
292. SeeJon Conrad & Trond Bjomdal, On the Resumption of Commercial Whaling: The Case of the Minke Whale in the Northeast Atlantic, 46 ARCTIC 164, 170 (1993)
(noting recovery of certain whale species).
293. See id. (noting recovery of Baleen whale and sperm whale species).
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kept the moratorium in place, overriding sentiment by several IWC
members that the abundance estimates for certain species provide
that commercial whaling for those species could safely be reintroduced.

294

The IWC has applied a strong form of the precautionary principle by keeping the moratorium in place despite mounting evidence that lifting the moratorium would not endanger the health
of certain species. 29 5 Continued uncertainty exists regarding the
level of risk to certain whale populations if commercial exploitation
re-commenced. Although the degree of uncertainty is reduced, it
has not been reduced sufficiently for the majority of IWC member
states. The IWC majority position is primarily concerned with the
magnitude of harm that would ensue if the risk to whale populations materialized.

extinction presents a clear example of an irreversible
the face of such harm, the TWC majority decided that
degree of uncertainty about whether a re-institution of
whaling would result in species extinction is too
29 7
The IWC majority used precautionary language, given
much.
the possibility of irreversible harm, and decided not to alter the
status quo and rescind the moratorium for certain whale populations short of established proof that no harm would ensue to those
Species
harm. 296 In
virtually any
commercial

populations. 298 In a sense, the PWC turned a component of the
precautionary principle on its head by demanding that the causal
link 299 (or high degree of association) between commercial ex294. See IWC, Chairman'sReport of the Forty-Second Meeting, 41 REP. Ir'L. WHALING COMM'N 11, 25-28 (1991) (explaining Norway's position in lifting whaling moratorium). Norway is a country that has taken this position regarding the minke
whale (Balaenoptera acutorostrata).
295. See Alexander Gillespie, The Ethical Question in the Whaling Debate, 9 GEO.
INT'L.

ENv'rL. L. REv. 355, 358-59 (1997) (positing reintroduction of commercial

whaling can be "scientifically justified"); see also Whale PopulationEstimates, International Whaling Commission, available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/conservation/
estimate.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (estimating population of various whale
species).

296. See 1WC,Chairman'sReport of the Forty-FirstMeeting, 40 REP. INT'L. WHALING
COMM'N. 18 (1990) (referring to acceptable risk that stock not be depleted, so that
risk of extinction not seriously increased by exploitation).
297. See id. at 40 (presenting argument that zero catch limit should be retained to avoid risk of species extinction).
298. See Gillespie, supra note 295, at 374-76 (noting need for certainty before
lifting species protections).
299. See United Nation Convention on the Protection and Use of Transbounday Watercourses and InternationalLakes, 31 I.L.M. 1312, 1316 (1992) [Transboundary] (giving text of Helenski Convention); 32 I.L.M. 1069, 1076 (1993) (emphasis added);
see also Unition Nation Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
NortheastAtlantic, 32 I.L.M. 1069, 1076 (1993) [Marine] (giving text of OSPAR Con-
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ploitation and the risk of species extinction be conclusively disjoined
before exploitation could be re-instituted.3 0 0 This may be a case of
asking for proof of harmlessness or zero-risk.30 1
The IWC has stated that those who wish to undertake an activity which may pose some risk of environmental harm or diminish a
natural resource "must prove that the proposed action will not degrade or negatively impact the environment or resource." 30 2 This
burden-shifting is a key element of any strong form of the precautionary principle.3 0 3 This burden-shifting aspect has been noted in
a number of articulations of the precautionary principle. One such
articulation occurred in the Nuclear Tests Case, New Zealand v.
France.30 4 In New Zealand v. France, the dissenting opinion recommended that those who propose a potentially environmentally
harmful activity must establish the activity will do no harm, rather
than ask those who are opposed to an activity to prove that it will be
vention). Most articulations of the precautionary principle which incorporate language referring to a degree of causality do so in a fairly straightforward manner.
Two such instruments are the Helsinki and the OSPAR Conventions. The Helsinki
Convention obligates the parties to recognize:
[t]he precautionary principle, by virtue of which action to avoid the potential transboundary impact of the release of hazardous substances shall
not be postponed on the ground that scientific research has not fully
proved a causal link between those substances, on the one hand, and the
potential transbounday impact, on the other hand....
Transboundary, 31 I.L.M. at 1316 (emphasis added). The OSPAR Convention, in
reference to the release of wastes from the normal operation of ships, states:
[t]he contracting parties shall apply: (a) the precautionary principle, by
virtue of which preventive measures are to be taken when there are reasonable grounds for concern that substances or energy introduced, directly or indirectly, into the marine environment may bring about
hazards to human health, harm to living resources and marine ecosystems, damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea,
even when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal relationshipbetween
the inputs and the effects ..
Marine, 32 I.L.M. 1316.
300. See Steinar Andresen, The Effectiveness of the InternationalWhaling Commis-

sion, 46 ARcric 108, 111 (1993) (discussing key IWC goals and motivations).

301. SeeJonathan Adler, More Sorry than Safe: Assessing the PrecautionaryPrinciple and the Proposed International Biosafety Protocol, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 173, 204-05

(2000) (noting inability of research to eradicate risk).

302. SeeJohn M. MacDonald, Appreciating the PrecautionaryPrinciple as an Ethical Evolution in Ocean Management, 26 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 255, 263 (1995) (ex-

plaining precautionary principle).

303. See Sonia Boutillon, The PrecautionaryPrinciple: Development of An International Standard,23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 429, 439 (2002) (noting best informed must

prove harmlessness of their conduct).

304. See Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph
63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v.

France), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 348 (Sept. 22) (arguing in dissent that reversing burden of
proof was critical in environmental protection).
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bear the burden to esharmful. 3 5 Those who propose the activity
3 6
0
harm..
no
do
will
activity
the
tablish that
The IWC majority holds that commercial whaling proponents
have not yet met the burden of proof by establishing, with an extreme
degree of certainty, that such an action would not deliver harm to particular whale populations. 30 7 This debate that continues within the
IWC seems to have certain parallels to the debate surrounding the
8
UNFCCC and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.30 The current administration concedes there is a measure of association between anthropogenic activity and climate change, but it denies that an unequivocal
causal link exists.3 0 9 Thus, the administration does not believe the
application of a strong version of the precautionary principle is warranted.3 1 1"Rather than initiate action to reduce GHG admissions in
the absence of scientific certainty, the administration requires
proof of harm. " '
C.

Initial Conditions

The United States, in effect, has rejected an application of a
strong precautionary principle for two reasons. First, it determined
that initiating action to diverge from the status quo in a precipitate
fashion is not warranted because a causal link has not been established. 3 12 This posture did not begin with the current administra305. See id. at 348 (arguing that absent proof of safety of tests from France,
New Zealand's claim of potential harm was established).
306. See id. (stating shift in burden of proof approach is sufficiently well established in international law for Court to act upon it).
307. See MacDonald, supra note 302, at 272 (quotingJ.A. Gulland, Fishery Management: How Can We Do Better?, in MANAGEMENT OF WORLD FISHERIES: IMPLICA-

255, 259 (Edward L. Miles, ed.,
1989) (noting need to reestablish whale population completely before whaling

TIONS OF EXTENDED COASTAL STATE JURISDICTION

recommences).
308. See IWC, Chairman's Report of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting, 33 REP.
INT'L WIHALING COMMISSION 20, 20-21 (1983) (outlining doubts about level of certainty in whale abundance estimates).
309. See CICERONE ET AL., supra note 66, at 17 (denying definite causal link

between anthropogenic activity and climate change).
310. See Paula Dobriansky, Sec'y of State for Global Affairs and Head for
United States Delegation to Conference, "The Convention After Ten Years: Accomplishments and Future Challenges," Dec. 15, 2004, http://www.state.gov/g/

rls/rm/2004/39805.htm (discussing complex nature of environmental science as
requiring further study before committing to action).
311. See CICERONE ET AL., supra note 66, at 23-4 (stating United States should
support actions that would improve IPCC process and promote clear appraisal of
uncertainties pertaining to climate change).
312. See id. at 17 (contending uncertainty of natural variability in observed
climate change during last century cannot be positively correlated to climate
change and extant climate models do not provide conclusive results).
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tion, but rather "negotiations over the 1992 Framework Convention
on Climate Change were delayed by the [George H. W.] Bush administration, which espoused the notion that it was premature to
set binding targets and timetables controlling greenhouse gases as
long as uncertainty existed regarding the impact and scope of
global warming.

'3

13

Second, the United States has rejected burden-

shifting by indicating that those opposed to the status quo bear the
burden of establishing a high degree of certainty. 314
The majority of states in the IWC have asserted that there is a
causal link between commercial exploitation and whale population
decline which must be rebutted for the target populations before
the moratorium for those species can be lifted. 31 5 Oddly, the IWC
stated that because a near causal link has been established, there
should be a very high degree of association and no divergence from
the status quo, or more simply that there shall not be a lifting of the
moratorium.3 16 Conversely, the administration has said because a
causal link between anthropogenic activity and climate change has
not been established, there should be no divergence from the status
quo, and consequently no mandate requiring a reduction in emissions. 317 The IWC has said that whaling advocates must show that
their proposal to engage in commercial whaling will not result in an
irreversible harm such as species extinction. 3 18 The current administration maintains that those, including the IPCC, who want the
United States and other countries to reduce GHG emissions more
quickly must show the ongoing GHG emissions level is a major contributor to climate change. 3 19 In other words, the current adminis313. See Gregory D. Fullem, Comment, The PrecautionaryPrinciple: Environmental Protection in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 31 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 495, 513
(1995) (explaining no immediate negotiations were necessary because of uncertainty in timetable for global warming).
314. See Revkin, supra note 173, at F4 (discussing the burden of proving certainty); see also CICERONE ET AL., supra note 66, at 17 (noting current data has less
than ninety percent certainty and contending greater certainty is required to
demonstrate climate change).
315. See Chairman'sReport of the Forty-FirstMeeting, 40 REP. INT'L WHALING COMMISSION 18 (1990) (discussing need to rebut presumed link before changing current procedures).
316. See id. (discussing existence of near causal link).
317. See White House Council of Economic Advisors, supra note 176, at 245
(presenting administration view that climate science requires additional research
of climate change itself and mitigating technologies).
318. See Gillespie, supra note 295, at 374-76 (discussing threatened extinction
by indigenous peoples for cultural reasons).
319. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush Discusses
Global Climate Change, (June 11, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html.
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tration posits the IPCC must provide evidence of harm extruding
from anthropogenic activity and that it is not incumbent on the
United States to provide evidence that current emission levels are
harmless.
The United States posture on climate change would seem to
show that campaigns to have a government apply or adopt a strong
form of the precautionary principle will have a greater likelihood of
success if the activity thought capable of causing serious environmental harm is in preparationrather than ongoing. An ongoing activity suspected of potentially causing environmental harm may be
more difficult to arrest than would an activity under consideration.
The relevant activity here is the private sector burning of fossil
fuels. The United States government made no energy policy proposal to the private sector when the United States economy began the
transition to fossil fuels in the second half of the nineteenth century. Still, the United States economy currently remains highly dependent on fossil fuels. 320 This dependence was not proposed by
the United States government, but that same government now has
the option of altering the dependence. In the late nineteenth century, atmospheric science was only in a nascent stage. Consequently, the potential for negative climate consequences resulting
from a fossil fuel combustion dependent economy and inadequate
regulatory emissions regime was not known. An argument suggesting an alteration in the regulatory machinery for emissions
would likely have been better received by a late 19th century administration, when the fossil fuel dependence was being created, rather
than in the early twenty-first century, when that dependence is
quite mature.
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the condition in
which the United States finds itself in terms of the willingness to
adopt a robust form of the precautionary principle. In March 2001,
President Bush pointedly referred to the disruption and costs to the
3
United States if it adopted the Protocol.

21

The implication was

that the United States economy could not absorb the costs or withstand the disruption because of the ongoing momentum of the
320. See Raul A. Estrada-Oyuela, Equity and Climate Change, in ETHIcs, EQuITY
AND INT'L NEGOTIATIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE,

36, 36-46 (Luis Pinguelli-Rosa &

Mohan Munasinghe, eds., 2002) (describing most industrialized countries' continued dependence on fossil fuels).
321. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Text of a Letter from the
Roberts (Mar. 13, 2001), available at
President to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig and
2 00
1/03/20010314.html (on file with
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
author) (explaining President Bush's opposition to Kyoto Protocol based on exemption of other countries).
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economy. 322 Political leaders are reluctant to take responsibility for
engineering the steps perceived to bring economic costs and social
disruption. This is true if it becomes clear later that the risks of
harm were overstated, the steps initiated to avoid or minimize the
environmental harm were not necessary, and the benefits lost because of mandated regulatory controls on industry should not have
been borne. Because the U.S. is heavily dependent on carbon
based energy sources, many of those benefits are economic in nature. Therefore, "reducing United States emissions to [seven] percent less than their 1990 level (the Kyoto target) over the next ten
years [could] cost[ ] up to [four] percent of GDP in 2010-a staggering sum when there is no scientific basis for believing this target
is preferable to one less costly.

' 323

This has been labeled the

"harms of precaution" problem, 324 or in other commentaries, the
325
"foregone benefits problem."
Critics of the precautionary principle have often pointed out
that the danger of "false negatives" may be greater than the danger
of "false positives" in regulatory decision making. 326 A false negative could result when the regulator fails to find any danger to a
proposed activity and approves the activity, when in fact there was a
danger which later becomes evident and causes serious harm. 327 A
false positive could result when the regulator erroneously finds
there is danger from a proposed activity and denies approval of the
proposed activity, when it is later established that the disapproved

322. See Miranda A. Schreurs, CompetingAgendas and the Climate Change Negotiations: The United States, the European Union, and Japan, 31 ENv-rL. L. REP. 11218,
11221 (Oct. 2001) (discussing Bush administration's rejection of Kyoto Protocol
based on energy and economic concerns).
323. See White House Council of Economic Advisors, supra note 176, at 247
(discussing administration's position on economic effects of implementation of
Kyoto Protocol).
324. See Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry Than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary
Principle and the Proposed InternationalBiosafety Protocol, 35 TEx. INT'L L.J. 173, 196
(2000) (describing FDA application of precautionary principle).
325. See Frank B. Cross, ParadoxicalPerils of the PrecautionaryPrinciple,53 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 851, 890 (1996) (exemplifying where substantial benefits foregone).
326. See id. at 852 (comparing risks of scientific false positives with cost of
scientific false negatives with respect to environment). For example, one observer
has made just such a claim that false negatives do carry more danger than false
positives. See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562, 641 (1992) (concluding
impacts of false positives are less serious than false negatives).
327. See generally Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and SimilarRisks,
7 ECOLOcY L.Q. 207, 233-35 (1978) (detailing rationale for limiting false negatives
with environmental risk).
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activity would have caused no harm.3 28 The potential harm of undue precaution in the health regulatory field has been described in
the following manner:

Perhaps the most prominent example of the harm caused
by excessive 'precaution' in regulatory policy is FDA-induced 'drug lag.' The FDA must approve new
pharmaceuticals and medical devices before they may be
used or prescribed in the United States. The purpose of
FDA approval is to ensure that only those drugs deemed
'safe and effective' are approved for use. In a precautionary fashion, the FDA seeks to prevent the release of an
unsafe drug. Delaying the availability of potentially life-saving treatment, however, poses risks of its own. Consider
the question posed by one prominent FDA critic: 'If a
drug that has just been approved by FDA will start saving
lives tomorrow, then how many people died yesterday
329
waiting for the agency to act?'
Delaying action to avoid certain costs may therefore bring about

unintended and perhaps larger costs.'3 0
The decision to reduce emission levels radically and more
quickly does not have an immediate and direct impact on human
mortality; however, the economic and presumably social costs as depicted by the Council of Economic Advisors are potentially severe.3 3 1

The administration

contends that sacrificing

current

economic gains to protect against potential future societal losses
2
would be unwise and probably unnecessary.3 3 This policy of adaptation seems to be firmly entrenched.
The United States had the world's largest economy and the
economy most dependent on fossil fuel energy sources when the
scientific community initially began to perceive an association between climate change and GHG gases emanating from burning fossil fuels. The current administration, however, has significant
doubts about the association between burning fossil fuels and cli328. See id. at 230-33 (providing information pertaining to false positives problem faced by environmental or health regulatory authorities).
329. See Adler, supra note 301, at 195 (citations omitted) (providing wellknown illustrations of problems created by overly precautious decision-makers).
330. See id. (discussing unanticipated harms stemming from precautionary
principles).
331. For a full discussion and analysis of the uncertainties of concern to the
current administration, see supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
332. See Press Release, supra note 146 (addressing financial considerations influencing administration's views on global climate change).
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mate change. Combining these doubts and the United States economic dependence on GHG-producing energy sources makes it
profoundly difficult to persuade the administration to agree to an
application of a robust, rather than utilitarian, form of the precautionary principle.
In some cases, it would be important to ask a particular state to
apply a strong version of the precautionary principle in the management or regulation of an activity, whether that activity was only
in the proposal stage or was extant. The scientific community may
only be able to perceive a linkage between an activity and a possible
harm after the activity has been ongoing for a lengthy period. In
the case of the Montreal Protocol, activity resulting from producing
products whose use resulted in ozone depleting substances was
ongoing in many countries when the Protocol was devised in
1987. 3 3 3 In that instance, however, there was widespread consensus
about which activities produced ozone-depleting substances. Despite the fact that compliance with the Montreal Protocol brought
some costs to particular sectors of signatories' economies, widespread compliance was forthcoming.
Applying robust forms of the precautionary principle to an activity may receive a warmer reception by governments if the activity
is only proposed, rather than ongoing. In the United States, this
association between activity and harm only occurred long after the
industrial activity had commenced. The Cartegna Protocol incorporates a strong form of the precautionary principle, which appears
to explicitly shift the burden of proof to the country exporting a
living modified organism (LMO). 3 3 4 Provisions in the Cartegna
Protocol call for an "advance informed agreement" between the exporting and importing countries of an LMO.3

35

The LMO export-

ing country must perform risk assessments and then provide the
333. See United Nations, Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer (Sept. 16, 1987) 1522 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended June 29, 1990, reprinted in 26
I.L.M. 1541, 1550 (1987) (entered into forceJan. 1, 1989), reprintedin 32. I.L.M. 875
(1993) (amended Nov. 23-25, 1992) (noting results on ozone depletion). The Pro-

tocol is part of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar.
22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11, 097, at 4, 1513 U.N.T.S. 324, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1516,

1529 (1987) (entered into force Sept. 22, 1988) (providing specific obligations established by Protocol).

334. See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 (2000) (providing text of Cartagena Protocol). The Protocol is part of the Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992,
31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) (establishing perogatives of LMO importing country).
335. SeeJonathan H. Adler, The CartagenaProtocol and Biological Diversity; Bi-

osafe orBio-Sorry?, 12 GEO. INT'L. ENVrL. L. REv. 761, 771 (2000) (indicating provisions support precautionary principle).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol19/iss1/1

72

Harris: Derogating the Precautionary Principle

20081

DEROGATING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

information to the importing country.3 3 6 The importing LMO
country can make decisions, with the goal of minimizing potential
adverse effects, even in the absence of scientific certainty, to reduce
3 37
the risk to human health.
Countries that substantially invest in LMOs may incur economic costs from the risk assessment carried out by the importing
country, regardless of whether the risk assessment conforms to the
exporter's assessment. In this instance of an existing activity, such
as corporate research on LMOs, the precautionary principle places
a potential economic cost burden, as well as a proof of negligible
harm burden, on the exporting country. This insistence that economic costs are a burden that states must prepare to incur to avoid
or minimize adverse effects of LMOs is a robust form of the precautionary principle. The United States is reluctant to accept this
burden.

The United States has been unwilling to accept the Kyoto Protocol's notion that United States GHG emission levels must be reduced by a specified percentage by a specified date range to
decrease the risk of inflicting environmental harm on the global
climate system. The administration has not accepted the burden
shift, which is the burden of proving harmlessness or a negligible
harm. The United States has not accepted the economic burden
that would be required to meet the Kyoto timetable.
D.

Causal Proofs

The United States is resolute in its fidelity to the burden of
proof remaining with the opponents of proposed or existing activity. In fact, the administration indicated it seeks proof of a causal
link between an increase in GHGs and climate change before a shift
in current policy would be instituted. 338 A major component of the
administration's policy is an emphasis on mitigation and adaptation
336. See Deborah Katz, The Mismatch Between the Biosafety Protocol and the Precautionary Principle, 13 GEO. INT'L. ENVTL. L. REv. 949, 954 (2001) (explaining precau-

tionary principle generally giving power to importing party).
337. See Cartagena Protocol, supra note 334 (noting Protocol supports granting of power to importing party).
338. See CICERONE ET AL., supra note 66, at 252 (noting causal link between
GHGs and climate change is not clearly established). "The fact that the magnitude
of the observed [global] warming is large in comparison to natural variability as
simulated in climate models is suggestive of such a [causal] linkage, but it does not
constituteproof of one because the model simulations could be deficient in natural
variability on the decadal to century time scale." Id. at 17 (2001) (emphasis added) (explaining effect of human activities on climate change). For a description
of human-induced changes in the climate, see supra notes 55-57 and accompanying
text.
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measures, with the mitigation directed toward the effects or consequences of climate change.3 39 On one level, there seems little to
criticize about an effort that seeks to minimize the potential adverse
effects of climate change on individuals and communities. The issue is whether the current administration's policy pursues a strategy
including the substitution of mitigating effects and adaptation endeavors in response to climate change effects, in lieu of measures to
reduce activities that may be helping to bring about climate change
itself.
The emphasis on understanding the vulnerability of human
systems to global change, and to then evaluate the ability of those
systems to adapt to climate change, may be a misplaced emphasis.340 In a worst-case scenario, it is conceivable that the long term
effects of climate change may swamp national and international efforts to reduce emissions. In that instance, measuring the capacity
of human systems to adapt would likely be a very prominent need.

The current administration is skeptical about the validity of the
IPCC thesis which states anthropogenic activity is making a strong
contribution to climate change. There is, therefore, reason to
doubt that the administration is emphasizing mitigating effects and
adaptation because it fears the worst. The administration's policy

may be predicated on the view that recent observed climate change
is more a result of natural variability than anthropogenic causes,
and that observed climate change has occurred in the past.34 1
339. See generally, UNITED STATES CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, supra
note 65 at Chapter 11 (researching effects of climate changes). The plan states:
"On a global scale, considerable gaps exist in understanding, modeling, and quantifying the sensitivity and vulnerability of human systems to global change and measuring the capacity of human systems to adapt." Climate Change Science Program
and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research, Strategic Planfor the U.S. Climate Change Science Program, 95 (2003), http://www/climatescience.gov/Library/
stratplan2003/final/ccspstratplan2003-all.pdf (clarifying level of knowledge and
information available on global environmental variability and change).
340. See Gamble & Simpson, supra note 212, at 95 (noting researching vulnerability of human systems may be misplaced).
341. See CICERONE ET L., supra note 66, at 8 (discussing natural variability in
climate).
Over long time scales, outside the time period in which humans could
have a substantive effect on global climate (e.g., prior to the industrial
revolution), proxy data (information derived from the content of tree
rings, cores from marine sediments, pollens, etc.) have been used to estimate the range of natural climate variability. An important recent addition to the collection of proxy evidence is ice cores obtained by
international teams of scientists drilling through miles of ice in Antarctica
and at the opposite end of the world in Greenland. The results can be
used to make inferences about climate and atmospheric composition extending back as long as 400,000 years. These and other proxy data indicate that the range of natural climate variability is in excess of several
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If climate change can be reliably attributed to natural variation, then the research agenda outlined immediately below gains
even greater weight. The agenda explains:
Research needs include empirical studies and modelbased simulation studies of the influence of social and economic factors on vulnerability and adaptive capacity in
households, organizations, and communities; assessments
and economic analyses of the potential impacts of climate
variability and change . . . retrospective analyses of the

consequences of surprising shifts in climate and the ability
of society to respond to negative impacts and potential opportunities ....

Specifically, attention needs to be paid to

the associated costs and benefits of adaptation strategies,
strategies for mitigating the impacts of global change on different economic sectors and people in different locations
and economic brackets, market and non-market valuation
of positive and negative impacts, the possibility of new economic instruments for responding to global change, and
degrees C on local and regional space scales over periods as short as a
decade ....

It is more difficult to estimate the natural variability of global

mean temperature because large areas of the world are not sampled and
because of the large uncertainties inherent in temperatures inferred
from proxy evidence. Nonetheless, evidence suggests that global warming
rates as large as 2'C (3.6°F) per millennium may have occurred during
the retreat of the glaciers following the most recent ice age.
Id.

Most recently, additional ice core data from Antarctica has been accumulated,
providing information regarding atmospheric GHG concentrations from 650,000
years before the present. Two teams of scientists sampled deposits in the ice core
record taken from depths of two miles. One team sampled atmospheric carbon
dioxide (C0 2 ) and methane (N 20), and found that pre-industrial concentrations
had never reached present levels of these two gases during the previous 650,000
years. See Renato Sphani et al., Atmospheric Methane and Nitrous Oxide of the Late
Pleistocenefrom Antarctica Ice Cores, 310 Sci. 1317, 1318 (2005) (describing European

Project for Ice Coring in Antarctica Dome Concordia). Working in the same region of Antarctica (Dome Concordia area), a second team sampled CO 2 deposits
in ice cores taken from the same depth as those extracted by the first team. The
analysis of the second team showed that current concentrations of atmospheric
carbon dioxide did not reach comparable levels for 650,000 years before the present. See Urs Siegenthaler et al., Stable Carbon-Cycle-ClimateRelationship During the

Late Pleistocene, 310 Sci. 1313, 1317 (2005) (indicating relationship between CO 2
and Antarctic remained constant during late pleistocene). The work of the two
teams has shown that present day concentrations of three very important GHGs
were not produced during the past 650,000 years. This evidence suggests that recent anthropogenic activity may have a causal relationship with current GHG
(CO2, CH 4 , and N 20) levels. See Andrew C. Revkin, Gases at Level Unmatched in Antiquity, Study Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2005, at A6 (noting high levels of C0 2 ,
methane, and nitrous oxide today are highest in 650,000 years).
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the role of public and private institutions and public poli3 42
cies in influencing adaptive capacity.
President Bush has explicitly commented on the amount of the
observed climate change that can be attributed to natural variation.
In a Press Release, the President stated: "[t]he Academy's report
tells us that we do not know how much effect naturalfluctuations in
climate may have had on warming. We do not know how much our
climate could, or will change in the future. We do not know how
fast change will occur, or even how some of our actions could impact

"s4 3
it.

After linking public statements of the current adminis-

tration with documents issued by agencies declaring the direction
of a significant proportion of future research, it seems evident the
administration is strongly disinclined to adopt a strong form of the
precautionary principle as a major plank of its climate change
policy.
The President's statement expresses strong doubt regarding
the existence of a causal link between GHGs produced by anthropogenic activity and climate change. It suggests the United States
need not embark upon an emission reduction program on the scale
called for in the Kyoto Protocol. The administration disagrees with
other countries regarding the immediacy of the climate change
problem. 344 The administration's lack of action in reducing GHGs
may not be harmful if natural variability is at fault. In the administration's view, a "proof of harmlessness" standard should not, therefore, be imposed on those countries choosing not to institute a
3 45
headlong nationwide emissions reduction program.

342. See Gamble and Simpson, supra note 212, at 96 (emphasis added) (outlining research needs).
343. See Press Release, supra note 148 (emphasis added) (discussing policy
objectives regarding climate change).
344. But see David M. Reiner, Climate Impasse: How the Hague NegotiationsFailed,

43 ENV'T 36, 41-43 (2001) (detailing various splits among European states, among
developing countries, and between two groupings of states). Although almost all
the members of these two groups strongly desired the United States' participation
in Kyoto, not all were prepared to make concessions of the magnitude the United
States desired. The issue seemed to be whether a "gutted" Protocol, with United
States' participation, was worth more than a stronger Protocol, absent United

States' participation. See id. at 42 (noting United States differing position and its
possible impact).
345. See Paula Dobriansky, Remarks: "The Convention After 10 Years: Accomplishments and Future Challenges," supra note 310 (stating parties to UNFCCC
need to absorb lessons learned prior to taking new action).
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To a certain extent, the administration's view can be characterized as partially requiring imminence of harm. 34 6 The administration repeatedly cites the lack of certainty in the climate science
regarding a degree of association between anthropogenic activity
and climate change. 347 The administration also appears to consider the view that the threat is not immediate. A harm that is imminent and dictates an urgent response exists where the probability
of harm is far beyond a mere possibility, seemingly approaching
certainty, and near temporally.3 48 This posture indicates that the
United States has adopted a form of the precautionary principle
349
that is "pedestrian" rather than "expeditious.
This imminence requirement implies that the harmful consequences of an event not near in time may be less likely. In this
instance, the administration seems to believe that the harmful effects of climate change, because they are farther in time, are less
probable if future mitigation of effects and adaptation efforts are
successful. This Article contends that the probability of the harm is
no less, and the gravity of the harm may be undiluted, regardless of
the perceived temporal proximity of the harm. An over-reliance on
mitigating effects and adaptation measures may be risky in itself.
A strong form of the precautionary principle would call for
policies to lessen the risk of environmental harm induced by climate change. The Bamako Convention on the ban on the Import into
Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of
Hazardous Wastes within Africa (Bamanko Convention) is a treaty
signed by African nations in January 1991, to prohibit the import of
hazardous waste. 3 5° The Bamako Convention employed a form of
the precautionary principle that seems to have language applicable
to the climate change issue:

346. See Daniel Dobos, The Necessity of Precaution: The Future of Ecological Necessity and the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 13 FoRDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 375, 381-82 (2002)
(defining imminence requirement). The article states "[t]he imminence requirement dictates that there must be 'a threat to the interest at the actual time.'" Id. at
381.

347. See CICERONE ET

AL.,

supranote 66, at 3 (noting major advances in under-

standing and modeling necessary to reduce uncertainty).
348. See Dobos, supra note 346, at 381 (discussing requirements of imminence). Specifically, Dobos noted one view where a peril is sufficiently imminent
when it is "far beyond the concept of 'possibility' and is unavoidable." Id.
349. See SA Perspectives: The Climate Leadership Vacuum, Sci. Am.At 6 Mar. 2004
(warning that as time proceeds, United States' and other countries' leverage over
climate change erodes).

350. See Basel Action Network, http://www.ban.org/Library/
bamakotreaty.html (explaining the Bamako Convention).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008

77

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 1

78

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XIX: p. I

Each Party shall strive to adopt and implement the preventive, precautionary approach to pollution problems which
entails, inter-alia, preventing the release into the environment of substances which may cause harm to humans or
the environment without waiting for scientific proof regarding such harm. The Parties shall co-operate with each
other in taking the appropriate measures to implement
the precautionary principle to pollution prevention
through the application of clean production methods,
rather than the pursuit of a permissible emissions ap3 51
proach based on assimilative capacity assumptions.
The last sentence in this quote is particularly relevant to the climate
change issue. The Kyoto Protocol calls for clean production methods as the best answer in avoiding environmental harm from climate change. The current administration opted for a "permissible
emissions approach," linked with further research and, in my estimation, an unwise amalgamation of efforts to "mitigate effects" with
adaptation measures and too great an emphasis on these measures.3 52 Implicit in this approach is the belief that the global climate is able to absorb or assimilate current levels of GHG emissions
on a global basis, at least until the global community is able to more
fully understand the dynamics of climate change.
Even before the Kyoto Protocol's introduction on February 16,
2005,35 3 the global community began to take steps to move beyond
the Protocol's provisions and time frame. In December 2004, at
COP10 in Buenos Aries, some participants hoped to organize a series of seminars under the auspices of the UNFCCC to discuss ways
to mitigate climate change after the Protocol's expiration in

351. See Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the
Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes
Within Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773, 781 (citing Art. 4 paragraph 3(f) to
show efforts devoted to adopting precautionary measure).
352. See Gamble & Simpson, supra note 212, at 96 (noting United States' passive approach to preventing harm from climate changes).
353. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 17, 37 I.L.M. at 41 (stating Kyoto Protocol
will be in effect when specific number of countries creating certain amount of
carbon dioxide emissions have ratified instrument). See also Steven Lee Meyers,
Putin Ratifies Kyoto Protocolon Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at A1O (describing
start of international efforts to reduce emissions and help stop heat trapping). See
generally Cory C. Miller, Comment: Developments in Climate Change in 2004: Three
Cheers for Russia, 2004 CoLo. J. INT'L. EN\VTL. L. & PoL'Y 143 (2004) (summarizing
both significant and insignificant nature of Kyoto protocol).
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2012. 354 The United States delegation believed such discussions
would be premature. The head of the United States delegation
stated that "[s]cience tells us that we cannot say with any certainty
what constitutes a dangerous level of warming, and therefore what
level must be avoided."3 55 Because of this objection, the substantive
mitigation discussions could not be scheduled. In their place, a
number of workshops were planned to facilitate information exchange between the parties, primarily targeting adaptation rather
3 56
than mitigation.
The current administration thus continues to support a weak
version of the precautionary principle to formulate the administration's policy regarding climate change. That is, the administration
is unwilling to accept the burden of proving the global climate
would not suffer undue harm despite continuous levels of GHG
emissions. This burden-shifting from the opponent of an ongoing
or proposed policy to the party engaging in an ongoing policy or
proposing to institute a particular policy is a strong form of the
precautionary principle. The administration insists that the burden
of proof resides with those opposed to the current United States
GHG emission policy. As Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Paula Dobriansky reiterated, the United States' position is that
we "cannot say with any certainty what constitutes a dangerous level
of warming."3 57 Those opposed must show that ongoing United
States emissions and anthropogenic emissions generally, are contributing to a change in climate which cannot be attributed to natural variation alone. Thus, the United States stance toward climate
change embodies a weak, "pedestrian," form of the precautionary
principle.
IV.

PALEO CLIMATE

The United States at COP1O opposed progressing on mitigation measures as a response to climate change. This shows a contin354. See Larry Rohter, U.S. Waters Down Global Commitment to Curb Greenhouse

Gases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, at 116 (discussing United States' unwillingness to
become involved in international efforts against global warming).
355. See id. (quoting Paula Dobriansky, head of United States delegation).
356. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties, December 6-18, 2004, TENTH SESSION HELD AT BUENOS AIRES,
FCCC/CP/2004/10 (Apr. 18, 2005), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/copl0/10.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (providing purpose and details of
international conference to create discussion on adaptation measures).
357. See Rohter, supra note 354 at 116 (quoting Secretary Paula Dobriansky,
reaffirming United States' position of uncertainty as to level of danger signaling
need for action).
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uation of a policy position highlighted earlier in this Article. 358
Specifically, the Draft Strategic Plan of the USCCSP was criticized
by the National Research Council (NRC) for "not adequately [articulating] the utility of better characterizing uncertainty. ' 35 9 The
NRC, however, recognized uncertainty as being "inherent in science and decision making and therefore not in itself a basis for
inaction." 360 The NRC suggested that the revised Strategic Plan
should "identify what sources and magnitudes of reductions in key
climate change uncertainties are especially needed, and where an
improved characterization of uncertainty would benefit decisionmaking .. .".61 Secretary Dobriansky's statement at COP1O does
not fairly convey the sense that uncertainty is inherent in science.
United States Special Representative to COPlO, Dr. Harlan Watson,
commenting on whether the Kyoto Protocol was based on sound
science, concluded "[i] t was not based on science.

'36 2

Dr. Watson

believed the Protocol would be better characterized as a "political
3 63
agreement.
An inspection of the NRC's evaluation of the USCCSP's Final
Strategic Plan is instructive in furthering this Article's contention
that the administration employs a weak version of the precautionary
principle. The 2003 Final Strategic Plan received a higher evaluation by the NRC relative to the 2002 Draft Strategic Plan. In its
review of the Final Strategic Plan,36 4 the NRC placed special empha-

sis on goals four and five in the 2003 version. Goal four seeks to
"understand the sensitivity and adaptability of different natural and
managed ecosystems and human systems to climate change and related global changes." 365 Goal five is to explore the uses and iden358. For a further discussion of the United States' opposition, see Gamble &
Simpson, supra notes 212-218 and accompanying text.
359. See id. (noting United States' means of mitigation of climate change).
360. For a further discussion of the issue of uncertainty, see supra notes 75-79
and accompanying text.
361. See id. (calling for clarification of uncertainty).
362. See Harlan L. Watson, Remarks at the U.S. COP - 10 Press Conference,
Dec. 7, 2004, available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/2004/39557.htm
(last visited Oct. 20, 2007) (commenting on climate policy from United States).
363. See id. (describing United States and international efforts on climate
control).
364. See National Research Council, Implementing Climate and Global Change Research: A Review of the Final U.S. Climate Change Science Program Strategic Plan, 2004,
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record-id=10635&page=6, at 6 (discussing
various USCCSP goals and emphasizing discussion of different influences involved
in environmental effects in fourth goal and discussion of positive influences of
scientific information in fifth goal).
365. See id. at 7 (listing and explaining fourth goal).
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tify the limits of evolving knowledge to manage366 risks and
opportunity related to climate variability and change.
The NRC review of the Final Strategic Plan is mixed at best.
The NRC commends particular components of the Plan, but its criticisms are correspondingly meted out. The following passage is an
apt illustration of this pattern:
The revised plan identifies 'the sensitivity and adaptability
of different natural and managed ecosystems and human
systems to climate and related global changes' as its fourth
overarching goal, appropriately calling attention to these
research areas. The plan's chapters on human contributions and responses to environmental change... and eco-

systems. .

are improved over the draft. Integrated

assessment analyses.

. .

include impacts modeling of the

environment as well as socio-economic systems. Other research activities relevant to economics are only weakly addressed in the plan. Although at least one product
addresses mitigation strategies... the plan's overarching
3 67
goals emphasize adaptation rather than mitigation.

The administration stated, during COP1O, that the follow-up period
to that conference was not the appropriate time to talk about post2012 Kyoto negotiations. 368 Inasmuch as those negotiations were in36 9 about mitigation in
tended to consist of "substantive discussions"
the post-Kyoto period, this comment is evidence that the administration is unwilling to seriously respond to climate change in a way
3 70

to mitigate causes..

A.

The Science of Abrupt Climate Change

The implications for this policy choice are profound. The tactical decision is to defer forming a policy imbued with greater urgency until more definitive knowledge regarding possible adverse
consequences of climate change is known. A strong form of the
precautionary principle would advise against this. The Bamako
366. See id. (listing and explaining fifth goal).
367. See id. at 12 (emphasis added) (providing brief illustration of revised

plan).

368. See Watson, supra note
position to discussion in COP10
369. See Rohter, supra note
sion efforts).
370. For a discussion of the
trol, see supra notes 269-272 and

224, (emphasizing United States' position of opconference).
354, at 16 (noting United States blocked discuscurrent administration's dealings on climate conaccompanying text.
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Convention represents a strong form of the principle.3 71 In addition to allowing action to prevent the release of harmful substances
into the environment, prior to scientific certainty, the Bamako Convention also disallows the consideration of a cost-benefit calculation
to be incorporated into the policy making process.
A strong form of the precautionary principle advises that mitigating steps should not be deferred until scientific certainty is established. An application of a strong form of the principle would
suggest that it is unwise to assume that current rates of GHG assimilation in the oceans and atmosphere will remain constant in the
future. At a minimum, there are grounds for concern that the
ocean's ability to absorb CO 2 and consequently retard the advance
of climate change may not be linear. If oceanic CO 2 assimilative
capacity slows, extra CO 2 would be retained in the atmosphere.
The rates of increase in atmospheric temperatures could possibly
rise, resulting in a positive forcing.
The NRC issued a 2002 study explicitly addressing the potential for non-linear climate change. 372 Much of its evaluation was
based on an assessment of models currently available to project the
likelihood of rapid climate change. The NRC placed limited confidence in these models. Climate models can only partially simulate
the extent of the large climatic changes that have occurred. The
models may be incomplete, or not as sensitive to abrupt climate
change as the natural environment. 3 73
For example, deep-ocean circulation such as the North Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation (THC) may be adequately represented in climate models. This ocean current brings warm water
from the tropics and the South Atlantic to the North Atlantic
Ocean surface region and causes colder water to sink to much
deeper levels; this occurs at least in part because of ocean water
density and salinity differences.3 7 4 Evidence exists showing that
371. See Bamako Convention, supra note 351 (stating that each party shall
strive for precautionary approach).
372. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, National Academy of Sciences, Abrupt Climate Change: Inevitable Surprises 1, 2002 [NRC Abrupt Climate] http:books.nap.edu/
openbook.php?record-id=10136&page=R1 (discussing findings of 2002 study).
373. See id. at 4 (explaining problematic features of past models).
374. See generally, W. Broecker, The Great Ocean Conveyor, 4 OCEANOGRAPHY 79
(1991) (providing explanation of thermohaline circulation). One of the best accounts of the operation of the thermohaline circulation, and of a specific aspect of
that circulation known as the north Atlantic deep water (NADW) circulation, has
been provided by a professor of geochemistry based at Columbia University, who
was one of the earliest investigators of possible past abrupt climate change. See id.
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THC changes have driven interglacial climate changes in the
past.

37 5

In the Executive Summary of the NRC's report, the "current
scientific emphasis on abrupt climate change was motivated by
strong evidence in proxy records that showed extreme climatic
changes in the past, sometimes occurring within periods of fewer
than [ten] years. 3' - 76 Whether we are approaching such a precipice

is unknown. In addition, whether the assimilating capacity of the
global environment is linear is uncertain. If it is linear, we do not
know whether it would remain so, and thus, whether the velocity of
change in climate is linear remains unknown. Since discernible signals indicate that the global environment's assimilative capacity

might be non-linear, a shift from the current weak precautionary
formulation of the administration as a basis for policy might be
proper.
Two additional areas of inquiry surrounding the likelihood of
abrupt or precipitous climate change and current United States climate change policy warrant comment. First, there is the question
of whether there has been a discernible paradigm shift among climatologists regarding the likelihood of abrupt climate change. Sec-

ond, there is a question regarding the sufficiency of the evidence
used to prove the concentration of GHGs, particularly carbon dioxide, has served as an abrupt change trigger. The underlying issue
emerging from these questions is whether the United States policy,
emphasizing adaptation to the consequences of climate changes, is
the most prudent approach given some likelihood of abrupt
change greater than zero.
Strong evidence exists that abrupt climate change has occurred with some frequency during the past quaternary period of
250,000 years, which includes alternating epochs of glacial-intergla375. AndrewJ. Weaver & Tertia M. C. Hughes, Rapid InterglacialClimateFluctuations Driven by North Atlantic Ocean Circulation, 367 NATURE 447, 449 (1994) (dis-

cussing results of scientific experiments leading to this conclusion). Other sources
state:
It is worth remembering that models such as those used in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report consistently underestimate
the size and extent of anomalies associated with past changes of the THC;
if the underestimate results from lack of model sensitivity possibly linked
to overly coarse resolution or other shortcomings rather than from improper specification of forcing, future climate anomalies could be surprisingly large.
NRC Abrupt Climate, supranote 372, at 116 (discussing potential effect of underestimating anomalies associated with THC).
376. See id. at 6 (discussing origin of concern regarding climate change).
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cial climate. 377 The view that climate change occurred in a gradual
manner, with moderate temperature gradients, over millennia was
pervasive in climatology through the first half of the twentieth century.3 78 That former paradigm appears to have shifted in recent
decades.3 79 This paradigm shift in climatology has been accepted
by the National Research Council (NRC),380 although it took some
years for the scientific community to adapt to the notion that the
climate system could be highly variable.
Definitions of abrupt climate change vary mostly by whether
the attempt is to define the idea in the temporal sense, or in a relatively stable climate state context.3 8 1 In general, an abrupt climate
change occurs when the climate system is pushed across some
threshold, triggering a shift to a new state. The climate system itself
modulates the rate of this shift; this rate is more rapid than the
38
cause of the shift. 2

The scientific community recognized that the global climate
system should be characterized as having been subject, at times, to

377. See M. Anklin et al., Climate Instability During the Last Interglacial Period
Recorded in the GRIP Ice Core, 364 NATURE 203, 207 (1993) (discussing evidence of
past abrupt climate changes); see also W. Dansgaard et al., Evidencefor GeneralInstability of Past Climate From a 250-kyr Ice-Core Record, 364 NATURE 218, 219 (1993) (discussing evidence of past instability in climate as well as abrupt climate change).
378. See Spencer Weart, The Discovery of Rapid Climate Change, 56 PHYsics ToDAY 30, 31 (2003) (noting researchers have only recently accepted possibility of
abrupt climate change).
379. See Claus U. Hammer et al., Preface 102 J. GEOPHYSiCAL REs., 26, 315
(1997) (noting special issues speaks to question of paradigm shift). This entire
issue of one scientific journal has a compilation of 47 articles detailing research
drawn from the Greenland ice cores of the Greenland Ice Sheet Project2 (GISP2),
and the European Greenland Ice Core Program (GRIP). See id.
380. See NRC, Abrupt Climate, supra note 372, at 16 (reporting new thinking
was not well appreciated in wider community of natural and social scientists).
381. See National Climactic Data Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Agency, Abrupt Climate Change, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/abrupt/storyl.
html (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) [NCDC, Abrupt Climate Change] (discussing systematic measurements used by scientists studying abrupt climate change). This latter
manner of defining climate change has been labeled "mechanistic." National Climate Data Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, Abrupt Climate
Change, http://www.ncdc.naa.gov/paleo/abrupt/story2.html
(defining climate
change terms). Also note that when referring to the temporal sense, it is important to consider the span of time in which the change, whatever the magnitude,
must be confined. See id.
382. See id. (discussing rate of climate system shift).
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384
38 3
in particular climate attributes.
certain precipitate fluctuations

The latter idea seems a better fit to current understanding where
temperatures, ice, and snow cover, and GHG concentrations all rechange in
main within a relatively narrow flux, with significant
38 5
those attributes occurring only over many millennia.
An aspect of the paradigm shift in climatology, or paleoclimatology, is most striking. Not only has climate change happened
in the past with some frequency, but also the past change is now
known to have occurred in some instances on decadal time scales,
38 6 It is now wellmaking the magnitude of the change surprising.
established that the current interglacial period, the Holocene, regarded in earlier decades as a period of relative warmth and stability, is now known to have been subject to abrupt changes in climate
of some magnitude, although perhaps not on the same scale 3as
87
changes (also frequently abrupt) recorded during glacial epochs.
The key question is what drove climate change in the past, specifically what mechanisms or forcings brought about such
383. See Taylor et al., The 'fickeringSwitch' of Late Pleistocene Climate Change, 361
432, 432-34 (1993) (reporting electrical conductivity measurements from
Greenland ice core revealing rapid climate change); see also, W. Dansgaard et al.,
supra note 377, at 219 (stating that scientific community recognizes climate
changes).
384. For a discussion of historical climate changes, see supra note 376 and accompanying text. Climate attributes include atmospheric temperatures, water vapor, and cloud content, ocean surface temperatures, ice and snow cover and trace
gas concentrations in the atmosphere (including GHGs). See id.
385. See NRC, Abrupt Climate Change, supra note 372 (characterizing climate
element). Recent work by glaciologists has suggested that a loss of ice cover in
Greenland and West Antarctica is occurring and is in fact accelerating, and the loss
of ice cover is not just from meltwater. See id. "Now glaciologists have a second
mechanism for the loss of ice: accelerated flow of the ice itself, not just its
meltwater, to the sea." Richard Kerr, A Worrying Trend of Less Ice, Higher Seas, 311
Sci. 1698, 1701 (2006). The evidence is particularly striking. "Although the duration of the recent warming is too short to determine whether it is an anthropogenic effect or natural variability, in either case, the data suggest that modest
(-IC) changes in temperature can lead to large changes in discharge of glacial
ice to the ocean." Ian Joughlin, Greenland Rumbles Louder as GlaciersAccelerate, 311
Sci. 1719, 1719 (2006) (finding that changes in temperature can lead to glacial
ice).
NATURE

386. See R.B. Alley et al., Abrupt Increase in Greenland Snow Accumulation at the
End of the Younger Dryas Event, 362 NATURE 527, 529 (1993) (noting climate transformations); see also Jonathan T. Overpeck, Warm Climate Surprises, 271 SCIENCE
1820 (1996) (describing changes in climate system); W. Dansgaard et al., The Abrupt Termination of the Younger Dryas Climate Event, 339 NATURE 532, 533 (1989)
(suggesting changes in climate system).
387. See O'Brien et al., Complexity of Holocene Climate as Reconstructed from a
GreenlandIce Core, 270 SCIENCE 1962, 1964 (1995) (describing climate change during Holocene).
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change.3 88 The paleoclimatology community is seeking to determine which of several candidate forcings (although not necessarily
internal to the climate system) 389 served as the primary trigger for
past abrupt climate change.39 0 Three candidate forcings which received significant attention are orbital,3 9 1 volcanic, and solar.39 2
Some investigators, however, have indicated that these forces may
have less explanatory power for abrupt climate change than the forcing produced by changes in ocean current density, salinity, and
temperature, coupled with atmospheric transport of GHGs, includ39 3
ing water vapor.
Although there is not universal acceptance that this is the most
plausible hypothesis, changes in the THC explanation for abrupt
climate change have generated voluminous study:
[I] n the presently most likely hypothesis, warm, salty water
flowing into the North Atlantic densifies as it cools and
then sinks. However, precipitation and runoff from surrounding land masses supply more fresh water to the
North Atlantic than is removed by evaporation. Failure of
sinking would allow freshening to decrease surface den388. See NRC, Abrupt Climate Change, supra note 372 (considering climate

change over period of time because of mechanism internal or external to system).
389. See Houghton et al., supra note 38, at 87 (describing forcings not derived
from one of five components considered external). The IPCC defines the climate
system as "an interactive system consisting of five major components: the atmosphere, the hydrosphere, the cryosphere [ice cover], the land surface and the biosphere." See id.
390. See R. B. Alley et al., Abrupt Climate Change, 299 Sci. 2005, 2006 (2003)

(determining which forcing was primary trigger for past climate change).
391. See id. There has been thorough investigation of the thesis that orbital

forcing is an important factor in explaining variations in ice cover of great magnitude (sometimes producing ice ages or glacial periods). See id. This astronomical
theory of ice ages suggests that the most important parameters of orbital forcing
are the angle of inclination of the earth's axis, and the precession of the equinoxes
due to the "wobble" of the earth's axis. See id. These attributes of orbital forcing

"strongly affect the distribution of available energy between latitudes and seasons."

See C. Lorius et al., The Ice-Core Record: Climate Sensitivity and Future Greenhouse
Warming, 347 NATURE 139, 141 (1990) (suggesting orbital forcing affects latitudes

and seasons).
392. See Thomas Crowley, Causes of Climate Change Over the Past 1000 Years, 289

Sci. 270, 271 (2000) (considering study of volcanic and solar forcings on millen-

nial time sealers). See generally David J. Thomson, Dependence of Global Temperatures
on Atmospheric C0 2 and Solar Irradiance,94 PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE
U.S. 8370 (1997) (exploring solar irradiance hypothesis).
393. See Wallace S. Broecker, Thermohaline Circulation, the Achilles Heel of Our
Climate System: Will Man-Made C0 2 Upset the Current Balance?, 278 Sci. 1582, 1584
(1997) (discussing power of changes in ocean and atmospheric elements).
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sity, preventing further sinking and the associated inflow
394
of warm waters.

Researchers believed this change in circulation of warm and cold
water between different regions of the ocean would have consequences. One of those consequences would be a redistribution of
CO, between the cold and warm water ocean reservoirs, resulting in
a change in atmospheric CO 2 content.3 95 Individual reservoirs
2
would thus have an increased concentration of CO .

If the increased concentration of CO 2 (and other GHGs) derived from changes in the thermohaline circulation is large, past
3 96 If GHGs
abrupt climate change may be more fully explained.
may have been responsible for past abrupt climate change, through
natural forcing, then GHGs generated from anthropogenic activity
39 7 Ocean
may produce a similarly rapid future change in climate.
current flux, as a climate system perturbation needed for abrupt
climate change, is only one of several candidate triggers that have
been investigated. Changes in ocean temperature, salinity and circulation have received as much or more study as the other possible
perturbations.3 9 8 Work on connecting past abrupt changes in
North Atlantic surface-ocean and atmospheric temperature with variation in deep ocean circulation has made significant progress in
recent years. This work has strengthened the belief that major reorTHC have played an important role in
ganizations of the Atlantic
399
change.
climate
abrupt
394. See Alley et al., supra note 390, at 2006 (suggesting change in circulation
of warm and cold water could result in climate change).
395. See Wallace S. Broecker et al., Does the Ocean-Atmosphere System Have More
Than One Stable Mode of Operation?, 315 NATURE 21, 23 (1985) (citing Broecker's
previous works which have been refined over several years). See also Broecker,
supra note 393, at 1585-86 (discussing sedimentary cycles).
396. See Lorius et al., supra note 391, at 141 (suggesting increased CO 2 could
have caused past climate change); see also Peter U. Clark et al., The Role of the
Thermohaline Circulation in Abrupt Climate Change, 415 NATURE 863, 869 (2002) (explaining how GHG may have caused reduction in Atlantic thermohaline
circulation).
397. See Peter A. Stott et al., External Control of 20th Century Temperature By Natural andAnthropogenic orcings, 290 Sci. 2133, 2136 (2000) (discussing GHGs effects
on climate change).
398. See Britton B. Stephens & Ralph F. Keeling, The Influence of Antarctic Sea
Ice on Glacial-InterglacialC0 2 Variations, 404 NATURE 171, 174 (2000) (suggesting
reduced ventication was driven by increased sea ice); see also Minze Stuiver, Solar
Variability and Climatic Change During the Current Millennium, 286 NATURE 868, 871
(1980) (setting causes of possible perturbations); but see Hartmut Grassl, Status and
Improvements of Coupled General CirculationModels, 288 Sci. 1991, 1993 (2000) (discussing other factors of abrupt climate change).
399. See Clark et al., supra note 396, at 863 (discussing past changes in
thermohaline circulation); see alsoJean Lyncy-Stieglitz, HemisphericAsynchrony of Ab-
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It is far from certain whether a perturbation to the climate system generated by anthropogenic activity will produce abrupt climate change in the future similar to past changes. 40 0 It is clear that
abrupt change has occurred in the recent past, during the current
interglacial period, especially on a regional or hemispheric scale. 40 1
There has not been consensus as to what is the most likely triggering mechanism for past episodes of abrupt climate change, particularly during the Holocene, which is approximately the past 10,00011,000 years. 40 2 Further, the changes in the ocean current circulation hypothesis have not always received the strongest support. 403
One of the best connections between past abrupt climate
change (non-anthropogenic) triggers and possible future abrupt
climate change (anthropogenic) triggers is based on changes in
ocean current circulation and the resultant ability of the ocean to
act as a sink for atmospheric carbon dioxide. When the ocean acts
as a sink, it is engaging in carbon uptake of anthropogenic CO 2.
We investigated a potentially important positive feedback
loop that involves atmospheric C0 2 , global warming, the
hydrological cycle, ocean circulation, and the marine carbon cycle in a world of continued carbon emissions. Rising
atmospheric CO 2 leads to increased radiative forcing, resulting in higher sea-surface temperatures (SSTs) and a
stronger hydrological cycle that may reduce sea surface salinity at high latitudes. These changes may induce a reorganization of the thermohaline circulation (THC) and a
collapse of the North Atlantic Deep Water (NADW) formation, a reorganization of the marine carbon cycle, and
a reduction in the surface-to-deep transport of anthropogenic carbon. The resulting reduction in oceanic carbon
rupt Climate Change, 304 Sci. 1919 (2004) (discussing past rapid and dramatic
changes of climate).
400. See Stott et al., supra note 397, at 2136 (discussing uncertainty of future
climate changes).
401. See J. C. Stager & P. A. Mayewski, Abrupt Early to Mid-Holocene Climatic
TransitionRegistered at the Equator and the Poles, 276 Sci. 1834, 1836 (1997) (examining timing of halocene reorganization); see also F. S. Hu et al., Abrupt Changes in
North American Climate During Early Holocene Times, 400 NATURE 437, 439 (1999)
(discussing abrupt climate change based on sediments in Minnesota Deep Lake);
Lyncy-Stieglitz, supra note 395, at 1919 (stating rapid climate change occurred in
past).
402. See Overpeck, supra note 386, at 1820 (detailing returned attention to
changes during Holcene).
403. See Crowley, supra note 392, at 275 (suggesting thermoalic arculation
changes play secondary role to climate changes).
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uptake may in turn accelerate the atmospheric
growth 404

CO 2

This investigation is a valuable extension of work carried out at an
earlier time. The reorganization of the THC and consequent reduction of surface-to-deep-ocean transport of anthropogenic carpointed to
bon is a human-induced modification of the process
40 5
several decades ago by Broecker and Takahashi.
Though an oversimplification of the relationship, there is at
least one association between the ocean surface temperature and
the concentration of atmospheric CO 2 exists. Historically, an increasingly warm ocean may have been less able to absorb carbon
dioxide, thus increasing the greenhouse effect. The enhanced
40 6
greenhouse effect occasionally brought rapid climate change.
Different candidate triggers, possibly producing the perturbation in the climate system necessary to rapidly move the system past
a certain threshold and into a different state, brought about the
confirmed record of past abrupt climate change. Members of the
scientific community voiced concern that the anthropogenic production of GHGs may provide a similar perturbation (an external
forcing), producing a similar rapid switch of the climate system into
a new state. 4 °17 This concern has evoked the question of how likely

a perturbation and subsequent switch of the system into a new state
or equilibrium will occur in the future.
Climate change skeptics expressed criticism toward the reliance on General Circulation Models (GCMs) to gain greater predictive ability. 40 8

Other climate scientists have argued that the

404. See Fortunat Joos et al., Global Warming and Marine Carbon Feedbacks on
FutureAtmospheric C02, 284 Sci. 464 (1999) (citations omitted) (emphasis added)
(discussing global warming simulations that show weakening of North Atlantic
THC circulation).
405. See Broecker et al., supra note 395, at 23 (citations omitted) (explaining
that an earlier paper used several-fold higher rate of transfer between cold and
warm water spheres to explain lower CO 2 during glacial time period).
406. See Alley et al., supra note 386, at 2009 (stating that data indicates dramatic climate changes occurred often in past). "Although the largest effects were
centered on land-surface moisture and high latitude temperatures, the climatic
effects were global." Id.
407. See Broecker, supra note 393, at 1587 (explaining concern of abrupt climate change); see also Clark et al., supra note 396, at 863 (theorizing increasing
CO 2 levels could trigger abrupt change in earth's climate).
408. For a discussion of the criticism toward reliance on GCMs, see supra note
106 and accompanying text. "Even if we are not right... the failure of models to
simulate observations makes it even less likely that models are a reliable tool for
predicting climate." Id. This comment by Lindzen has been weakened by a recent
paper which shows that current model refinements have allowed the models to
capture an increasing concentration of water vapor in the upper troposphere.
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models need not be abandoned, only improved. 40 9 The latter climate scientists called for the kind of work that appears to be occurring currently. Scientists have recently conducted investigations of
abrupt (sub-decadal) climate change coupled with GCMs executing
4 10
simulations, both with and without external forcing.
At least some of these models appear to have achieved a measure of success. One participant in the paleoclimatology enterprise
has expressed confidence that "improved models evaluated against
expanded high-fidelity paleoclimate databases are on the horizon,
and should be adequate to support policy decisions concerning the
reduction of fossil-fuel CO 2 emissions."' 4 11 If the findings of these

improved models prove able to replicate the actual results from a
large series of GCM simulations, certain national policy modifications may be necessary.
The policy modifications should be driven by a sense of urgency. There is a lack of certainty that abrupt climate change
brought about by an anthropogenic activity is any more likely than
abrupt climate change generated through multiple potential internal forcings. Because of the possible harms abrupt climate change
may bring to particular regions and possibly to the globe, this Article suggests a more expeditious United States public policy stance
regarding climate change.
Given the recent evidence from the paleoclimatic record, the
likelihood of future abrupt climate change is high. It is not currently possible to predict how soon abrupt change will occur or how
imminent such change might be. 4 12 Given some likelihood that climate change could be abrupt rather than gradual and could occur
This increased concentration is termed a "moistening" effect. See BrianJ. Soden et
al., The Radiative Signature of Upper Tropospheric Moistening, 310 Sci. 841-44 (2005)

(examining the connection of water vapor to climate changes).
409. See Overpeck, supra note 386, at 1821 (discussing expanding testing of
predictive models). Overpeck notes: "If the climate system turns out to be highly
sensitive to elevated atmosphere trace gas concentrations, then we may be confronted with modes of climate variability without precedent. This possibility further highlights the need to expand our testing of predictive models against the
varied patterns of significant paleoenvironmental change." Id.
410. See Alex Hall & Ronald J. Stouffer, An Abrupt Climate Event in a Coupled
Ocean-Atmosphere Simulation Without External Forcing, 409 NATURE 171, 174 (2001)

(discussing use of coupled ocean-atmosphere model); see also Stott et. al., supra
note 397, at 2136 (detailing simulated change in ocean surface temperatures).
411. See Lee R. Kump, Reducing Uncertainty About Carbon Dioxide as a Climate
Driver,419 NATURE 188, 190 (2002) available at http://www.nature.com/nature/

journal/v419/n6903/full/nature01087.html (last visited Oct. 20 2007) (explaining improvement in indicator technology).
412. See Overpeck, supra note 386, at 1820 (noting that goal of research is to
improve predictive capacity).
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in the near term rather than in the distant term, it might seem wise
to pose some alteration in the current United States climate change
posture. As the current administration relies on adaptation to address the consequences of climate change, foregoing a greater emphasis on mitigation (reducing GHG emissions), the need for
4 13
policy alteration is particularly evident.
The Final Climate Change Science Program Strategic Plan recognizes the need to address mitigation. The Plan questions what
future projections can be made about the effectiveness and cost of
alternative energy and mitigation technologies, including possible
sequestration options. 4 14 The response to the posed question
should be an effort to develop assessment models better able to
analyze the social and economic effects of efforts to reduce green415
house gas emissions.
The response is meant to help answer the larger question of
how to evaluate the primary human drivers of global environmental
(climatic) change. 4 16 An equally large question posed is "what factors influence the capacity of human societies to respond to
change, and how resilience can be increased and vulnerability reduced?" 417 The response provided in the Strategic Plan is, in part,
to give attention to "the associated costs and benefits of adaptation
strategies, [and] strategies for mitigating the impacts of global
change on different economic sectors and people in different loca413. See generally Gamble & Simpson, supranote 212 (discussing United States
administration reliance on adaptation to consequences of climate change). This
chapter is the preeminent statement in the current administration's Strategic Plan
on how anthropogenic activity may be contributing to climate change, and in the
administration's view, what the appropriate response to climate change ought to
be (regardless of the origins of climate change). There is some attention given to
mitigation (in reducing GHG emissions) in the chapter, but it is certainly not expansive; for example, "Evaluations will be developed of the economic opportunities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or increase sequestration in the
agriculture and forestry sectors." Id. at 95. A much more extensive discussion of
adaptation is contained in the chapter, of which the following statement is
illustrative:
[L]ittle is known about the effectiveness of applying adaptation experiences with past and current climate variability and extreme events to the
realm of climate change adaptation, nor about how this information
could be used to improve estimates of the feasibility, effectiveness, and
costs and benefits of adaptation to long-term change.
Id. at 95.
414. See id. at 94 (specifying questions still remaining in realm of technological change).
415. See id. at 95 (identifying key research needs).
416. See id. at 93 (summarizing major questions on global change).
417. See id. at 95 (summarizing another question regarding human change).
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tions and economic brackets .. ,,418 Here, mitigation means the
amelioration of the consequences of climate change, rather than a
reduction of the sources of climate change.
It is important that human vulnerabilities to climate change be
reduced. The positioning of research priorities (GHG reduction
against a reduced human vulnerability to climate change) in this
section of the revised Strategic Plan gives one pause in grasping
where the greater emphasis resides. This Article argues that an
equivalent emphasis on both GHG reduction (mitigation) and adaptation is insufficient and ill-advised; a greater emphasis must be
placed on mitigation.
Adaptation measures require some minimum time frame for
implementation. The parameters of these time frames will vary
with the pains taken and expenditures put forward by the current
administration. The receptiveness of states asked to embrace adaptation measures and their implementation is central to the success
of an adaptive policy. 4 19 The consequences of climate change, either gradual or abrupt, need not be catastrophic. Abrupt climate
change, if it were to occur, would shorten the time frames necessary
for the implementation of adaptive measures. The magnitude of
certain consequences from gradual or abrupt climate change could
ultimately be comparable, such as a two-foot rise in sea level. Because abrupt climate change compresses societal response time,
however, the consequences of a two-foot rise in sea level would be
more harmful.
Some commentators believe the precautionary principle has
not reached the level of a peremptory norm, a norm "from which
no derogation is permitted. '4 20 This may indeed be the
418. See Overpeck, supra note 386, at 1820 (articulating where analysis should
be focused).
419. See Gamble & Simpson, supra note 212, at 96 (determining that embracing and implementing adaptation measures is essential). The (revised) FINAL
PLAN comments: "Much of this research will need to be place-based
analysis at regional and local scales in order to capture the complexities of the
human-environment interface and the adaptive strategies of individuals, industries,
STRATEGIC

institutions, and communities .

. .

. " Id.

420. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M.
679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (defining peremptory norm). The full article, "Treaties
Conflicting With A Peremptory Norm Of General International Law," (Jus Cogens)
states:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present
Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can
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case. 42 1 If this is true, the United States faces no international restraints against, or reprobation for, its decision to employ a weak,
utilitarian, and pedestrian restatement of the principle. In the case
of climate change, however, accepting the risks of such a restatement of the precautionary principle may be unwise.
Other observers have opined that the precautionary principle
has achieved a status of a norm in international law, if not yet a
peremptory norm.4 22 This view on the precautionary concept "rejects a policy based on the assumptions that science can accurately
determine the assimilative capacity of the environment and that,
once determined, sufficient time for preventive action will remain. '' 42 3 By failing to employ a robust version of the precautionary
principle, the United States may be accepting a large risk at the
global community's peril.
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.
See id.

421. See Hickey & Walker, supra note 273, at 432 (determining peremptory
norm may not have been reached). "No uniformity exists regarding the definition
of the term 'precautionary principle' or regarding when and how the principle
should be applied." Id.
422. See Phillipe Sands, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: FRAMEWORKS,
STANDARDS AND IMPLEMENTATION 212-13 (1995) (indicating precautionary principle is international norm). "This level of academic support, coupled with recent
State practice and ICJ commentary, would appear to conclusively endorse the principle's status as a norm of customary international law." Id.
423. See Ellen Hey, The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and Law:
InstitutionalizingCaution,4 GEO. INT'L. ENVTL. L. Rrv. 303, 305 (1992) cited in Gregory D. Fullem, Comment, The PrecautionaryPrinciple: Environmental Protection in the
Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 495, 498 n.13 (1995) (stating
policy rejected by precautionary concept).
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